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Introduction 
 
 
1. Subject matter and main theses 
The public debates surrounding the 2003 Iraq War were not only debates about 
the questionable legitimacy of the war itself, but just as much about the role of 
international law and international institutions. While the Bush government and 
its supporters considered unilateral military action for the sake of international 
security and alleged universal values to be justified, critics of the war frequently 
argued that commitment to UN multilateralism and adherence to the text of the UN 
Charter were essential for just international conduct. Central among the former 
were neoconservative ideologues who, combining want of moral clarity with a self-
professed acute sense for political realities, dismissed the UN as an ineffective 
organization of dubious legitimacy.1 Attempts at ascribing any basic normative 
significance to international law and multilateral institutions were rejected as the 
delusional utopianism of weak states dreaming of a Kantian paradise of perpetual 
peace and wanting to curtail American power by subtle and indirect means.2 
Seeing the world organization as morally tainted by its inclusion of authoritarian 
and non-liberal states among its members and as incapable of acting on whatever 
good intentions it might have, neoconservatives instead put their trust in US 
power. Although fundamental interests and ideals could sometimes be effectively 
promoted via multilateral paths as well, they generally considered the US to be the 
more reliable defender of such interests and ideals. In their view, the choice 
between unilateralism and multilateralism was ultimately a matter of weighing 
                                                          
1  See Boot 2004 and Murray 2006. Even after his halfhearted distancing from the 
neoconservative movement, Francis Fukuyama characterizes the UN as “a huge distraction.” 
See Fukuyama 2006, p. 156. 
2  Kagan 2003. 
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costs against benefits on a case-by-case basis, and US decision-makers should not 
hesitate to employ military force unilaterally in view of UN failure. 
 In this dissertation, I argue in favor of the other side in the debate about the 
role of international law and institutions by defending a Kantian alternative to this 
neoconservative vision of a hegemonic world order based on the unrivalled 
military power of the US. Thereby, I do not deny that fair criticism can be raised 
against the UN in its present state. On the contrary, I believe many of the proposals 
for reform of the UN that have been on the table for some time now can be 
supported by good reasons.3 In the following, I will nevertheless defend the thesis 
that co-operation within the framework of inclusive intergovernmental 
institutions like the UN is a necessary condition for justice among states and not 
just one option normatively on a par with other options. If states do not commit 
themselves to such co-operation, I argue, there can be no justice among states. As a 
point of departure, I take an idea congenial to Kant’s philosophy of right: the idea 
that an order of public right establishing conditions for rightful exercise of freedom 
cannot be limited to the domestic sphere, but must extend beyond the territorial 
borders of states. Although I will not spend much more space discussing 
neoconservative thinking, I believe a strong case can be made, by exploring the 
normative foundations and implications of Kant’s idea, against the belief that the 
US (or any other major power) is an exceptional nation entitled to employ its 
supreme power for alleged moral purposes. 
According to Kant, the idea of a comprehensive legal order that extends 
beyond the domestic realm brings with it two additional forms or dimensions of 
public right, thus leaving us with a differentiation between three equally important 
and mutually dependent dimensions of right: the right of a state, which concerns 
the internal affairs of each state; the right of nations, which concerns relations 
between states; and cosmopolitan right, which concerns relations between states 
and strangers.4 Although I comment on the last dimension at certain points in this 
text, my primary focus is on the first two dimensions. The principal objectives are 
to defend and clarify the thesis that subjection to public authority is constitutive of 
justice not only in the relations between persons, but also in the relations between 
states. These objectives are pursued in part as an attempt to dissolve what has 
                                                          
3  See the 2004 report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Chance: A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, http://www.un.org/secureworld/. 
4  See Kant 1996a [1797], 6:311 and 1996d [1795], 8:350. 
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often been considered irresolvable conceptual tensions internal to Kant’s theory 
and in part as a critique of some of its theoretical adversaries. 
One central conceptual issue concerns the coherence of establishing an 
international civil condition without an international public authority vested with 
coercive power. According to many Kant scholars, international norms could only 
acquire the quality of being legally binding if there were an international 
enforcement mechanism in place. This view is here rejected. Another important 
conceptual issue concerns the apparent conflict between the normative 
individualism at the heart of Kant’s philosophy of right and the defense of state 
sovereignty implied in his advocacy of a league of states. Contrary to a widely held 
view, I argue that respect for individual freedom and respect for the equal 
sovereignty of states go well together. As regards theoretical adversaries, I take 
issue with Carl Schmitt’s realist critique of the 20th century efforts at prohibiting 
aggressive war which implicitly is a critique of Kant’s project for perpetual peace. I 
also take issue with a certain kind of cosmopolitan thought that stresses global 
protection of human rights without acknowledging the fundamental normative 
importance of state sovereignty. Finally, I critically discuss Jürgen Habermas’ 
attempt at reconstructing Kant’s idea in view of contemporary political challenges. 
This reconstruction I understand less as a competing project than as a dispute 
among theoretical consociates. 
This is not a dissertation which primarily seeks to defend a specific 
interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of right, but a dissertation in which Kant’s 
philosophy of right plays an important argumentative role. Rather than adding 
another work to the abounding secondary literature on Kant, the primary issue is 
to systematically reconstruct Kant’s arguments with a view to their soundness and 
relevance to the situation today. Accordingly, I have not tried to give a 
comprehensive account of Kant’s philosophy of right. Since my main interest is not 
exegetical in nature, there are many aspects of it that I have omitted to comment 
on. By this, I do not imply that interpretative issues are unimportant, or that I have 
not tried to do justice to the relevant texts. To argue with Kant is also to interpret 
Kant, and I would not have given Kant such a prominent place in the argument if I 
did not think the interpretation on which I rely was sound. In the following, I will 
therefore present some preliminary thoughts on interpretative issues of relevance 
to major themes in the present work. 
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2. Kant’s justification of the state 
One interpretative issue which is in several respects important for my overall 
argument concerns Kant’s justification of the state. In accordance with the 
standard argumentative scheme of the modern social contract tradition, Kant 
approaches this issue by founding the state on a contract that marks the 
demarcation line between a hypothetical state of nature and a civil condition. As in 
all former contract theories, the point of employing this argumentative scheme is 
to show why the state is a rational construct, or why we need the state: Taking the 
idea of a state of nature as a starting point, he argues that this is a problematic or 
defective condition precisely because it lacks a state authority, and therefore 
concludes that one should enter civil society, of which the state is constitutive.  
 In the secondary literature, one can find competing accounts of what Kant 
sees as the fundamental defect of the state of nature and what corresponding 
function he ascribes to the state. According to a common line of interpretation, the 
core of the problem is the imperfection of human nature. What makes the state of 
nature a defective condition requiring us to enter civil society is human beings’ 
general lack of moral virtue: bias, malevolence, resentment, weakness of will, etc. 
Accordingly, the primary function of the state is to keep human wickedness in 
check by coercive means. Bringing about institutions that enforce justice is 
necessary in order to counteract our corrupt nature and to provide incentives for 
doing what is right. One example of such a reading is Sharon Byrd and Joachim 
Hruschka’s recent commentary on Kant’s Doctrine of Right. In their view, the need 
to proceed from the state of nature to civil society is based on a “presumption of 
badness:” “When opportunity presents itself, the human being will deviate from 
the moral law. … Presuming others are evil, we can further assume that others 
might attack us in the state of nature.” And for this reason, we need to “mutually 
guarantee security through a certain act. This act is entering the juridical state.”5 
Another example is Howard Williams Kant’s Critique of Hobbes, where Kant is said 
to consider the restraints of civil society necessary because “as … phenomenal 
beings we need to be reminded by a physical incentive that we should obey the 
law.”6 Similarly, Onora O’Neill writes that since “human beings are not always well 
                                                          
5  Byrd and Hruschka 2010, pp. 192-3. 
6  Williams 2003, pp. 82-3. 
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disposed towards one another, justice requires enforcing institutions which 
unavoidably curtail external freedom.”7 
 In contrast to such an anthropological grounding of the state, I have based 
central arguments in this dissertation on an interpretation that brackets 
assumptions about human nature and instead focuses on structural defects which 
make the state of nature a condition incompatible with justice, conceived as each 
person’s right not to be subjected to anyone’s arbitrary choice. On this 
interpretation, the fundamental problem is that the absence of a public authority 
which makes, applies, and enforces positive laws would make interacting persons 
systematically dependent on rather than mutually independent from each other’s 
arbitrariness. And due to this structural problem caused by the lack of a higher 
third position, the state can be seen as a necessary institutional framework for just 
interaction among persons, which is why one has to subject oneself “to a public 
lawful external coercion” unless one “wants to renounce any concepts of right.”8 
Irrespective of whether interacting persons are moral virtuosos or wickedness 
incarnate, the right kind of relations between them are impossible to establish in 
the state of nature, because in the state of nature we unavoidably subject each 
other to arbitrary choice whenever there is a conflict over rights. The purpose of 
the state is to provide a public institutional framework that allows for resolution of 
rights conflicts without such subjection. 
If this latter reading is sound, Kant’s justification of the state provides a 
non-consensual and non-instrumentalist account of legitimate political authority, 
where legitimate political authority is understood as: (a) the right to impose 
obligations on those subject to the authority and (b) the right to coerce those 
subject to the authority if they do not comply voluntarily with the authority’s 
commands.9 In contrast to consent theorists, Kant does not recognize any natural 
                                                          
7  O’Neill 2000, p. 139. I owe this reference to Varden 2008b, where several other works 
defending this line of interpretation are listed. See Varden 2008b, pp. 30-1, footnotes 9 and 10. 
8  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:312. 
9  With A. John Simmons I take the legitimacy of a political authority or state to be its right “to be 
the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these 
duties and to use coercion to enforce the duties.” See Simmons 2001, p. 130. Simmons 
distinguishes between legitimizing the state and justifying the state, where the latter amounts 
to “showing that some realizable type of state ... is rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate 
alternatives.” Ibid., p. 126. Defending a Lockean consent theory of state legitimacy, he criticizes 
Kant for unsuccessfully trying to legitimate states by justifying them. The problem is that Kant 
allegedly does not sufficiently explain why we cannot discharge our duties of justice by 
supporting just arrangements without “binding ourselves to one of them.” Ibid., p. 153. If I am 
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right to be unbound by political authority. The normative starting point for his 
theory is instead an innate right to freedom, which can only be rightfully 
determined and guaranteed in civil society. And since entering civil society 
requires the establishment of a coercive public authority, subjection to such an 
authority is an enforceable right and duty. Neither actual nor hypothetical consent 
play any role in the argument.10 In contrast to instrumentalist accounts, such as 
Joseph Raz’s, Kant does not construe coercive public institutions simply as means 
of achieving morally important ends that could be clarified in a fully determinate 
way even if such institutions were not present. According to Raz, political authority 
is legitimate when it can be shown that we generally will do better in acting on 
reasons that apply to us independently of the authority by following its directives 
and prescriptions instead of scrutinizing these reasons directly.11 The idea here 
seems to be the following: Although we can specify sufficiently what we owe to 
others without the help of a political authority, having a political authority is still of 
great value since it can make us better capable of complying with our obligations 
vis-à-vis others. And to the extent that we generally will do better at complying 
with our moral obligations by following the commands of an authority we also 
ought to do so. On the interpretation of Kant that I defend, however, an important 
part of the problem that makes political authority necessary is precisely that no 
fully determinate answer to the question of what we owe to others can be given 
prior to civil society. This is so, not only because the idea of an innate right to 
freedom is indeterminate with regard to what our specific obligations are, but also, 
and crucially, because it is not possible to overcome this indeterminacy in a way 
compatible with the right to freedom before public institutions are in place. For 
this reason, political authority is not just an effective means of establishing justice, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
not mistaken, this critique rests on the assumptions that our duties of justice essentially 
consist in the advancement of certain goods, such as welfare and security, and that these 
duties can be discharged individually by moral conduct. On the account given here, however, 
Kant’s argument is not directed at what goods can or cannot be provided, but at the form of 
the relationship between interacting persons in the state of nature. The problem is not that 
people cannot act benevolently without subjecting themselves to a public authority, but that 
even the most benevolent acts of any person are arbitrary from the perspective of everyone 
else. 
10  This is of course not to say that consent never plays an important normative role. In most 
private transactions, it does. Yet consent is not necessary for the legitimacy of a state. It should 
also be noted that the two types of interpretation described above do not seem to differ when 
it comes to rejection of consent theory. However, those who emphasize human beings’ lack of 
virtue do seem to come close to an instrumentalist view. 
11  See Raz 1986, p. 53. 
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but an enabling condition for rightful or just interaction. Relying on work by 
Arthur Ripstein and Helga Varden,12 I present this line of interpretation in more 
detail in the third section of chapter 1. In chapter 3, the idea of the state as an 
enabling condition for justice among persons is central in defending the thesis that 
respect for individual freedom requires respect for state sovereignty in the 
international realm. 
I support this reading of Kant mainly because I believe it is the one that 
makes most sense in view of textual evidence. It is of course undeniable that there 
are frequent referrals to human corruption in both Toward Perpetual Peace and 
the Doctrine of Right,13 which are the two most relevant texts in this connection. 
Yet, in view of Kant’s characterization of the Doctrine of Right as a doctrine “within 
the limits of reason alone”14 and his programmatic denial that it, as part of a 
metaphysics of morals, can be “based upon anthropology,”15 I find it unlikely that 
these referrals play any systematic role in his argument. They could do so 
consistently only if moral baseness were an a priori feature of human nature. 
Generally, however, Kant links human depravity to experience, 16 which in turn 
                                                          
12  See, in particular, Ripstein 2004 and 2009, and Varden 2008a and 2008b. A similar reading is 
defended by Eberl and Niesen 2011, pp. 134-7 and Hodgson 2010b. Although they share the 
same basic perspective, these works also differ in their accounts of the structural defects of the 
state of nature. Ripstein 2009 distinguishes between three distinct defects: the problem of 
unilateral choice, which concerns first acquisition; the problem of assurance, which concerns 
rightful enforcement of rights; and the problem of indeterminacy, which concerns application 
of general rules to particulars. Hodgson 2010b, Varden 2008a and 2008b, and Ripstein 2004 
all seem to treat the first and third of these under the same heading, leaving them with two 
defects: the problem of assurance and the problem of indeterminacy. Finally, Eberl and Niesen 
reduce all the problems to one fundamental problem: epistemic uncertainty, which they seem 
to identify with what Ripstein calls the problem of indeterminacy. They do not, however, 
explain in what specific way epistemic uncertainty or indeterminacy is the more fundamental 
problem, i.e., in what way the other two problems can be subsumed under it. 
13  See, for instance, Kant 1996d [1795], 8:345 and 8:355; 1996a [1797], 6:307 and 6:312. 
14  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:355. 
15  Ibid., 6:217. 
16  In this connection, the opening lines of §44 in the Doctrine of Right are central. Unfortunately, 
their meaning is distorted in Mary Gregor’s translation. The German original reads: “Es ist 
nicht etwa die Erfahrung, durch die wir von der Maxime der Gewalttätigkeit der Menschen 
belehrt werden, und ihrer Bösartigkeit, sich, ehe eine äuβere machthabende Gesetzgebung 
erscheint, einander zu befehden, also nicht etwa ein Faktum, welches den öffentlich 
gesetzlichen Zwang notwendig macht.“ See Kant 1977 [1797], p. 430. In the English version, 
the connection between experience and human malevolence is precisely the opposite due to a 
missing comma after the fourth word: “It is not experience from which we learn of the maxim 
of violence in human beings and of their malevolent tendency to attack one another before 
16 
 
seems to imply that the bellicose and violent inclinations of human beings are 
thought of as contingent, and therefore changeable factors. 
Moreover, he also emphasizes that it is “not experience” or “some fact that 
makes coercion through public law necessary,” that the state of nature is a 
defective condition “however well disposed and law-abiding men might be,” and 
that even if “the state of nature need not … be a state of injustice (iniustus), of 
dealing with one another only in terms of the degree of force each has,” it “would 
still be a state devoid of justice (status iustitia vacuus), in which when rights are in 
dispute (ius controversum), there would be no judge competent to render a verdict 
having rightful force.”17 As far as I can see, Kant here unequivocally denies that the 
necessity of subjecting to public lawful coercion is premised on some regrettable 
fact about human nature. What he appears to say, is that the transition from the 
state of nature to civil society is necessary even under counterfactual ideal 
conditions where everyone is well-disposed toward each other, because structural 
features of the state of nature prevent any impartial solution to rights conflicts 
before such a transition has taken place. Accordingly, I do not think one should 
emphasize anthropological pessimism when reconstructing Kant’s argument for 
the need to exit the state of nature. Instead, the emphasis should be on the terms of 
interaction in the state of nature. These terms leave persons with no other option 
than to act on the basis of their unilateral judgment and (if necessary) their own 
reservoir of force. They are therefore in conflict with each person’s innate right to 
freedom. Correspondingly, Kant elsewhere characterizes the state of nature as “a 
condition of war,” not because “actual hostilities are the rule between human 
beings who do not stand under external public laws,” but because “the relationship 
in and through which they are capable of rights ... is ... one in which each of them 
wants to be himself the judge of what is his right vis-à-vis others, without however 
either having any security from others with respect to this right or offering them 
any.”18 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
external legislation endowed with power appears, thus it is not some deed that makes 
coercion through public law necessary.” See Kant 1996a [1797], 6:312. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Kant 1996c [1793], 6:97. 
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3. Implications for the differentiation between morality and law 
Reading Kant in this way is of consequence to the differentiation between morality 
and law, or ethics and right. If the state of nature is a condition devoid of justice no 
matter how virtuous people are, then legal norms cannot be understood as a 
subset of moral norms. If they could be so understood, it does not seem that 
subjection to public authority would be strictly necessary for enabling just 
interaction among persons. There could of course be weighty prudential reasons 
for doing so, but to the extent that legality forms a mere part of morality, moral 
reflection and perfection of humanity’s moral faculties in principle seems to be 
enough. As reconstructed here, however, Kant’s argument is precisely that justice 
is not something which simply is discovered by moral reflection, but something 
which must be established by public legislative, adjudicative and coercive 
institutions. Accordingly, I think it is incorrect to say that Kant’s philosophy of right 
“is guided by the Platonic intuition that the legal order imitates the noumenal 
order of a ‘kingdom of ends’ and at the same time embodies it in the phenomenal 
world.”19 As far as I can see, its architectonic structure is similar to the 
architectonic structure of Habermas’ discourse theory of law and democracy, 
where the relation between morality and law is presented as one of 
complementarity rather than as one of hierarchy and subordination. 
 While it is true that juridical laws form a subcategory of “moral laws” in the 
introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, it is a mistake to conclude on this basis 
that the concept of right is therefore derived from the basic concept of the moral 
law, understood as a law that determines a free will. As Ingeborg Maus has pointed 
out, in this work “moral” does not denote morality (Moralität) as opposed to 
legality (Legalität). Instead, “moral laws” is a generic term that refers to all “laws of 
freedom” – the subject of practical philosophy – which are contrasted to causal 
“laws of nature” – the subject of theoretical philosophy.20 With regard to the 
distinction between ethics and right, the term is still undifferentiated. Moral laws 
are all those laws that can be universalized, irrespective of their status as ethical or 
juridical laws. Only in the next step, when distinguishing between internal and 
external freedom, is this further distinction introduced. This seems to correspond 
very well with Habermas’ proposal that moral norms and legal norms branch out 
                                                          
19  Habermas 1996, p. 106. 
20  Maus 2002, p. 108; Kant 1996a [1797], 6:214. 
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coevally from a “parsimonious discourse principle” that articulates the conditions 
for the validity of norms in general.21 
 In both Kant and Habermas, the non-hierarchical differentiation of morality 
and law is, among other things, motivated by concerns related to the coercive 
aspect of positive law. In contrast to ethics, positive law or “right rests ... on the 
principle of its being possible to use external constraint that can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with universal laws.”22 This conceptual link 
between right and coercion causes morality and law to split up inasmuch as the 
latter must be restricted to the requirement of norm-compliance in external 
behavior, whereas the requirement of compliance for the right reasons belongs to 
the former. As I point out in the second section of chapter 1, there are both 
normative and conceptual reasons for such a split between morality and positive 
law. 
Yet this split does not in itself explain sufficiently why moral and legal 
norms should not be differentiated hierarchically. In so far as positive law merely 
brackets what is implied in morality it might seem that legal norms are indeed a 
subset of moral norms, or that the concept of right is derived from “the basic 
concept of the moral law ... by way of limitation.”23 Just as important as the 
restriction of positive law to external relations is therefore a concern with the 
possibility of what Peter Niesen has called “moralist abuse” in the coercive 
sanctioning of norm-deviant behavior.24 
A danger inherent in a hierarchical model that subordinates law to morality 
is self-empowerment by would-be enforcers of justice. If the sphere of legitimate 
coercion is understood simply as a subdivision of morality those sufficiently 
powerful might think themselves justified in applying force against perceived 
injustice on the basis of their own moral argument. Such justificatory strategies, 
aiming at a one-sided application of force in the name of justice are supposed to be 
closed off by the non-hierarchical differentiation of morality and law. By 
acknowledging the autonomy of positive law from morality, moral arguments for 
the use of force are bound to public legal procedures whereas moral arguments 
                                                          
21  Habermas 1996, p. 107. 
22  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:232. 
23  Habermas 1996, p. 105. 
24  Niesen 2011, pp. 129-31. 
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aiming at extra-legal enforcement practices are ruled out.25 As Niesen puts it: 
“Moral arguments for the use of force should ... not be interpreted as complete or 
self-sufficient. In order to immunize them from moralist abuse, they should be 
understood elliptically: not as demanding sanctions, but as demanding the 
establishment of a legal framework on the basis of which sanctions may be 
administered.”26 
 
 
4. Relevance for external relations between states 
Reconstructing Kant’s justification of the state in the way outlined in section 2 
above also provides support for many of the theses defended in this dissertation. 
Importantly, a parallel argument can be given in favor of the thesis that subjection 
to an international public authority is constitutive of justice among states, because 
some of the considerations that apply to interacting persons also apply to 
interacting states. Qua enabling condition for just interaction among persons, a 
state is what Kant calls a “moral person” having a right to freedom or 
independence from subjection to other states’ arbitrary choice.27 At the same time, 
as in interpersonal relations, conflicts over rights can obviously arise in 
international relations as well. And as long as there is not established a higher 
third position via public institutions states have no other option than to act as 
judges in their own cases whenever such conflicts arise. In other words, in the 
absence of an international public authority there can be no solution to conflicts 
over rights consistent with each state’s right to freedom. The international state of 
nature is therefore structurally defective in a way similar to the interpersonal state 
of nature. It is a condition in which states are systematically dependent on, rather 
                                                          
25  On Kant’s conception of right, the idea of unilateral enforcement of justice is strictly speaking 
nonsensical, because unilateral enforcement implies coercion on the basis of arbitrary choice, 
irrespective of the enforcer’s good or bad intentions. This is part of the reason why a transition 
from the state of nature to the civil condition is necessary. Inasmuch as all employment of 
force is unilateral in the state of nature, there can be no coexistence of coercion and freedom in 
accordance with universal laws in this condition. 
26  Niesen 2011, p. 131. This concern with self-empowerment is not only central to the analysis 
which on the present interpretation makes the transition from the state of nature to the civil 
condition necessary, but is also reflected in the institutional structures of the public 
authorities constitutive of justice at the respective levels. For a good account emphasizing the 
latter aspect, see Eberl 2008, pp. 183-262. 
27  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:344; Kant 1996a [1797], 6:643. 
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than mutually independent from each other’s arbitrariness. Hence, they too ought 
to enter a civil condition by subjecting to an international public authority. 
I believe this point is illustrated well by §56 in Kant’s Doctrine of Right, a 
paragraph which at first sight might seem like a revocation of the critique launched 
against the just war tradition in Toward Perpetual Peace. In the latter work, Kant 
rejects the alleged right to wage war for moral purposes defended by just war 
theorists as “strictly speaking, unintelligible (since it is supposed to be a right to 
determine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting the freedom 
of each but by unilateral maxims through force).”28 And a few pages earlier, Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and Emer de Vattel, all natural law theorists in the just 
war tradition, are sarcastically dubbed as “sorry comforters” who are frequently 
cited in order to justify military aggression, “though there is no instance of a state 
ever having been moved to desist from its plan by arguments armed with the 
testimony of such important men.”29 While these quotes fit nicely with the motif of 
opposing unilateral use of force, the picture is seemingly complicated by the 
opening lines of §56 in the Doctrine of Right: 
In the state of nature among states, the right to go to war (to engage in hostilities) 
is the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute its right against another 
state, namely by its own force, when it believes it has been wronged by the other 
state; for this cannot be done in the state of nature by a lawsuit (the only means 
by which disputes are settled in a rightful condition).30 
Inasmuch as Kant here recognizes a right to go to war, one might think he takes a 
more accommodating position toward just war theory than he did in the work 
published two years earlier. Recently, commentators have also tried to depict Kant 
as a just war theorist on the basis of the quoted passage.31 Contrary to this, I do not 
think §56 represents any kind of reorientation with regard to the just war tradition 
on Kant’s part. In line with Oliver Eberl and Peter Niesen, I believe its main 
purpose is to demonstrate how far-reaching and potentially unlimited just causes 
for war are in the international state of nature, and thus implicitly to substantiate 
the claim that states have a duty to enter an international civil condition.32  
                                                          
28  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:356-7. 
29  Ibid., 8:355. 
30  Kant 1996a [1797], 6: 346. 
31  See, in particular, Orend 2000, pp. 41-60. Shell 2005 seems to affirm Orend’s thesis. 
32  Eberl and Niesen 2001, pp. 151-55. Note that the right to go to war is a right in the state of 
nature, and not part of international public right. Hence, there is no conflict between what 
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Consider first that, according to the above quote, it is a sufficient 
justification for engaging in hostilities that a state believes itself to be wronged by 
the acts of another state. This is a consequence of being in a state of nature where 
everyone is judge in their own case. Consider next the relevant wrongs 
subsequently listed by Kant. In addition to “active violations” or “first aggression,” 
he also counts threats, which include both preparations for war and “the menacing 
increase in another state’s power.”33 Accordingly, from the right to prosecute one’s 
rights by means of war there follows not only a right to fight defensive war, but 
also rights to preventive attack and to wage war for the purpose of restoring a 
balance of power. In sum, this leaves few practical limits on a state’s right to go to 
war. In the state of nature, there is a wide range of justifications available for going 
to war and each state is entitled to decide when there is sufficient reason for taking 
up arms against another state. As long as a justification referring to an alleged 
violation or threat can be presented, a state is permitted to use force in the defense 
of its own claimed rights because this is the only possible procedure in absence of 
an international public authority. Hence, the unspoken message seems to be what 
Kant says explicitly elsewhere, using the same terminology as in the case of the 
state of nature among persons: that states in the state of nature are in “a condition 
of war (of the right of the stronger), even if it is not a condition of actual war and 
actual attacks being constantly made,” that “this condition is in itself ... wrong in 
the highest degree,” and that “states neighboring upon one another are under 
obligation to leave it.”34 
Despite the explicit parallels Kant draws between the interpersonal and the 
international state of nature, the public authority constitutive of justice among 
states is not a second-order state authority. In order to overcome the problems of 
the international state of nature, states should not form a state of states vested 
with legislative, judicial, and coercive power, but join a league of states vested with 
judicial power only. In contrast to many critics, who find Kant to be in conflict with 
the implications of his own argument on this point, I believe the differences 
between the two cases can be accounted for by reading Kant’s analysis of the state 
of nature as an analysis of structural defects causing systematic dependencies 
between interacting parties. Hence, where the critics argue that analogous 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Kant says in the quoted passage from the Doctrine of Right and his characterization of a right 
to go to war as unintelligible in Toward Perpetual Peace. 
33  Kant 1996a [1797], 6: 346. 
34  Ibid., 6:344. 
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challenges call for analogous solutions and that Kant should have opted for a state 
of states, I argue that Kant’s justification of the state as an enabling condition for 
just or rightful interaction among persons speaks in favor of the league of states. 
For one thing, the state’s role as a necessary institutional framework for just 
interpersonal relations generates normative constraints with regard to institution-
building beyond the state. Moreover, there is only a partial parallel between the 
state of nature among persons and the state of nature among states. Kant’s 
argument rests on an analogy, not a full parallel. Notably, the concerns which make 
a public enforcement mechanism necessary in the domestic realm are not in place 
in the international realm. I present this line of argument more extensively in 
chapter 1. Some of the same considerations are also important for the argument in 
chapter 4. 
It should be noted that in defending Kant’s league of states, I am not saying 
that establishing such a league will solve every possible problem in the 
international realm. Although Kant links the idea of extending public right beyond 
the territorial borders of states with the formula “universal and lasting peace,”35 it 
is a mistake to identify this idea with the utopian vision of a peaceful and 
prosperous ideal world society far removed from present real-world conditions. 
The league does not lead us into a conflict-free “post-historical paradise.”36 It does, 
however, enable states to resolve their conflicts in a way compatible with each 
state’s right to freedom. Thereby, it puts in place minimal conditions for just 
interaction among states. And this is why commitment to international law and UN 
multilateralism cannot be reduced to one policy-choice among others or to the 
indirect strategy of the weak against the strong. The UN is not simply European 
states’ substitute for lack of military power, but the only actually existing 
alternative to unilateral employment of force by powerful states. Arguably, the 
world organization in its present state has many flaws, but that does not seem to 
give anyone sufficient ground for bypassing it. Rather than being a reason for 
states to arrogate the right to decide about the rights of other states, those flaws 
should motivate efforts at reforming the world organization. 
 
                                                          
35  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:355. 
36  Kagan 2003, p. 3. With Oliver Eberl and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, I believe Robert Kagan’s 
simplistic differentiation between Kantian idealists from Venus and Hobbesian realists from 
Mars first and foremost displays that he makes use of “a binary coding which does not have 
much to do with the conditions on the planet Earth.” See Eberl and Fischer-Lescano 2005, p. 1 
note 5 [translated from German by K.K.M.]. 
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5. Outline of articles 
The main part of the text consists of four chapters originally written as separate 
articles.37 In the first article, “In Defense of Kant’s League of States,” I address the 
issue of what kind of institutional arrangement Kant does or should prefer for 
enabling just relations between states. As mentioned, his proposal that rightful or 
just international relations can be achieved within the framework of a league of 
states is often criticized for being at odds with his overall theory. In view of the 
analogy he draws between an interpersonal and an international state of nature, it 
is often claimed that he should instead have opted for the idea of a state of states. I 
call this the standard criticism. Agreeing with the standard criticism that a league of 
states cannot establish the institutional framework for international justice, others 
also suggest an alternative stage model interpretation. According to this 
interpretation, Kant’s true ideal is in fact a state of states, whereas the league is 
introduced as a temporary and second best solution. In contrast to both the 
standard criticism and the stage model interpretation, I argue that fundamental 
normative concerns count in favor of a league rather than a state of states. I also 
argue that Kant’s defense of such a league is consistent with his position on the 
institutional preconditions for just interaction in the domestic case because of 
crucial relevant differences between the state of nature among individuals and the 
external relations between states. 
 In the second article, “Carl Schmitt and the Prohibition against Aggressive 
War,” I discuss Carl Schmitt’s critique of the efforts at criminalizing aggressive war 
from the First World War onwards. For Schmitt, an effective bracketing [Hegung] 
of war is the most we should hope and strive for in international relations. Ideas 
such as Kant’s project for perpetual peace are hopelessly utopian and deeply 
problematic because prohibiting aggressive war leads to a “discriminatory concept 
of war” that can intensify antagonisms between political adversaries and thereby 
prepare the ground for especially brutal and inhumane wars. It is not unusual to 
understand this critique as a general critique of the Just War-tradition for 
introducing moral notions into international politics. In contrast to such readings, I 
argue that the real target of Schmitt’s critique is liberal individualism. In his view, 
                                                          
37  A version of the first article is published in Law and Philosophy 30 (2011), pp. 291-317. I have 
been invited to publish the third article as a contribution to an anthology on Kant and 
cosmopolitanism edited by Gary Banham, Garrett Wallace Brown, and Áron Telegdi-Csetri. The 
fourth article has been accepted for publication in Ratio Juris. 
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liberal ideology is the driving force behind the interwar efforts at criminalizing 
war, and the abstract universalism of liberalism combined with the inescapability 
of what Schmitt calls “the political” is what causes intensification and brutalization 
of international conflict. I further argue that Schmitt’s analysis rests on a radical 
form of anthropological pessimism that is difficult to defend in any other way than 
as a subjective profession of faith, that the realism of his defense of a non-
discriminatory concept of war can be questioned, and that he seems to overstate 
the deep existential significance of the political. Although intertwined with a keen 
analysis of a deceptive and interventionist form of imperialism highly relevant to 
present political trends, the critique aimed at the criminalization of aggressive war 
(and thus implicitly at Kant’s project for perpetual peace) does not seem sound. 
 Part of the problem with Schmitt’s position is that he overemphasizes the 
political to the detriment of individual freedom. In the third article, “A 
Cosmopolitan Defense of State Sovereignty,” I criticize a position that I have called 
anti-statist cosmopolitanism and that falls into the opposite trap of 
overemphasizing individual freedom to the detriment of the political. Proponents 
of this influential strand of contemporary political thought include Brian Barry, 
Charles Beitz, Allen Buchanan, Simon Caney, Darrel Moellendorf, and Fernando 
Tesón. They advocate international legal reforms in a decisively individualistic 
direction, arguing that state sovereignty should not be considered a basic principle 
of international law, but instead be ascribed derivative significance, dependent on 
its instrumental value for protecting human rights. Implied in this view is rejection 
of non-intervention and self-determination as fundamental international norms 
and, more generally, support for a non-egalitarian international system that 
discriminates between states on the basis of their internal features. In contrast to 
the anti-statist cosmopolitans, I argue that there is a stronger connection between 
individual freedom and state sovereignty. Explicating justice among persons in 
terms of what Kant calls an innate right to freedom, I show that state sovereignty is 
not only compatible with, but essential to the recognition of individuals as units of 
ultimate concern and that respect for the rights of persons therefore requires 
respect for sovereignty in the international realm. On this view, sovereignty is an 
international analogue to individual freedom in the domestic realm. Such an 
analogy is often criticized by anti-statist cosmopolitans, either for overlooking 
important differences between states and individuals or for putting undue 
emphasis on communal integrity. I also argue that the present defense of this so-
called domestic analogy is not susceptible to these critiques. 
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 In the fourth and final article, “Habermas and Kant on International Law,” I 
present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas’ reformulation of Kant’s project 
for perpetual peace. Here, special attention is paid to how well Habermas’ proposal 
for a multi-level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant’s league of 
states. Like Kant, Habermas rejects the idea of a state of states vested with coercive 
power. At the same time, he is dissatisfied with Kant’s idea of a voluntary league of 
states which is only vested with judicial power. In what seems like an attempt at 
finding the middle ground between these two alternatives, he proposes a model 
that involves cooperation between the UN, conceived as a supranational executive 
agency, and democratically reformed regimes, such as the EU, operating at a mid-
level between the nation states and the world-organization. Contra Habermas, I 
argue (a) that his critique of the league fails in important respects and (b) that his 
own proposal faces at least two problems related to the attempt at going beyond 
such a league. With regard to (a), I argue that Habermas does not succeed in 
showing that a voluntary league of sovereign states is at odds with the project of 
establishing a system of binding international law or with the primacy of 
individuals as units of normative concern. With regard to (b), the first problem is 
that Habermas’ alternative model implies a problematic asymmetry between 
powerful and less powerful states. The second problem is that his proposal entails 
creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious 
human rights violations world-wide, and that this seems incompatible with the 
idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. In short, I argue that there 
are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the 
international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. Yet 
this does not mean that Kant’s league cannot be supplemented with more 
comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of 
my assessment of the multi-level model, I therefore propose a hybrid model 
combining elements from Kant and Habermas. 

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Chapter 1 
In Defense of Kant’s League of States 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The starting point for this article is a contested issue among Kant researchers: 
What kind of institutional arrangement does or should Kant prefer for the 
achievement of a just international legal order? While there is broad agreement 
that the idea of a global unitary state which merges all states into one state should 
be rejected, the disagreement concerns which of two models is the more adequate: 
a) A league of states vested with judicial, but no coercive power which states are 
free to join and leave at will, or b) a state of states which leaves the primary state 
units as separate entities, but which permanently establishes coercive power over 
its members. In this article, I defend the league of states against two competing 
positions which I call the standard criticism and the stage model interpretation. 
According to proponents of both these positions, such a league is a too weak 
institutional arrangement for achieving a just international legal order. In their 
view, the only institutional model consistent with Kant's own theory is a state of 
states. 
 Despite this agreement between the standard criticism and the stage model 
interpretation concerning the necessity of establishing a state of states, they 
disagree on how Kant’s idea of a league of states should be understood. Proponents 
of the standard criticism understand the introduction of this idea as a rejection of a 
state of states, and argue that there is a problematic mismatch with regard to what 
obligations Kant says hold for individuals and what obligations he says hold for 
states. The problem arises because Kant draws a parallel between the original 
state of nature between individuals and external relations between states, and at 
the same time rejects that overcoming the international state of nature calls for a 
solution parallel to the solution to the interpersonal state of nature. With regard to 
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the latter, Kant claims that persons that cannot avoid interacting with other 
persons have an enforceable right and duty to subject themselves to a public 
authority enacting and enforcing positive laws, i.e., a state. By contrast, state 
communities can neither be compelled to do so, nor should they do so by 
establishing a state of states. Instead, they should voluntarily form a league of 
states. This move is seen as inconsistent with Kant's overall theory. As Otfried 
Höffe puts it: “According to the international state of nature argument, the 
establishment of a state-like union is already needed between existing states,” and 
“the thesis about the federalism of free states … is clearly incompatible with the 
analogy it rests on.”1 
 Although proponents of the stage model interpretation agree that a 
voluntary league cannot establish the necessary institutional framework for 
international justice, they claim that the standard criticism is based on a 
misunderstanding regarding the role of the league. According to Pauline Kleingeld, 
“the standard view of Kant’s position is mistaken” and does not recognize that he 
“combines the defence of a voluntary league with an argument for the ideal of a 
world federation with coercive powers.”2 On this reading, the league of states is 
not the final institutional scheme for establishing rightful international relations, 
but merely a first step to be superseded by a state of states when the time is ripe.3 
While Kleingeld emphasizes that the transition from the league of states to the 
state of states cannot be forced upon states, an alternative version of the stage 
model interpretation is defended by Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka in a recent 
article in Law and Philosophy. In their view, Kant does not only defend the league of 
states as an intermediary stage in the process leading towards the state of states, 
but also holds the view that “all states may use force to coerce all other states to 
make this move.”4 
 In the following, I contest both versions of the stage model interpretation, 
as well as the underlying assumption that they share with the standard criticism of 
Kant – namely that overcoming the international state of nature requires a state of 
states. In contrast to adherents of the stage model interpretation, I argue that the 
league is Kant’s final conception. In contrast to adherents of both the stage model 
interpretation and the standard criticism, I argue that systematic normative 
                                                          
1  Höffe 2006, p. 193. For similar claims, see Lutz-Bachmann 1997 and Carson 1988. 
2  Kleingeld 2004, p. 304. 
3  This view is also defended by Byrd 1995, Cavallar 1999, and McCarthy 2002. 
4  Byrd and Hruschka 2008, p. 624. 
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considerations suggest that the league is the rational ideal whereas the state of 
states is in conflict with right or justice.5 
In my view, the asymmetries between the domestic and the international 
case can be explained with reference to the fact that peace is an end internal to the 
doctrine of right, and that its realization therefore must not oppose the principle of 
equal freedom which is at the centre of Kant’s theory. Peace among nations is a 
condition of right, not a goal external to it. Being such a condition, any 
conceptualization of and attempt at achieving lasting peace must cohere with what 
is right. In order to see why this implies a rejection of the state of states, it is 
necessary to examine more closely Kant’s justification for his non-voluntarist view 
of domestic political obligations, which is the view that a state’s authority to 
impose duties on its subjects rests on an enforceable right and duty to enter civil 
society, and not on the actual or hypothetical consent of its subjects.6 In this 
connection, a crucial point is that irresolvable structural problems7 in the state of 
nature make a public authority vested with coercive powers a necessary 
precondition of rightful relations between persons. But insofar as a public 
institutional framework is a necessary precondition of rightful relations it is 
possible to show that states cannot, as can individuals, be forced to subject 
themselves to a public authority and that the public institutional framework 
constitutive of the international civil condition should not establish a global 
monopoly of violence. In addition, focusing on Kant’s justification for non-
voluntarism in the domestic case helps us see why this conclusion is consistent 
with the proposal for a league of states. By considering to what degree the 
problems with regard to interpersonal relations apply also to the external relations 
between states it can be shown that the international state of nature is similar to 
the former only in some respects and therefore does not necessarily call for a state 
of states. 
In order to explain why Kant regards a coercive public authority as 
constitutive of rightful relations between persons and therefore adheres to a non-
voluntarist conception of domestic political obligations, I first give a brief 
presentation of his conception of right in section 2. Thereafter, in section 3, I show 
what structural problems make the state of nature a condition incompatible with 
right. In section 4, I introduce Kant’s idea of a league of states, and discuss what 
                                                          
5  In this article I use the terms “right,” “justice,” and “rightful relations” interchangeably. 
6  On Kant’s non-voluntarism, see Varden 2008b. 
7  These are the problems of assurance and indeterminacy treated in section 3 below. 
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critics find problematic about this idea. Here, I also argue that the stage model 
interpretation is unconvincing on a textual basis. In this connection, I consider in 
particular the arguments put forward by Byrd and Hruschka. In section 5, I first 
argue that states cannot be rightfully forced to leave the state of nature, which is 
also why a state of states with coercive powers is a problematic goal. Then, I 
explain why there is a need for a league, but not a state of states, arguing that there 
is only a partial parallel to the interpersonal state of nature in the external 
relations between states. 
 
 
2. Kant’s conception of right 
Kant’s conception of right can be described in terms of the familiar idea of 
coercively protected spheres of freedom within which everyone is equally free to 
choose as they please. This idea is expressed in his definition of right as “the sum of 
the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom,”8 and is grounded in each 
person’s innate right to freedom, the right to “independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice … insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of 
every other in accordance with a universal law.”9 
While this emphasis on equal freedom places Kant within the tradition of 
liberal political thought, there is also an affinity with the so-called republican 
tradition, in particular with this tradition’s notion of “freedom as non-domination” 
which Phillip Pettit describes as “the condition under which you live in the 
presence of other people but at the mercy of none.”10 In contrast to Isaiah Berlin’s 
“negative” concept of liberty, the innate right to freedom does not track 
interferences with regard to goal attainment.11  Whereas Berlin considers any act 
by other human beings that frustrates a person’s wishes as an obstruction of that 
person’s freedom, Kant says that right does not concern the “relation of one’s 
                                                          
8  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:230. All references to Kant in this article are according to the Prussian 
Academy pagination. I have made use of the following of his works: The Metaphysics of Morals, 
PA 6:203-493; Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, PA 8:15-31; On the 
common saying: ‘That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice, PA 8:273-313; 
Toward perpetual peace – A philosophical project, PA 8:341-386. 
9  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:237. 
10  Pettit 1997, p. 80. 
11  Cf. Berlin 2006, p. 169. 
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choice to the mere wish … of the other.”12 In his view, to be independent is to be 
able to set ends of one’s own without the interference of other people,13 but not 
necessarily to be unaffected by the choices other people make. Since the actions of 
other people lead to changes in the world they may indeed frustrate the pursuit of 
whatever end we choose, but as long as they do not interfere with our capacity to 
pursue ends they do not restrict our innate right to freedom. It is perfectly possible 
to be hindered by others in achieving what one strives for without thereby having 
one’s freedom of choice restrained. And, since the crucial issue is whether other 
persons interfere with our capacity to pursue ends rather than whether one is 
hindered in achieving one’s ends, Kant need not, as does Berlin, draw a sharp 
conceptual line between freedom and justice.14 Freedom is to have the final word 
with regard to the use of one’s own powers. It does not entail the use of other 
people’s powers. Restrictions that prevent some person from arrogating or 
damaging some other person’s capacity to make free choices are therefore strictly 
speaking not restrictions on freedom. More appropriately, they should be seen as 
conditions that enable the equal freedom of everyone, that is, restrictions that 
secure each person’s independence from subjection to the arbitrary choices of 
others. 
The indifference with regard to the relation between one person’s choice 
and another person’s wishes reflects a general aspect of Kant’s conception of right: 
the emphasis on the form of the relationship between interacting persons rather 
than on substantive standards such as basic human needs, purposes, interests and 
the like. The rightfulness of an action does not depend on it being favorable to the 
promotion of basic values or fundamental human interests. The only requirement 
is that it accords with universal laws – that is, rules which, first, restrict every 
person equally and, second, do not merely represent the choice of one particular 
person or group. 
There is a structural similarity between Kant’s theory of right and his ethics. 
In both cases he stresses formality and universality. At the same time there is an 
                                                          
12  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:230. 
13  Arthur Ripstein defends the idea of equal freedom against critics who argue that liberty is not 
a self-limiting concept by stressing this point, in Ripstein 2009, pp. 31-9. 
14  Referring to Hobbes’ view of the free man as the man who is not hindered in doing what he has 
a will to, Berlin sees any restriction as external to freedom. Although he recognizes that the 
legitimate area of free action must be limited, it is characteristic that political liberty is 
conceived as conceptually distinct from justice: “Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice.” Berlin 2006, p. 172. 
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essential difference between the two insofar as the sphere of right is restricted to 
“what is external in actions.”15 From the perspective of right, our inner dispositions 
for acting in a particular way are not of interest. Virtuous action requires the right 
kind of motivation, whereas justice is agnostic on this question. In both cases we 
are obliged vis-à-vis universal laws of freedom. But as far as right is concerned, it 
cannot be demanded that we make the fulfillment of moral laws the incentive of 
our action. 
This restriction of right to the external sphere is related to the conceptual 
link between right and coercion. Even if coercion is an impediment to or hindrance 
of external freedom, right is still analytically connected to an authorization to 
coerce. Whoever hinders rightful use of freedom does wrong by laying arbitrary 
constraints on the innate right of some other person, and coercion that prevents 
such constraints is legitimate, “as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom.”16 It is 
therefore no surprise that the requirement of a moral motive must be abandoned 
in the sphere of right. Since questions of right are essentially questions of 
legitimate coercion, there cannot, as a matter of principle, be any rightful 
regulation of morality. For one thing, if coercion is allowed to reach beyond the 
external sphere to the internal motivations of people, we seem to have no 
substantial barrier against paternalistic, not to say authoritarian or totalitarian, 
intrusions by governments with regard to how one should lead one’s personal life, 
how one should think, what one should desire, etc.17 Moreover, such efforts would 
also be self-defeating for the simple reason that virtuous action is beyond the reach 
of possible coercion. Virtuous or moral action implies that what is done is done 
because one recognizes that it is the right thing to do, so whatever a person does 
because he or she is externally compelled to do so is not a virtuous action. 
The boundaries of each person’s sphere of freedom demarcate what powers 
or means belong to whom. They designate what empirical objects other people are 
obliged to refrain from using without our consent. Among the objects which we 
can coercively exclude other people from using, our body is the only thing to which 
we have an innate right, and any use of some person’s body not consented to by 
this person or any intentional injury caused by one person on another is wrong. 
Beyond this entitlement to be in control of the powers of one’s own body, it must 
also be possible to be in rightful control over objects separate from us. 
                                                          
15  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:232. 
16  Ibid., 6:231. 
17  Cf. Maus 2002, p. 109. 
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Kant recognizes three kinds of external objects which can be mine or yours: 
corporeal things (property right), other persons’ deeds (contract right), and 
another’s status in relation to me or you (domestic right).18 Being separate from 
us, external objects are not innately ours. Entitlements to such objects must 
nonetheless be possible to acquire. A general prohibition against the use of things 
separate from us would be an arbitrary, and thus illegitimate, restriction of 
external freedom. The treatment of “any object of my choice as something which 
could objectively be mine or yours” is therefore what Kant calls a “postulate” or 
“permissive law (lex permissiva) of practical reason.”19 This implies that we are 
permitted to put others under contingent obligations, obligations which they 
would not have had if we had not in fact made some specific thing our own, which 
further means that a new set of possible wrongs is generated. Since entitlements to 
external objects extend our sphere of external freedom beyond our own body, it is 
possible for a person to do wrong without physically interfering with another 
person, for instance by using what rightfully belongs to the other without 
permission, or by failing to perform a certain deed to which the other has a 
contractual right. 
On Kant’s account, then, a rightful condition is a condition of equal 
independence where each of us is required to refrain from non-consensually using 
the persons or possessions of others, as well as to fulfill contractual agreements. 
However, the state of nature cannot possibly be such a condition. Absent a public 
authority that enacts, enforces and arbitrates in accordance with positive law, 
there is in Kant’s view no way consistent with the principle of right in which each 
person’s entitlements could be properly guaranteed or delimited. In the state of 
nature some persons will unavoidably be exposed to arbitrary and non-reciprocal 
restrictions due to what is sometimes referred to as problems of assurance and 
indeterminacy.20 And this leads Kant to the conclusion that to choose to remain in 
the state of nature is to do “wrong in the highest degree,”21 as well as to its 
corollary: that entering civil society is an enforceable right and duty. 
 
 
 
                                                          
18  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:247. 
19  Ibid., 6:247. Cf. also Ludwig 2002, pp. 175-6. 
20  Ripstein 2004; Varden 2008a and 2008b. 
21  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:307. 
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3. The assurance and indeterminacy problems 
The assurance problem is a problem regarding rightful possession. If a person is in 
rightful possession of something external, others are obliged not to make use of it 
as long as they have not been given permission to do so by the possessor. The core 
of the assurance problem concerns under what conditions people are so obliged. 
According to Kant, we are not obliged to leave objects belonging to others 
untouched unless they provide us assurance that they will behave equally with 
regard to objects belonging to us.22 The question then becomes: How can we 
rightfully provide such assurance? 
Considering that right is only concerned with external use of choice, a 
rightful obligation is necessarily an external obligation. For this reason, the 
solution to the assurance problem entails creating a power strong enough to 
secure compliance from everyone. This claim does not rest on the assumption that 
human beings are made of such “warped wood” that they cannot be expected to 
respect the boundaries between mine and yours virtuously. The problem is not 
that we are “phenomenal beings” that “need to be reminded by a physical incentive 
that we should obey the law,”23 but that reliance on mere trust in other people for 
the purpose of providing rightful assurance is to make oneself dependent on their 
arbitrary choice.24 Even in an ideal world, where everyone keeps their part of any 
agreement, reliance on someone’s promise that she will not infringe on your 
acquired rights makes it her choice whether something external is yours or hers. 
And since an anarchical condition where no one is subjected to external 
constraints fails to guarantee each person independence from the choice of other 
people such a condition is deficient from the perspective of right. 
But if virtuous promising does not suffice to provide a rightful guarantee, 
neither does creating a power that simply serves as an irresistible external 
constraint. Apart from the capacity to restrain all others without itself being 
restrained, the power providing assurance must also be a power that restrains 
everyone equally. This implies that no private agent can serve the role as enforcer 
of justice. As private, such an enforcer is what Kant calls a “unilateral will,”25 and 
such a will cannot possibly establish a system of reciprocal restrictions. For one 
                                                          
22  Ibid., 6:255-6. 
23  Williams 2003, p. 83. 
24  On this, see Varden 2008b, pp. 8-9. 
25  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:256. 
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thing, its acts of enforcement would be arbitrary from the perspective of everyone 
else, since they represent the choice of the private enforcer. Moreover, a private 
enforcer can at most obligate everyone but itself, which means that the assurance 
problem remains unsolved with regard to the relation between the enforcer and 
other agents.26 But if a private enforcer fails to obligate everyone equally, then 
justice is impossible outside civil society, because in the state of nature any use of 
force is private use of force. 
The problem of indeterminacy concerns how the distinction between mine 
and yours can be rendered accurate in a way compatible with the innate right to 
freedom. In part, this is a problem of specifying what the abstract principles of 
private right prescribe generally, and, in part, it is a problem of applying these 
principles to particular cases.27 In relations of private right there may be 
disagreement concerning the determinate content of each person’s rights. General 
principles of right are indeterminate with regard to what belongs to whom, what 
counts as the fulfillment of a contracted service, or whether a certain act is 
exploitative or not, and thus under certain circumstances leave room for a plurality 
of equally reasonable, yet incompatible interpretations. Although there may be 
easy cases, there are also circumstances which give room for reasonable 
disagreement concerning where the boundary between mine and yours is to be 
drawn. The challenge is to resolve such conflicts of interpretation in a rightful 
way.28 
                                                          
26  The latter point is emphasized by Varden 2008a, p. 8 and 2008b, pp. 10-11. 
27  At this point, Ripstein 2009, pp. 145-76 distinguishes between the problems of unilateral 
choice and indeterminacy, and thus ends up with three structural problems which make the 
state of nature a non-rightful condition. While this is more adequate in certain respects, I stay 
with the bipartite distinction between the problems of assurance and indeterminacy, partly 
due to considerations of space, and partly because it is sufficient for my main argument to 
single out these problems. 
28  It is sometimes claimed that the problem of indeterminacy arises only with regard to acquired 
rights, and not with regard to the right to one’s own body. This view is defended by Varden 
2008a, p. 8 on the ground that the innate right to freedom necessarily entails a right to our 
own bodies, since there is an analytical connection between our person and our body in terms 
of right. Similarly, Paul Guyer seems to assume that the problem of indeterminacy can only 
come up with regard to property and contract right because our bodies have determinate 
boundaries. See Guyer 2002, p. 62. However, none of this implies that what is covered by 
innate right is completely determinate in every possible case. As Ripstein points out, it is not a 
purely factual question whether startling a person standing at the edge of a cliff by shouting 
out loud is to wrong this person, or whether a certain use of force should be judged as an act of 
aggression or as preventive self-defense. See Ripstein 2009, pp. 176-9. I also believe there is 
room for reasonable disagreement with regard to the authorizations which Kant says are 
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As is the case with the problem of assurance, so Kant’s view on this second, 
but logically prior, issue is that there is no way in which we could actually solve 
problems related to indeterminacy in the state of nature. The reason is that there is 
no authority that could rightfully decide what interpretation is to prevail.29 Again, 
the heart of the problem is that in the state of nature any judgment about the 
appropriate distinction between what is mine and what is yours is a private 
judgment. Whoever decides where the line is to be drawn inevitably subjects 
everyone else to one-sided restrictions, and thus acts contrary to everyone else’s 
right to be restricted by universal laws only. There is, of course, the possibility of 
coming to bi- or multilateral agreements on the issues. While this is preferable to 
the unilateral imposition of one person or group’s will, it would still not accord 
with what is right. We would still be subject to the choices other people make 
whether to consent or not, and would therefore not have the independence 
implied in the innate right to freedom. But if there is no solution to the problem of 
indeterminacy in the state of nature, then we have a second reason why justice is 
not possible outside civil society. 
The only way to overcome the problems of assurance and indeterminacy is, 
in Kant’s view, to establish a public authority that organizes legislative, executive 
and adjudicative bodies, i.e. a state. As a public authority, a state is an authority 
that represents the will of all united. It is a “collective general (common) and 
powerful will,”30 what Rousseau calls a volonté générale, that has no partial interest 
vis-à-vis its subjects. It is only such a will that can, by means of legislation and 
adjudication, determine the boundaries of mine and yours in a rightful way, and, 
through its coercive powers, ensure that everyone is made subject to reciprocal 
restrictions. And since a public authority representing everyone subject to its 
restrictions equally is a precondition for rightful interaction, there follows the 
enforceable duty to “subject ... to a public lawful external coercion, ... that is, ... to 
enter a civil condition.”31 To refuse to do so is to “renounce any concepts of right”32 
                                                                                                                                                                          
implied in the innate right to freedom. For instance, it is not unlikely that the right to 
communicate one’s thoughts may come into conflict with the right to be beyond reproach, at 
least if the latter is taken to entail a prohibition against libel. Cf. Kant 1996a [1797], 6:238. 
Hence, there may be cases involving neither property nor contract right where there is a 
potential indeterminacy problem. 
29  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:312. 
30  Ibid., 6:256. 
31  Ibid., 6:312. 
32  Ibid. 
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and to choose to “remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one 
is assured of what is his against violence.”33 Refusing to leave the state of nature is 
in other words tantamount to denying others the possible enjoyment of freedom in 
accordance with universal laws. Coercing a person to enter civil society must 
therefore be permitted as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom. 
It is important to note that according to the interpretation presented here, 
Kant’s non-voluntarist conclusion with regard to political obligations does not 
depend on the assumption of a morally corrupt or problematic human nature. The 
claim is that in the state of nature even good-natured persons cannot but subject 
others to their arbitrary choice due to the problems of assurance and 
indeterminacy. Even under the presupposition that human beings happen to agree 
on what is each person’s fair share and also are well-disposed toward each other in 
such a way that no one is inclined to violate other persons’ spheres of external 
freedom, it would still be wrong in the highest degree to deny entrance to civil 
society, because in so doing one fails to provide the only framework within which 
rightful independence is possible. For this reason, a public coercive framework is 
in Kant’s view more than a mere remedy for the “inconveniences” of the state of 
nature, as in Locke.34 It is rather a condition for the possibility of rightful 
interaction among persons, that is, an enabling condition for freedom in 
accordance with universal laws. 
 
 
4. From the right of a state to the right of nations: The puzzling 
rejection of the state of states 
The ideal form of the state authority that in Kant’s view is constitutive of civil 
society, the republic, has two essential institutional features: first, separation and 
hierarchical organization of legislative (sovereign), executive (ruler), and judicial 
(judge) powers, and, second, ascription of legislative power “to the united will of 
the people,”35 that is, popular sovereignty. This institutional structure Kant calls 
“the state in idea, as it ought to be in accordance with pure principles of right,” and 
“serves as a norm (norma) for every actual union into a commonwealth.”36 Yet 
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34  Locke 1986 [1690], p. 13. 
35  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:313. 
36  Ibid. 
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even if conceived in ideal terms, a republican constitution constitutes only part of 
the conditions that as a sum are to enable the free choice of every person to be 
united with the free choice of everyone else in accordance with universal laws. 
According to Kant, the establishment of “a perfect civil constitution” is dependent 
on a solution to “the problem of law-governed external relations among nations.”37 
Similarly to the state of nature among persons, the external relations between 
states are characterized as a non-rightful condition which can only be overcome by 
entering a civil condition of which an international public authority is 
constitutive.38 
 Although he draws repeated parallels between the original state of nature 
among individuals and interstate relations,39 Kant’s view regarding the 
institutional presuppositions for just interaction in the international sphere differs 
in important respects from his view regarding the institutional presuppositions for 
just interaction in the domestic sphere. In contrast to what he says with regard to 
the domestic case, Kant does not say that the international public authority should 
be a state authority. Nor does he say that states have an enforceable right and duty 
to leave the state of nature. Rather than a global state authority, he proposes a 
treaty-based “pacific league” that “seeks to end all wars forever,” but without 
requiring member states to “subject themselves to public laws and coercion under 
them (as people in a state of nature must do).”40 The league is not to have 
legislative or executive powers, as it is not founded in order “to meddle in one 
another’s internal dissensions but to protect against attacks from without.”41 
Furthermore, entrance and exit must be voluntary. The league is “a permanent 
congress of states,” which neighboring states are “at liberty to join,” and which can 
“be dissolved at any time.”42 In other words, the institutionalization of an 
international civil condition differs from the civil order among persons in two 
ways. First, the public authority is no sovereign power, only an international 
organization with arbitration capacities. Second, no state may be legitimately 
forced to join this organization, which means that there is no parallel to Kant’s 
non-voluntarist view of domestic political obligations at the international level. 
                                                          
37  Kant 1983 [1784], 8:24. 
38  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:344; 1996c [1795], 8: 354. 
39  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:354; cf. also 1983 [1784], 8:24 and 1996a [1797], 6:344-5. 
40  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:356. 
41  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:345. 
42  Ibid., 6:350-1; cf. also ibid., 6:345. 
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It is the rejection of a state of states with coercive power that motivates the 
standard criticism. In the critics’ view, Kant, in drawing an analogy between the 
interpersonal state of nature and external state relations, also ought to favor an 
institutional structure at the international level analogous to the institutional 
structure at the domestic level. What seems primarily to trouble these critics is 
that the league of states cannot solve an assurance problem assumed to exist in the 
international realm. Since the league does not possess coercive powers it cannot 
ensure compliance from its members, and thus leaves it for each state to decide 
whether or not to comply with the league’s judgements. According to the standard 
criticism, this means that states will continue to subject one another to arbitrary 
choice rather than universal restrictions authorized by the international public 
authority. Consequently, interaction at the international level will in important 
respects remain in a state of nature: “[S]ince a federation lacks the instruments 
requisite for securing that which is to be agreed on, namely, world peace, there can 
be peace only with reservations and qualifications … Without the ‘sword of justice,’ 
a federation remains a (modified) state of nature.”43 
Few, if any, of these critics think of the state of states in terms of a global 
unitary state that reduces existing states to parts which it may fuse together or 
split up at will. What is usually held up as an alternative to both the global unitary 
state and the league of states is the idea of complementary statehood, where the 
second order state authority is vested with a restricted set of powers and leaves 
the primary state units intact. Just as individual persons do not give up, but affirm, 
their freedom by entering the civil condition, so the freedom of every state should 
be affirmed by its subjection to an international public authority with narrow 
competencies: “[T]he correctly formed analogy demands that the ‘republic of 
states’ ... not be organized in opposition to its members’ rights of liberty and 
equality. … [T]he ‘republic of states’ would have a mandate for action only in those 
spheres individual states could not regulate on their own.”44 
But even if the international public authority should not be established at 
the expense of the first order state communities’ right to territorial integrity and 
self-determination, Kant’s analogy is still said to require some kind of state 
authority with coercive powers. Otherwise, there seems to be something wrong 
with the foundations of the entire theory. If one can deny that a second order state 
                                                          
43  Höffe 2006, p. 200; see also p. 195. The lack of coercive power is also emphasized as the 
league’s main deficiency by Byrd 1995, Byrd and Hruschka 2008, Pogge 1988, and Wood 1995. 
44  Lutz-Bachmann 1997, p. 71. 
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unit is constitutive of an international civil condition, then one should also deny 
that first order state units are constitutive of rightful relations among individuals: 
“Either the imperative of individuals to renounce their freedom in leaving the state 
of nature already involves a contradiction ... Or ... international statehood ... is a 
condition that makes possible the state of international lawfulness.”45 
The distinction between a global unitary state and a limited state of states is 
also the backdrop of the stage model interpretation. According to this line of 
interpretation, the league of states should not be seen as an alternative to the state 
of states altogether, but merely as the first stage in a process that is ultimately to 
result in a state of states. On this reading, Kant’s arguments against a global unitary 
state, that it dissolves rather than solves the problem of guaranteeing the right of 
nations,46 and that it will lead to a “soulless despotism” which “finally deteriorates 
into anarchy,”47 are misunderstood if they are taken to be arguments against any 
form of global statehood. The real motive behind the introduction of the league of 
states, it is said, is not to reject global statehood as such, but to accommodate to the 
political realities of his times. Since the obstinate unwillingness of political leaders 
to comply with a priori principles of right makes it unrealistic to expect the 
realization of the superior alternative in the near future, Kant suggests that a 
league of states may be a first step that prepares for the eventual establishment of 
a coercive state of states. Although the league is seen as insufficient for the purpose 
of establishing the sought for international civil condition, it may serve as a 
temporary surrogate to be superseded by a state of states when time is ripe: “The 
core of Kant’s argument ... is that the full realization of perpetual peace does 
require a federal state of states …, but that this goal should be pursued mediately, 
via the voluntary establishment of a league, and not via premature attempts to 
institutionalize a state of states immediately.”48 
As for the second difference between the domestic and the international 
cases, the voluntary membership in the league, it has not only been argued that 
Kant should have opted for the opposite view, namely that subjection to the 
international authority must be compelling;49 there are, as mentioned, alternative 
interpretations in the secondary literature on this point as well. Recently, Sharon 
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Byrd and Joachim Hruschka have ascribed the view that any capable state can 
force any other state to enter an international civil condition to Kant.50 According 
to Byrd and Hruschka, Kant takes a more mature stance in the Doctrine of Right 
than in Toward Perpetual Peace, where states are said to “have outgrown the 
constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-governed 
constitution in accordance with their concepts of right.”51 They see evidence for 
such a change of mind in the discussion of “the original right that free states in a 
state of nature have to go to war with one another (in order, perhaps, to establish a 
condition more closely approaching a rightful condition),”52 as well as in the 
discussions of the right to go to war, right during a war, and right after a war in the 
later work. In addition, they find support for the same conclusion by pointing to a 
parallel between states and individuals similar to the one we have seen in 
connection with arguments in favor of the state of states. Against the background 
of Kant’s characterization of states as moral persons, they claim that states can 
acquire analogues to property, contract, and status rights, and conclude that the 
enforceable right and duty to leave the state of nature applies also to state actors. 
I think there are good reasons to question both versions of the stage model 
interpretation in favor of the more traditional reading, where Kant is seen as 
rejecting any model of global statehood and, consequently, non-voluntarism at the 
international level. In the next section, I set out the principled normative 
considerations that support this view. Yet before I turn to this issue some textual 
considerations are in order. 
Proponents of the stage model interpretation may find some support in the 
often cited passage from Toward Perpetual Peace, where Kant seemingly makes an 
unequivocal judgment in favor of the state of states, and the league of states is 
characterized as a “negative surrogate” brought forward so that everything “is not 
to be lost.”53 Neverthless, I find it hard to square this reading with the main 
tendencies and arguments in this work as well as in the Doctrine of Right. Even if 
the proponents of the stage model interpretation take Kant’s concern for a political 
world consisting of a plurality of states into consideration, there is the further 
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52  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:344. 
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complication that Kant seems to reject global statehood in any form, and not just in 
the form of a unitary state. For instance, at the end of the chapter on the right of 
nations in the Doctrine of Right, Kant contrasts the idea of a congress of states, i.e. 
the league, with a federation like the US, which “is based on a constitution and can 
therefore not be dissolved.”54 The fact that he immediately afterwards says that 
“[o]nly by such a congress can the idea of a public right of nations be realized,”55 
suggests that he also rejects more modest proposals for global statehood. 
Moreover, directly before the passage where he is often assumed to reduce the 
league to a second rate surrogate, Kant says that reason must necessarily connect 
“the concept of the right of nations” with “free federalism.”56 Later in the same text 
he also says that “a federative condition [föderativer Zustand]” is “the sole rightful 
condition compatible with the freedom of states.”57 Against this background, it 
seems implausible that he thinks of the league of states as a temporary surrogate 
for a future state of states. 
Even if Byrd and Hruschka point to some interesting differences between 
Toward Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right, it is also hard to find support for 
their non-voluntarist interpretation with regard to the right of nations in the 
passages they refer to from the latter work. Consider first the “original right” to go 
to war which Kant ascribes to “free states in a state of nature.” What Byrd and 
Hruschka do not mention is the context of the quote. In the relevant paragraph 
(§55), Kant discusses the question whether a state has a right to use its subjects for 
war against other states, a question which he answers only conditionally in the 
positive, since citizens cannot be treated as mere means and therefore must 
consent to “each particular declaration of war” if they are “to serve in a way full of 
danger to them.”58 In other words, the argument does not revolve around the 
question whether a state can force other states to enter an international civil 
condition. The question is only raised hypothetically as an introduction to a 
discussion about another topic, and therefore does not seem to have any direct 
impact on the issue dealt with by Byrd and Hruschka. Nor is there much support 
for their interpretation in the proceeding paragraphs (§§56-58) on the right to go 
to war, right during a war, and right after a war. Rather than indicate that Kant 
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“accepts the right states have to coerce other states to move to a juridical state of 
nation states,”59 the discussion in these paragraphs seems to affirm much of what 
is contained in the preliminary articles of Toward Perpetual Peace which address 
questions pertaining to acceptable and non-acceptable conduct of states in a pre-
civil condition, but not the issue of whether states can be forced to leave this 
condition. As far as the parallel between the domestic and the international cases 
is concerned, it suffices to say at this point that its soundness depends on the 
assumption that all the structural problems identified in the state of nature 
between persons also apply to the state of nature between states. This assumption 
ought to be doubted. I return to this issue in the following section, after first 
explaining why states cannot be rightfully forced to subject themselves to an 
international public authority. 
 
 
5. Why the league of states is and why the state of states is not an 
ideal precondition for perpetual peace 
Beyond the textual considerations discussed at the end of the previous section, 
there are also principled normative considerations which make non-voluntarism 
an inadequate ideal of international political obligations. The main reason is that 
such an ideal of international political obligations would entitle every capable state 
to force other states to become members of a league of states or a state of states. 
Such an entitlement is problematic, first, because it allows the stronger state to set 
the terms of cooperation unilaterally. This would be an obvious injustice, since it 
contradicts the requirement that every restriction is to be a universal restriction.60 
Second, non-voluntarism in the international sphere implies a right to wage war in 
order to enforce exit from the state of nature. This is not to say that war is the only 
coercive means available to states in their relations to other states. Yet in the 
international sphere an analogue to the enforceable right and duty of individuals to 
enter civil society would in the final resort imply a right to go to war against states 
that refuse to leave the state of nature voluntarily. It is therefore tantamount to a 
right to put existing state sanctioned legal orders at risk, one’s own as well as those 
                                                          
59  Byrd and Hruschka 2008, p. 625. 
60  Kleingeld seems to have a similar point in mind when arguing that forcing a state to join a state 
of states violates the political autonomy of the state that is forced to join. See Kleingeld 2004, 
p. 309. See also Kant 1996d [1795], 8:356-7. 
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of the other states. But there can be no right to do this. First and foremost we have 
a duty to establish a state, since it constitutes a necessary institutional framework 
for rightful interaction among persons. Jeopardizing this framework by going to 
war is therefore incompatible with right. Coercing an unwilling state to leave the 
international state of nature is not a hindering of a hindrance to freedom, but 
employment of unilateral force opposed to our primary duty to leave the state of 
nature among persons. I believe this is the main reason why Kant says that states 
have “outgrown the constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-
governed constitution.”61 The original subjection to any international public 
authority must be based on consent, since the opposite “is analogous not to 
founding a state but to a revolution which fails and leads to a state of nature.”62 
 In view of these considerations, one can also see why conceiving individuals 
as the basic normative units does not imply a non-statist conception of 
international law or that statist conceptions of international law are based on 
illiberal or authoritarian theories of the state.63 Rather than reflecting illiberal 
authoritarianism, prohibiting aggressive wars and interventions in the internal 
affairs of a state confirms the state’s role as a necessary precondition for each 
person’s independence vis-à-vis other persons. 
I take it that concerns similar to those which lead to the rejection of an 
enforceable right and duty to enter an international civil condition also motivate 
Kant’s opposition to a permanent union of states. This is at least indicated by the 
claim that the possibility of dissolving or renouncing the league of states “is a right 
in subsidium of another original right, to avoid getting involved in a state of actual 
war among the other members.”64 When some member states fight among 
themselves, any other state must be allowed to withdraw from the league at will in 
order to remain neutral. If there were no such right, every member of the league 
could be commanded by the international political authority to become entangled 
in conflicts between or within other states. But this would imply that the 
international public authority had a right to put the lives of its member states’ 
citizens at risk. Again: there can be no such right. The founding idea of the state is 
to guarantee the rightful use of freedom among interacting persons. In order to 
provide this guarantee, the state can demand that its citizens act in a way that is 
                                                          
61  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:355. 
62  Maus 2004, p. 91. 
63  For the opposite view, see Tesón 1997, pp. 1-2. 
64  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:344. 
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consistent with the perpetual existence of the state. But citizens are not obliged to 
risk their lives in wars against other states as long as their own state is not directly 
threatened. If they are forced to fight to assist other states, they are used for 
purposes that are not their own. They are thereby used as mere means, which 
violates their innate right to freedom.65 Besides, a state’s duty to establish rightful 
relations between itself and other states does not imply any obligation to assist 
other states whenever they are in conflict with external enemies or are afflicted by 
internal violence. To do wrong is to hinder external use of freedom in accordance 
with universal laws, and whoever abstains from taking part in an ongoing conflict 
does no wrong. 
In light of similar considerations, Helga Varden has argued that the public 
authority constitutive of rightful international relations “cannot ever establish a 
perpetual monopoly on coercion.”66 While this seems like a sound conclusion, we 
still need to explain why consent can do a job in the international sphere which 
Kant says it cannot do in the domestic sphere. Given Kant’s non-voluntarist 
conclusion with regard to domestic political obligations, it is not yet clear why a 
league of states is sufficient for the establishment of an international civil 
condition. Why is the “sword of justice” dispensable in the international realm? In 
order to give a satisfactory answer to this question we have to consider in what 
respect the international state of nature is a non-rightful condition of war. 
At this point, it can be useful to recall that for Kant the term “state of 
nature” does not refer to a previously existing condition in historical time that 
could only be overcome by means of a contract establishing the state. Rather than 
describing a previous state of affairs, it is a theoretical fiction that shows why 
certain structural problems make rightful interaction among persons impossible 
absent a public authority.67 As such, it is a term that serves the normative-practical 
                                                          
65  Cf. Ibid., 6:345-6. 
66  Varden 2008a, p. 21. Puzzlingly, she also says that this authority should have a “tripartite 
republican constitution.” See ibid., p. 23. I do not see how this claim can be squared with the 
rejection of a supranational monopoly of coercion. An international public authority without 
coercive powers is an authority which lacks one of the powers constitutive of a republican 
constitution, namely the executive power, and could therefore at most have a bipartite 
constitution. 
67  Correspondingly, the contract that founds the public authority should not be conceived of as 
an actual agreement explicitly or tacitly consented to by state citizens: “it is by no means 
necessary that this contract ... be presupposed as a fact (as a fact it is indeed not possible). … 
Instead, it is a mere idea of reason, which, however, has its undoubted practical reality.” See 
Kant 1996b [1793], 8:297. 
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purpose of displaying that it is pragmatically inconsistent for agents possessing 
practical reason to renounce obligations toward any such authority. Similarly, the 
characterization of external relations between states as a state of nature is a 
proposition about the ideal preconditions for justice in the international sphere: in 
this sphere too there are irresolvable structural problems which make rightful 
interaction impossible unless there is established a second order public authority. 
The crucial question is therefore in what respect the structural problems in the 
latter case are similar to and in what respect they are different from those in the 
former case. 
 We saw in the previous section that the proponents of the state of states 
assume that there is an assurance problem in the international sphere which a 
league of states cannot solve. Given this assumption, the conclusion that a second 
order public authority with coercive powers is constitutive of an international civil 
condition is convincing. Insofar as the major concern is to provide rightful 
assurance, and no particular state can serve as an external guarantor, since each 
state, considered in opposition to other states, in such a case would represent a 
particular will whose relation to the others is also in need of regulation, a state of 
states appears necessary in order for states to interact rightfully. However, the 
premise that there is an assurance problem to be solved in the external relations 
between states is false. 
 In his recent book Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein observes that there is 
in fact no reference to such a problem in Kant’s discussion of conflicts between 
states.68 What we find is a partial analogue to the problem of indeterminacy, but 
there is no analogue to the claim that we are not obliged to leave what belongs to 
others untouched unless we are provided assurance that they will behave 
accordingly with regard to what is ours. According to Ripstein, this deviation from 
the domestic case reflects two features of states which distinguish them from 
persons: first, states do not have external objects of choice, and second, states have 
a fundamentally public nature. 
 Unlike Byrd and Hruschka, who conceive of a state’s territory as the 
property of the state, Ripstein argues that territory, in Kant’s view, “is just the 
spatial manifestation of the state.”69 That is to say that territory constitutes the 
state’s person in its external relation to other states and therefore should be 
                                                          
68  Ripstein 2009, pp. 227-8. 
69  Ibid., p. 228. 
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conceived of as analogous to a person’s body rather than as analogous to her 
possessions. If this is correct, it explains why Kant does not speak of an assurance 
problem in the international state of nature. As argued in section 3, there is an 
irresolvable assurance problem in the state of nature between individual persons 
because these persons have enforceable rights to external objects of choice which 
no one is in a position to rightfully enforce. This problem does not arise with 
regard to the right persons have to their own bodies. Other persons are always 
obliged to not violate our bodily integrity. Resisting violations against it with force 
is therefore not contrary to right. In fending off aggressors one does not impose 
unilateral force on others, but merely hinders a hindrance to freedom. Similarly, if 
territory is what a state is, perceived externally, then there is no assurance 
problem in the international sphere, because there are no external objects of 
choice with regard to which assurance must be provided.70 Any wrong done by one 
state against another state is comparable to the wrong one person does against the 
body of another person, and can rightfully be resisted with force by the aggrieved 
party. Acknowledging defensive wars as legitimate, Kant speaks of “the right to go 
to war” in the state of nature as “the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute 
its right against another state … when it believes it has been wronged by the other 
state.”71 
 Against this, one can object that states are artificial entities that have no 
natural borders comparable to a person’s body. For one thing, it is not always clear 
just where the borders between neighboring states are, whereas it is generally 
easy to tell whether something is part of a specific person’s body. Also, territory 
can be divided and disposed of more easily than can body parts. The latter 
difference seems to be the main reason why Byrd and Hruschka speak of territory 
as property.72 
 While the artificiality of a state’s borders certainly makes the relation of 
state and territory different from the relation of person and body, I do not think it 
suffices for arguing that the former relation is structurally the same as the relation 
                                                          
70  By the same token, Byrd and Hruschka’s inference from non-voluntarism in the domestic case 
to non-voluntarism in the international case is undermined. It is the normative requirement 
that it must be possible to have rightful possession which justifies the use of coercive means 
for the purpose of establishing a civil condition among individuals. Cf. Kant 1996a [1797], 
6:256. But if states do not have external objects of choice a crucial premise is missing, and a 
mere parallel from the one case to the other will not do. 
71  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:346. 
72  Byrd and Hruschka 2008, pp. 625-6. 
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of person and property. As a category of right, property is most appropriately 
described as means with which a person has an exclusive right to pursue whatever 
end he or she chooses. Property therefore stands in a means-end relation to the 
choices of persons. For reasons which have to do with the second difference 
between a state and a person, the public nature of the state, we cannot think of 
territory in the same way. Being a public authority, a state does not have ends of its 
own. Its sole function is to provide a coercive institutional framework which 
enables citizens to interact in a rightful way. Therefore it is not appropriate to 
speak of territory as some means with which a state can pursue private purposes. 
Territorial borders should rather be understood as the demarcation of the sphere 
of validity of the public order constituted by the state. In this perspective, borders 
are the limits of a state’s “inner” lawgiving. Externally, from the perspective of 
other states, these limits make up the person of the state, which is to say that 
territory counts as embodiment and not as property. 
 Beyond this, there is also a separate reason why the public nature of the 
state supports the view that there is no assurance problem in the international 
sphere. In virtue of being a public rightful condition, a state can only act for public 
ends, such as continually approximating an ideal republican constitution and 
sustaining the already established public order. In our context, the crucial 
implication of this notion of a state is that it is conceptually impossible for any 
genuine state to wage aggressive wars. The only rightful or just cause for which a 
state can fight wars is to preserve itself as a public order. As argued above, not only 
do aggressive wars violate the rights of the state under attack. To wage war is to 
put the necessary institutional framework for rightful interaction at risk, and is 
therefore at odds with our primary duty to leave the state of nature, unless 
required for the state’s survival. Consequently, just states can only fight defensive 
wars, since fighting non-defensive wars is irreconcilable with their status as public 
authorities. 
 In view of these reflections regarding states’ lack of external objects of 
choice as well as their essentially public nature one can see why a “sword of 
justice” is not needed for establishing an international civil condition. Both aspects 
imply that there is no assurance problem in the international sphere, and so 
rightful interaction among states is possible without a strong physical power 
securing compliance from everyone. This means that an important premise for the 
stage model reading of Kant’s position on international right is undermined. If it is 
possible for states to interact rightfully without subjecting themselves to a public 
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coercive authority, then there seems to be no reason why a league of states should 
be seen as a temporary surrogate for a more satisfactory institutional framework 
to be implemented at a later point in time. The league, however, is still needed in 
order to overcome an indeterminacy problem in the external relations between 
states. This problem arises with regard to at least two different kinds of issues: 
rightful use of defensive force,73 and rightful determination of national borders.74 
 Even if every state has a right to fight defensive wars, it is not necessarily 
clear what acts amount to aggression in every particular case. Discussing a state’s 
right to execute its own right against other states, Kant does not only recognize 
“active violations,” or “first aggression,” as legitimate grounds for defensive use of 
force. A state may also be threatened by another state, either by the other state’s 
preparations for war, or by its “menacing increase in … power (by its acquisition of 
territory).”75 This makes it possible for states to reasonably disagree on whether 
certain uses of force are aggressive or defensive. What one state considers an act of 
first aggression, the other state may consider a preemptive action covered by its 
right to self-defense. In the state of nature there is no rightful way to settle such 
conflicting rights claims. As long as there is “no judge competent to render a 
verdict having rightful force,”76 each state is within its right to follow its own 
judgment. Yet thereby they employ force on the basis of their own arbitrary choice, 
which is contrary to right. 
 The same problem applies to disputes about borders. Whenever there is 
disagreement in the state of nature concerning where the lines between different 
states’ jurisdictions are to be drawn, any judgment made on the issue is the 
particular judgment of one state. This again means that states in the state of nature 
are unavoidably subjected to arbitrary choice rather than universal law. 
Irrespective of whether a particular state’s judgment is forced through or the 
parties in the dispute come to an agreement, the relation between the states is not 
one of rightful independence. 
 Even if a state of states is not required, the existence of an indeterminacy 
problem in the international sphere still makes an international public authority 
with judicial powers necessary in order to overcome the international state of 
nature. The league of states is such an authority, and can therefore be seen as an 
                                                          
73  This is emphasized by Ripstein 2009, p. 227. 
74  This is emphasized by Varden 2008a, pp. 18-9. 
75  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:346. 
76  Ibid., 6:312. 
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ideal precondition for rightful relations between states. Of course, being a 
voluntary congress which can be dissolved at any time, the league cannot provide a 
guarantee that existing states will accept its decisions. Individual states may be 
dissatisfied with specific decisions and thus choose to act on their own unilateral 
judgment. Yet this circumstance does not challenge the view that a voluntary 
league provides the institutional framework constitutive of an international civil 
condition. In refusing to comply with the verdict of the public authority, a state 
does wrong, but it does not do so unavoidably. In the state of nature the 
irresolvable problem is that each state, however just and right-loving it might be, 
has no choice but to either act on its own unilateral judgment or else yield to that 
of another state. As an arbiter, the league provides the means by which conflicting 
claims made by states vis-à-vis each other can be resolved in a rightful way. In this 
way it establishes the minimal conditions required for states to decide “disputes in 
a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), 
namely by war.”77 
 
 
6. Summary 
In this article, I have defended Kant’s league of states as a rational ideal 
constitutive of international justice against proponents of the standard criticism 
and the stage model interpretation. Against the latter position, I have considered 
textual evidence which indicates that the league is not merely the first stage of a 
process leading towards an international civil condition which has to find its final 
form in a state of states. More importantly, I have challenged the common premise 
of both competing positions, namely that a league of states is insufficient for 
establishing rightful relations between states. In contrast to this view, I have 
argued that normative concerns related to the rationale for establishing states lead 
Kant to conclusions with regard to international justice that differ from the 
conclusions he draws in the domestic sphere. In addition, I have argued that there 
is no contradiction involved here. By focusing on structural problems under ideal 
conditions, it can be explained why the institutional preconditions for rightful 
interaction are different in the domestic and the international sphere. The only 
international parallel to the state of nature between individuals is an 
                                                          
77 Ibid., 6:351. 
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indeterminacy problem which can be overcome by establishing an international 
public authority with judicial authority, i.e., a league of states. In other words, if my 
arguments are sound, there are good reasons to think that the ideal institutional 
structure for approaching perpetual peace which Kant has in mind is indicated by 
the three definitive articles of Toward Perpetual Peace: an order of independent 
republican states78 whose disputes are dealt with in a common intergovernmental 
organization, and whose citizens have a right to make attempts at contact across 
borders without thereby being treated as enemies. There are also good reasons to 
endorse this structure as a rational ideal as well as to reject the claim that it is at 
odds with Kant’s overall theory.79 
                                                          
78  By this I do not imply that an internal republican constitution is a criterion for membership in 
the league, only that the republican constitution is the ideal toward which states should strive 
as far as their internal order is concerned. 
79  Acknowledgements: In addition to an anonymous referee, I would like to thank Kristian Skagen 
Ekeli, Ståle Finke, Øystein Lundestad, Reidar Maliks, Helga Varden and Audun Øfsti for 
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Chapter 2 
Carl Schmitt and the Prohibition against 
Aggressive War 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Central to Carl Schmitt’s writings on international law is his critique of the 20th 
century efforts at making aggressive war an international crime. There are two 
aspects to this critique. First, there is a critique of a subtle and indirect form of 
imperialism associated with the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, and the 
rising power of the US.1 Second, there is a critique of the political efforts at 
criminalizing aggressive war from the end of the First World War onwards as such, 
irrespective of what particular interests these efforts served in the concrete 
historical context. In the following, I take issue with Schmitt’s critique, focusing on 
the latter aspect in particular. 
 Schmitt does not criticize these efforts at criminalizing aggressive war 
because he considers war to be something attractive. The problem is rather that 
prohibiting aggressive war can lead to a dangerous intensification of political 
conflicts, since the resulting ‘discriminatory concept of war’ will sharpen the 
antagonisms that always exist between political communities. Discriminating 
between aggressive and defensive war makes war a crime on one side and 
enforcement of justice on the other. Thereby, recognition of the enemy as a worthy 
opponent who is on a par with oneself is ruled out, which in turn puts traditional 
restraints on warfare at risk and prepares the ground for especially brutal and 
inhumane wars. 
                                                          
1  This aspect is what Leftist critics of the contemporary US hegemony in world politics 
sometimes find attractive in Schmitt. See, for instance, Douzinas 2007 and Mouffe 2005. 
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 This line of criticism is sometimes understood as a general critique of Just 
War theory and its introduction of moral notions into international politics. 
Allegedly, it is discrimination of political enemies in accordance with the moral 
distinction between good and evil that causes escalation of violence in 
international conflicts. In contrast to such readings, I argue that Schmitt has a more 
specific target in mind: the pacifistic attitude implicit in liberal individualism. It is 
liberal ideology that is the driving force behind the interwar efforts at 
criminalizing war, and it is the abstract universalism of liberalism combined with 
the inescapability of what Schmitt calls “the political” that causes intensification 
and brutalization of international conflict. Seeking the end of war in the name of 
humanity leads to a particularly intense asymmetrical relation between oneself 
and one’s enemy, because the enemy of this project is turned into the enemy of 
humanity, an inhuman monster that must be annihilated by any available means. 
And this is what sets in motion a dynamic of violence that potentially leads to the 
terror of total war. 
 In opposition to liberalism, Schmitt takes an affirmative stance in favor of 
the political, a stance that is also reflected in his speculations on an international 
Großraum-order which began in the late 1930s. Underlying this affirmation of the 
political is a radical form of anthropological pessimism according to which efforts 
at abolishing war are hopelessly utopian and apolitical undertakings. Such 
pessimism, I suggest, seems to be difficult to defend in any other way than as a 
subjective profession of faith. Consequently, one can call into question the 
relevance of Schmitt’s critique for people not sharing his religious-political faith. In 
addition, I suggest that 20th century experience not only raises questions 
concerning the realism of Schmitt’s defense of a non-discriminatory concept of 
war, but also indicate that he overstates the deep existential significance of the 
political. Although his diagnosis of a deceptive form of imperialism has some 
relevance in relation to contemporary political trends, the critique aimed at the 
criminalization of aggressive war does not seem sound. 
 Schmitt’s argument relies to a large extent on a historical narrative where 
efforts at making aggressive war an international crime are understood as part of a 
process that dissolves the classical European state-system and thereby as a threat 
to the civilizing achievements of this system. In section 2, I therefore present 
Schmitt’s analysis of this system, emphasizing the way in which he finds it a 
successful restraint on international violence. In section 3, I pinpoint the real 
target of his critique as the liberal individualism and universalism underlying the 
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interwar efforts at criminalizing aggressive war. Subsequently, in section 4, I 
explain how the liberal opposition to granting states a right to go to aggressive war 
in combination with the alleged inescapability of the political in Schmitt’s view 
leads to a dangerous intensification of enmity. In section 5, I briefly account for 
Schmitt’s affirmation of the political in terms of his preference for an international 
order of large regions (Großräume) or hemispheres dominated by a central power. 
Here, I also point out what role anthropological pessimism plays in Schmitt’s 
affirmation of the political. In section 6, I conclude by making some critical 
remarks regarding the soundness of Schmitt’s analysis. 
 
 
2. Jus publicum Europaeum 
An important backdrop for Schmitt’s critique of the attempt at criminalizing 
aggressive war is his analysis of the state-system that arose out of the European 
religious civil wars in the 16th and 17th centuries. This system, which he names jus 
publicum Europaeum, supposedly led to a progressive “limiting and bracketing 
[Hegung] of European wars.”2 It was a working order representing a common 
orientation among European sovereigns that succeeded in tempering violent 
conflicts between religious factions and that “signified the strongest possible 
rationalization and humanization of war.”3 In Schmitt’s view, it is this civilizing 
effect of the traditional European state-system that is put at risk by the interwar 
efforts at prohibiting aggressive war. 
 Schmitt presents the jus publicum Europaeum as the first global nomos of 
the Earth. Its global character was due to what – for the Europeans – represented 
discoveries that took place from the end of the 15th century. These discoveries for 
the first time made possible an international order that encompassed the world as 
a whole. When Schmitt speaks of this order as a nomos, he does so in opposition to 
“normativistic” approaches to jurisprudence – that is, theories of law that reduce 
legal orders to systems of material and procedural rules. Rather than a set of 
general rules, a nomos is a “concrete order,” a substantive political and social unity 
for which legal rules are secondary means.4 Importantly, such an order is 
connected to a concrete distribution of land. Seeing “land-appropriation” as “the 
                                                          
2  Schmitt 2003b [1950], p. 140. 
3  Ibid., p. 142. 
4  Schmitt 1993 [1934], pp. 10-20. 
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primary legal title that underlies all subsequent law,”5 Schmitt conceives of nomoi 
as “spatial orders” involving crucial spatial distinctions and divisions. 
 Accordingly, the jus publicum Europaeum was not primarily a treaty system 
based on voluntary agreed treaties and the principle pact sunt servanda, but an 
order based on “strong traditional ties” of a “religious, social, and economic 
character.”6 In the words of William Hooker, it was “a shared framework of 
understanding” within which politics took place.7 The most important spatial 
distinctions of this global nomos were (a) the distinction between land and sea and 
(b) the distinction between European and non-European soil. From this, a 
tripartite spatial division arose. First, there was European ground divided into 
territories of sovereign states. Second, there was non-European ground open for 
acquisition by European powers – i.e., potential colonies. Third, there was the sea, 
which could not be occupied by anyone and therefore remained an open space “for 
trade, fishing, and the free pursuit of maritime wars.”8 
 In view of these divisions, one can distinguish between two senses in which 
the European state-system signified a bracketing9 of war: a spatial sense and a 
metaphorical sense. Spatially, the bracketing of war refers to a demarcation line 
made by Europeans between European soil and the rest of the world, and the 
special status thereby given to European soil. As the centre or core of the jus 
publicum Europaeum, Europe was “the theatre of war …, the enclosed space in 
which … states could test their strength against one another under the watchful 
eyes of all European sovereigns.”10 Here, there was an anarchical order of equally 
sovereign states – a purely interstate order conceived as a balance of power, the 
stability of which depended partly on the equilibrium of continental land powers 
and, crucially, on the role of England as a balancing sea power.11 
                                                          
5  Schmitt 2003b [1950], p. 46 
6  Ibid., p. 148. 
7  Hooker 2009, p. 24. 
8  Schmitt 2003b [1950], p. 172; see also p. 148. 
9  “Bracketing” is Gary Ulmen’s translation of the German word Hegung, which literally means 
“enclosure” or “an area that is fenced in.” The translation seems somewhat misleading, but it 
has become standard terminology in the English-speaking secondary literature, and I 
therefore adopt it in this article. 
10  Ibid., p. 142. 
11  Being the dominant maritime power, England played an essential role for the balance of power 
on the European continent. Based on its naval superiority, England could keep continental 
wars and alliance politics at some distance and rather exercise its influence so as to maintain 
the balance among the land powers and thereby its own security. For Schmitt’s emphasis on 
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Metaphorically, the bracketing of war refers to the state-system’s tempering 
effect on war within Europe.12 On the European continent, territorial borders 
defined the distinction between inner jurisdiction and external self-assertion. 
Internal to these borders, sovereignty signified the highest authority within a 
centralized political and juridical order. Externally, in relation to other states, an 
important implication of being recognized as sovereign was the possession of jus 
ad bellum, i.e., the right to wage war. Qua sovereign, no state could be subjected to 
any superior authority empowered to resolve disputes between it and other states, 
and since each state was just as sovereign as any other, each state was conceded 
the same right to wage war as a last resort in the prosecution of its own claimed 
rights vis-à-vis other states.13 
Due to this right to wage war on the part of sovereign states, the European 
state-system recognized no normative distinction between aggressive and 
defensive war. The act of going to war was not in itself regarded as a crime, and the 
state defending itself against an attack was not seen as fighting a more just war 
than the attacker. There were of course acts recognized as war crimes in the sense 
of offenses against jus in bello – rules applying to parties engaged in war. Acts of 
war should be preceded by declarations of war, the parties of war were supposed 
to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, prisoners of war should 
be treated humanely and released at the end of hostilities, and those displaying a 
flag of truce should not be attacked, etc. However, no sovereign state could commit 
a crime of going to aggressive war, because the right to decide whether to go to 
war or not belonged to the sovereign. Accordingly, regular wars – that is, wars 
between sovereigns respecting the formal rules of war – had to be accounted 
equally just on both sides.14 As Schmitt sees it, this conception of war as a relation 
between sovereigns that recognized each other as equals was crucial for 
overcoming the brutal wars between religious factions plaguing Europe in the 16th 
and 17th centuries. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the significance of English sea power for the balance of power, see Schmitt 2003a [1955], pp. 
352-3; and Schmitt 2003b [1950], pp. 140, 145, 172-5, and 183. 
12  With regard to the account following here and in the next two sections, I owe much to 
Høibraaten 2010, esp. parts III and V. 
13  Schmitt 2003b [1950], p. 147. In his Doctrine of Right Kant similarly speaks of war as a 
permissible way for states to prosecute their rights against other states absent an 
international public institutional framework that enable them to settle disputes by a lawsuit. 
See Kant 1996a [1797], 6:346. 
14  Cf. Vattel 2008 [1758], p. 591; referred to by Schmitt 2003b [1950], p. 166. 
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 In contrast to medieval wars, the wars between Christian princes after the 
Reformation were not wars between parties subject to a common spiritual 
authority, but wars between parties that claimed to represent the one and only 
true faith while at the same time being divided on creedal grounds. Whereas 
medieval wars among Christians took place within the framework of a concrete 
order, the respublica Christiana, no such common ground existed for the 
belligerents in the religious wars after the schism of the 16th century. This resulted 
in wars according to the logic of civil war, which in Schmitt’s view is a particularly 
barbaric form of war since it is war within a political unity to which each of the 
warring factions lay an exclusive claim. 
 Before the schism, European wars were wars among parties that recognized 
the church as a common authority and as the institutional embodiment of an 
overarching Christian order. They were “bracketed” wars “distinguished from wars 
against non-Christian princes and peoples,” and “did not negate the unity of the 
respublica Christiana,” even when justified in accordance with Just War doctrine.15 
After the schism, however, Christianity was a contested concept to which each 
faction laid claim at the expense of their opponent. In this context, claims about 
waging war for a just cause could only be the self-righteous claim of a particular 
side – it was to make oneself judge over one’s enemy. As in civil war, it was a case 
of adversaries sitting in judgment over each other without ceasing to remain 
enemies. And since each side – in claiming to represent the only true Christian 
religion – laid a claim to the whole in a way that left no legitimate space for the 
adversary, the adversary was placed in a “position of absolute and unconditioned 
injustice.”16 According to Schmitt, this necessarily led to a hardening and 
deepening of hostilities to the point where the enemy was not seen as someone 
that had to be fought and driven back, but as someone that had to be annihilated. 
The enemy was outlawed in the name of the law, and thus the means and methods 
of law were turned into means and methods of extinction.17 
 Against this backdrop of religious civil war, the European state-system is 
portrayed as an effective limiting and bracketing of war, “the highest form of order 
within the scope of human power.”18 Rather than a conflict between parties that 
self-righteously condemned each other as unjust on creedal grounds, war now 
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became a conflict between justi hostes, or just enemies. Such a war could be 
characterized as a “war in due form,”19 comparable to a duel among gentlemen, 
where the question of justice no longer referred to the cause for which one fought, 
but to the formal status of the fighting parties. The “duel”-war was not a war where 
the one party was right and the other party was wrong, but a war between parties 
that were in their own right, provided they adhered to the procedural rules 
constituting jus in bello. Thereby, there was in Schmitt’s view established a “realm 
of relative reason,” where enemies were no longer fought by “methods of 
annihilation.”20 By setting the question of just cause to the side, the jus publicum 
Europaeum could acknowledge the justice of both sides in a regular war. In 
contrast to the unjust criminal, the just enemy was someone with whom one could 
conclude a peace treaty. This in turn prevented the worst excesses and prepared 
the ground for an effective legal regulation of war. War became a “regulated 
contest of forces,” a contest that provided “the only protection against a circle of 
increasing reprisals, i.e., against nihilistic hatreds and reactions whose 
meaningless goal lies in mutual destruction.”21 
 In other words, Schmitt links the civilizing effects of the European state 
system to its morally neutral or non-discriminatory concept of war. Because the 
equal justice of political adversaries was recognized, hostilities were tempered, 
and this enabled less brutal warfare circumscribed by formal rules of conduct. 
However, with the 20th century turn toward a discriminatory concept of war 
condemning aggressive war as a moral crime against humanity, this bracketing of 
war was threatened. Such condemnation transforms war from a contest between 
just enemies into an asymmetrical relation where justice belongs exclusively to 
one side. This in turn potentially implies a regression to the nihilistic logic of civil 
war. 
 
 
3. The target of Schmitt’s critique 
As regards the practical efforts at criminalizing aggressive war, Schmitt 
emphasizes the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the subsequent founding of the 
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League of Nations, the 1924 Geneva Protocol, and the 1928 Kellogg Pact.22 In the 
Treaty of Versailles, the indictment of William II (art. 227) and the so-called war 
guilt article (art. 231) were of particular importance. They both “must be 
considered to be a symptom of, if not a precedent for a conceptual change” toward 
a discriminatory concept of war.23 The founding Article 10 of the League of Nations 
declares that member states “undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of 
all Members,”24 and is succeeded by prescriptions for peaceful resolution of 
international conflicts. Further, the Geneva Protocol explicitly states that a war of 
aggression constitutes an international crime, whereas The Kellogg Pact condemns 
war as an instrument of national policy. 
 In Schmitt’s view, none of this was sufficient for establishing a legally 
binding prohibition against aggressive war. As things turned out, William II was 
never put to trial, and the major European powers did not push the issue. Since the 
war guilt article was placed under the heading “Reparations” rather than 
“Penalties,” Schmitt suggests that “one cannot say that the transformation of 
aggressive war into an international crime in the criminal sense was intended.”25 
In the Covenant of the League of Nations, one finds prescriptions for the 
prevention of war, but no formulations that explicitly criminalize aggressive war. 
And while the Geneva Protocol was accepted and signed by several states, it did 
not come into effect, as Czechoslovakia was the only state to ratify it. Finally, the 
Kellogg Pact not only lacked clear determinations of what constituted war as an 
instrument of national policy, but also lacked stipulations about penal action 
against aggressors as well as an organization to pursue wrongdoers. Accordingly, it 
could not be understood as forming the legal basis for a new international crime. 
 Yet, even if these diplomatic efforts did not succeed in criminalizing 
aggressive war, Schmitt still considers them to reflect an important trend that 
points in the direction of such a criminalization. This trend, which was also 
reflected in legal scholarship,26 took place along with a highly problematic 
dissolution of the traditional European state system. Partly due to lack of 
consciousness of traditional spatial distinctions, notably that between European 
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state territory and colonial possession, and partly due to the rising power of the 
US, the concrete European order of states had been declining into an abstract 
“global universalism lacking any spatial sense” since the end of the 19th century.27 
As a consequence, mutual recognition among states could no longer refer to a 
“homogeneity among the recognizing and recognized,” because all that was left 
was “a collection of states randomly joined together by factual relations – a 
disorganized mass of more than 50 heterogeneous states, lacking any spatial or 
spiritual consciousness of what they once had in common.”28 
 Most of what Schmitt finds wrong about the new constellation is reflected in 
the League of Nations, a recurring object of critique throughout his writings. 
Aspiring to be a “universal” or all-inclusive organization comprising states from all 
over the world, the League for one thing lacked a basic degree of homogeneity 
requisite for an effective bracketing of war. Second, it was a vehicle for the indirect 
imperialism of the US. Not only was the Monroe Doctrine given priority over the 
League Charter, but the US, despite its official non-membership, was still 
effectively present in the League via the numerous member states from the 
Western Hemisphere whose “sovereignty” was qualified by their US-dependency.29 
Third, the League served as an instrument for the continued subjugation of 
Germany in giving the Treaty of Versailles a veneer of legitimacy, thus securing 
France and Britain’s war booty. Finally, and in this context most importantly, the 
League symbolized the interwar efforts at criminalizing aggressive war.30 
 In view of the international disorder of the 20th century in general, and the 
interwar period in particular, Schmitt does not see any prospect for effective ways 
of preventing, or of upholding an eventual prohibition against, aggressive war. 
Instead, and despite the efforts at making aggressive war an international crime, 
new possibilities for justifying war are generated. It now becomes possible to wage 
defensive war against war – that is, a war to end all future wars. Referring to the 
situation in interwar Europe, Schmitt specifically points to strong anti-war 
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sentiments seeking the abolition of war as a likely rationale for waging a final war 
against aggressors, and, at the same time, warns against the catastrophic 
consequences of such a war: “[T]he absolute last war of humanity … is necessarily 
unusually intense and inhuman because … it … degrades the enemy into moral and 
other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be 
defeated but also utterly destroyed.”31 In line with this, the League of Nations is 
elsewhere described as nothing but “a means to the preparation of a war that is in 
the fullest sense ‘total:’ namely, a war backed by trans-state and trans-national 
claims to justice.”32 
 According to some commentators, this warning against the inhumane 
potential contained in humanitarian efforts at criminalizing aggressive war is 
grounded in a general critique of Just War theory on Schmitt’s part. On these 
readings, Schmitt endorses a non-discriminatory concept of war, indifferent vis-à-
vis the distinction between just and unjust war, because the alternative, 
introducing discriminatory moral notions into international conflicts, tends to feed 
self-righteousness and thus to promote the escalation of violence. As Chris Brown 
puts it, “the basic logic of the Just War” on Schmitt’s view implies “that the unjust 
must be defeated whatever the cost.”33 Similarly, Gabriella Slomp writes that “the 
condemnation of the idea of just war is a recurring theme” in his writings because 
“a commitment to just war results in the demonization of the enemy.”34 
 Although this takes important aspects of Schmitt’s analysis into 
consideration, I do not think it is entirely adequate as an account of his opposition 
to a discriminatory concept of war. It is true that he emphasizes the separation of 
the question of justa causa from the question of justus hostis when accounting for 
the civilizing force of the jus publicum Europaeum. It is also true that he takes a 
critical stance toward the re-emergence of Just War terminology in 20th century 
international law. In The Concept of the Political he affirmatively writes: “That 
justice does not belong to the concept of war has been generally recognized since 
Grotius.”35 And in the above quote, the inhumanity of war against war seems to be 
explained as a consequence of the degradation of political enemies by means of 
moral (and other) categories. 
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 While this suggests that judging political adversaries in moral terms as evil 
is what ultimately lifts all restraints on international violence, at least two things 
are missed if one reads Schmitt’s critique simply as a general critique of Just War 
theory. First, the historical contrast to European bracketed wars he refers to is not 
primarily medieval just war, but religious civil war. Second, he draws an important 
distinction between medieval Just War doctrine and the attempts of his own 
contemporaries to apply ideas from this tradition to a completely different context 
and for completely different purposes: “the modern distinction between just and 
unjust war lacks any inherent relation to medieval scholastic doctrine … If today 
some formulas of the doctrine of just war … are utilized in modern and global 
formulas, this does not signify a return to, but rather a fundamental transformation 
of concepts of enemy, war, concrete order, and justice presupposed in medieval 
doctrine.”36 
 To be sure, Schmitt does not consider medieval Just War doctrine to be 
unproblematic. At the same time, he generally takes a more sympathetic stance to 
it than to its 20th century counterpart. Despite carrying with it a potential for total 
war,37 the medieval doctrine was still embedded in a concrete order kept together 
by common faith and recognition of the church as a common spiritual authority 
(potestas spiritualis). For this reason, just wars were not necessarily self-righteous 
crusades justifying all sorts of atrocities, but could also be bracketed wars, at least 
among Christians.38 Even justified “punitive” wars were compatible with 
recognition of the opponent as a just enemy.39 By contrast, modern just war 
doctrine seeks to outlaw aggressive war and to turn the aggressor into a criminal. 
Thereby, equality and mutual recognition among just enemies is excluded. In fact, 
the aggressor is no longer someone against whom one fights a real war, because, as 
a criminal, he becomes no more than an object of violent measures: “the action 
taken against him … is merely the execution of justice and, ultimately … only a 
measure taken against a parasite or trouble-maker.”40 
 In view of this differentiation, one should avoid reading Schmitt simply as a 
critic of Just War theory. The more specific target of his critique, I contend, is 
rather the abstract universalism of liberalism. The ultimate source of modern wars 
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of annihilation is not merely the introduction of moral distinctions between just 
and unjust war into international conflicts, but also, and just as much “the pseudo-
religion of absolute humanity”41 which seeks to abolish war, although without 
being able to escape the logic of what Schmitt calls “the political”. 
 
 
4. Political versus liberal universalism 
True to his own statement “all political concepts … have a polemical meaning,”42 
Schmitt coins the concept of the political with a specific opponent in view, namely 
liberal individualism. Characteristic of liberal thinking, he claims, is its lack of 
positive political ideas. First and foremost, liberalism is a critique of politics that 
seeks the limitation of state power for the sake of individual freedom and private 
property. In the domestic domain, this individualistic impulse leads to diverse 
methods for taming and controlling the power of state and government such as the 
division of powers and constitutionally entrenched civil rights, but no constructive 
ideas about the public organization of communities.43 In the international domain, 
it provides the liberal with a rationale for criminalizing aggressive war. A right to 
go to war in the sense of the jus publicum Europaeum implies that a political 
community can demand of its citizens that they fight its enemies and, if necessary, 
sacrifice their own life. Yet, “from the viewpoint of the private individual,” this is 
“lack of freedom and repression,” and “eo ipso something evil.”44 
 In opposition to the liberal “system of demilitarized and depoliticalized 
concepts”45 Schmitt defines the political in terms of the distinction between friend 
and enemy. This distinction corresponds to, but is also independent of other 
distinctions, such as the moral distinction between good and evil, the economic 
distinction between profitable and unprofitable, or the aesthetic distinction 
between beautiful and ugly. Positively, the distinction between friend and enemy 
“denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association 
or dissociation.”46 “The political enemy,” Schmitt writes, “is … the other, the 
stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, 
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existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts 
with him are possible.”47 The enemy need not be someone we think of as immoral 
or repugnant, although, as Schmitt also points out, he is easily treated as such. Nor 
does moral corruption or aesthetic unattractiveness necessarily make someone an 
enemy. What is in all cases decisive is rather the intensity of the disassociation, 
which in the final resort can lead to violent conflict with, and thus possibly the 
physical killing, of the enemy. 
 When Schmitt further specifies the political enemy as the public enemy he 
also has the polemic against liberalism in view. In liberalism, the enemy tends to be 
transformed into an economic competitor, a debating adversary, or someone one 
hates on a personal basis. Contrary to this, Schmitt emphasizes that enmity is a 
relation between politically constituted groups, and that an “enemy exists only 
when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar 
collectivity.”48 This means that the possibility of violent conflict inherent in enmity 
refers to the possibility of war, although not in the sense that political antagonisms 
normally take the form of war or that war is something desirable. Political action is 
not the same as military action. Nor is war the aim or purpose of politics. The 
crucial thing is rather the existence of war “as an ever present possibility” that 
“determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates 
a specifically political behavior.”49 
 To say that war is an ever present possibility determining human action and 
thinking is to say that the political is inescapable. The division into friend-enemy 
groupings is essential to the human condition, and any attempt at escaping the 
logic of the political is futile. From this, it does not follow that specific groups 
forever have to remain enemies, or that the political constitutes a domain of its 
own, apart from other domains of human life. Despite the independence of the 
friend-enemy distinction vis-à-vis other distinctions, such distinctions, be they 
moral, economic, aesthetic, or religious ones, can nevertheless be transformed into 
political distinctions. The political “does not describe its own substance, but only 
the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can 
be religious, national …, economic, or of another kind and can effect at different 
times different coalitions and separations.”50 Rather than some substantial content 
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that forever divides groups into friends and enemies, the political refers to the 
degree of intensity of an intergroup relation capable of turning a non-political 
antithesis into a political antithesis.51 Such a transformation takes place at the 
point when a group starts orienting itself and acts with a view toward the 
possibility of war. At this point a former non-political entity becomes a political 
entity. 
 The political entity has the final say with regard to the friend-enemy 
distinction. It is decisive or authoritative when it comes to decisions concerning 
the possibility of violent conflict with another political entity. Only the political 
entity can demand of its members a readiness to die and to kill for the sake the 
entity itself. This capacity to instigate a readiness to die and kill, Schmitt claims, 
cannot be normatively circumscribed: “War … has no normative meaning, but an 
existential meaning only … [N]o rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no 
program no matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no 
legitimacy nor legality … could justify men in killing each other.”52 The only 
possible justification for war is the presence of “a real enemy” that poses “an 
existential threat to one’s own way of life.”53 And the decision as to who is the real 
enemy belongs entirely to the political entity. In the most extreme cases of political 
conflict the perspective of participants has an absolute primacy over the 
perspective of detached observers. Precisely what constitutes the utmost degree of 
intensity between collectives, so that violent conflict between them is possible, 
“can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the 
judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party. Only the actual 
participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation 
and settle the extreme case of conflict.”54 
 It is analytically implied in the concept of the political that “the political 
world is a pluriverse, not a universe.”55 Only if the political world consists of a 
multiplicity of political entities can the distinction between friend and enemy be 
drawn. In a universal state embracing all of humanity, there is no place for such a 
distinction. This is not to say that the political pluriverse has to consist of a 
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plurality of sovereign states. The sovereign territorial state is in Schmitt’s view not 
a universal organizational form for political entities. It is rather a particular and 
contingent form bound to a specific geographical area and a specific historical 
period, namely Europe from the 16th to the 20th century. It was preceded by other 
political forms, and it is likely that it will be replaced by new ones in the future.56 
That the political world is a pluriverse therefore primarily means that the 
existence of a political entity – of whatever form – presupposes the existence of 
another political entity, whereas the idea of a universal political unit is self-
contradictory because it excludes the possibility of enmity. 
 A further implication of the concept of the political related to this is that 
“humanity,” the core concept of liberalism, is not a political concept. “Humanity” is 
a concept that covers everyone born human, referring to their equality qua human 
beings. Being a concept entailing no specific differentiations, it cannot give rise to 
any concrete political distinction, since even enemies remain human beings.57 
Rather than a political concept, “humanity” is the principle of bourgeois freedom, 
and “freedom,” Schmitt writes, citing the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, 
“constitutes nothing.”58 
 At the same time, Schmitt does not reject the importance or value of 
“humanity” as a moral concept. On the contrary, he considers it to be an elevated 
concept, comparable to the concept of God; a concept whose dignity resides in it 
being enthroned above political divisions. It is a concept that unites everyone, 
irrespective of their particular political, religious or other allegiances, and can 
therefore temper and moderate discords and conflicts between groups.59 Yet this 
tempering capacity of the concept presupposes that it is not distorted by being 
caught up in political struggles. 
 That “humanity” is an apolitical concept does not mean that it cannot be put 
to political use. Given its lack of an identifiable enemy “humanity as such cannot 
wage war,” but wars can very well be “waged in the name of humanity.”60 Far from 
being wars for the sake of humanity, the latter kind of wars would be wars where 
one political grouping usurps the concept of humanity in its fight against its enemy. 
It is precisely this kind of usurpation that Schmitt sees as particularly dangerous. 
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Once “humanity” is used for political purposes the concept loses its capacity to 
restrain political antagonisms, because it is transformed into what Reinhart 
Kosselleck has termed an “asymmetric counterconcept” – that is, a classification 
that articulates the identity of a person or group vis-à-vis other persons and 
groups in a way implying lack of mutual recognition.61 To identify one’s own group 
with humanity is to make a qualitative differentiation between particulars by 
means of a universal concept. This can only come at the price of denying the 
quality of being human to the enemy. If the constitutive trait of one’s own group is 
to represent humanity, then the existentially other, the alien, can only be the 
inhuman. And this ultimately turns a tempering and moderating moral concept 
into a vehicle for excessive and barbaric violence: “To confiscate the word 
humanity … probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy 
the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a 
war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.”62 
 It is less the vocabulary of just and unjust war than the liberal-humanitarian 
urge to escape the alleged inescapable logic of the political that unleashes the 
terror of total war in the 20th century. Given the political as a basic aspect of the 
human condition, any attempt at abolishing the political becomes, as Leo Strauss 
points out, entangled in a contradiction.63 Such efforts can only succeed by 
becoming political – that is, by grouping men into friends and enemies and driving 
pacifists into a war against non-pacifists. Insofar as such a war against war is 
waged in the name of humanity, however, liberal pacifists leave no legitimate 
space for their political enemy, the proponent of classical interstate “war in due 
form.” As in the case of religious civil war, the enemy is placed in a “position of 
absolute and unconditioned injustice”64 and thus reduced to a mere object of 
violent measures – an inhuman monster that has to be exterminated. 
 Precisely the attempt to eliminate the political in the name of humanity, 
then, is what lifts all restraints on international violence. In contrast to enmity 
based on economic, religious, national, etc. antitheses, which presupposes the 
common humanity of friends and enemies, the identification of one’s own cause 
with humanity turns the political adversary into an enemy of humanity. Far from 
referring to the equality of every person, the political abuse of the concept of 
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humanity has a particularly intense divisive power that bears with it an awful 
potential for slaughter. Used asymmetrically, not only does the concept correlate 
with its antithesis, “inhumanity,” but also for all practical purposes it realizes the 
distinction between superhuman (Übermensch) and subhuman (Untermensch). 
And for the subhuman, only extermination and annihilation waits.65 
 
 
5. Großraum and the anthropological grounding of the political 
On the face of things, Schmitt’s invocation of the political is an objective and 
descriptive account of an apparent blind spot in liberalism. The distinction 
between friend and enemy is said to be “inherent reality,” something that “cannot 
be denied” and that “remains actual” as “an ever present possibility for every 
people existing in the political sphere.”66 Yet, as Strauss correctly remarks, the 
appeal to the political is more than the recognition of political enmity as a 
persistent historical fact. Schmitt does not merely pinpoint an essential aspect of 
the human condition overlooked by liberalism, but normatively affirms a political 
world divided into plural and antagonistically related political entities.67 The 
political, to which belong enmity and the possibility of war, is not only real, but 
should also be vindicated. It should be vindicated as a modest and rational 
alternative to “any world- and humanity-encompassing universalism” that can only 
lead to a dangerous intensification of enmity.68 For Schmitt, international order 
cannot have its meaning in the elimination of war. Ideas such as Kant’s project for 
perpetual peace are hopelessly utopian, and in the final resort undermine the 
possibility of international order. In international relations, an effective bracketing 
of war is the most we can hope and strive for, and this therefore represents “the 
highest form of order within the scope of human power.”69  
This affirmation of the political is not, however, a plea for a return to the 
traditional European state system. Being intertwined with the sovereign territorial 
state as the dominant organizational form for political entities, the jus publicum 
Europaeum is bound to a particular time and place in the same way as the former. 
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Even if Schmitt speaks of “peoples unified into states” as the preferable alternative 
to liberal universalism at least as late as 1930,70 in 1938 he rejects that his 
criticism of the turn toward a discriminatory concept of war is “directed … against 
the idea of fundamentally new orders.”71 And one year later, in 1939, he presents 
the idea of a Großraum principle that is to replace “state territory” as the relevant 
spatial concept for theoretically dealing with questions about international 
order.72 
According to the Großraum principle, which is modeled on the 1823 Monroe 
Doctrine, a limited number of large regions (Großräume) or hemispheres, each 
dominated by a hegemonic power or Reich, could be the constitutive elements of a 
new nomos and bracketing of war. Rather than territorially defined political 
entities, the Großräume are exclusive spheres of influence where the political ideas 
of the hegemonic power “radiate,” and thus transcend the borders of the states 
within the respective Großraum.73 These spheres of influence are regions of states 
that share a common cultural and ideological orientation, and that live under the 
authority of a leading power whose exceptional status relies on its capacity to 
protect against interventions by so-called spatially alien (raumfremde) powers. 
Although a Großraum system does not exclude interaction or legal relations 
between and across the different regions,74 each region represents a separate 
space constituted by political entities sharing a unifying political idea that qua 
political is polemically directed against the politically unifying ideas of other 
regions. On this model, the traditional principle of non-intervention is transferred 
from the state level to the level of regions. Non-intervention no longer refers to the 
right of sovereign states to organize their internal affairs without interference 
from other states, but to the right of hegemonic powers to keep spatially alien 
powers out of their own backyard. 
A pluriverse of Großräume is not the only possible constellation for a future 
global order envisaged by Schmitt. Speculating on possible models for a new nomos 
of the Earth in the mid-50s he saw at least two other alternatives. One was a 
                                                          
70  Schmitt 1999 [1930], p. 205. 
71  Schmitt 2011c [1937], p. 74. 
72  Schmitt 2011a [1939]. 
73  Ibid., p. 101. 
74  On this point, Schmitt makes a fourfold division between (a) relations between Großräume as 
wholes, (b) relations between the hegemonic powers of the Großräume, (c) relations between 
states within a Großraum, and (d) relations between states belonging to different Großräume. 
Ibid., p. 110. 
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unified world ruled and administered by one great power – whichever would 
emerge as the victorious party from the cold war. Another was a hegemonic 
balance structure similar to that of the jus publicum Euroaeum, yet with the US, 
rather than England, in the role as a balancing power.75 Although it remained an 
open question for Schmitt what kind of order would eventually replace the 
traditional European state system, he evidently saw a balance between internally 
homogeneous Großräume as the most favorable alternative,76 whereas any 
unification of humanity under a single sovereign would be a “frightful” and 
“dubious progress.”77 
Underlying the affirmation of the political is an “anthropological profession 
of faith:” that man is “by nature evil.”78 This presupposition, which in Schmitt’s 
view is shared by all genuine political theories, should not, however, “be taken … in 
any specifically moral or ethical sense,” but “in a rather summary fashion” as “the 
answer to the question whether man is a dangerous being or not, a risky or a 
harmless creature.”79 That man is by nature evil does not imply that intentional 
wickedness is an essential trait of human nature, but that mankind is a species 
with a problematic and dangerous nature – that human beings represent a threat 
to other human beings, and, accordingly, are vulnerable beings in need of 
protection and care. 
At first sight, this might seem trivial. Does anyone consider human beings to 
be unproblematic or harmless? What is controversial about Schmitt’s 
anthropological pessimism is not the assumption of dangerousness as such, but the 
denial of the possibility of historical progress. In his view, evil does not only 
“appear as corruption, weakness, cowardice, stupidity, or … brutality, sensuality, 
vitality, irrationality,” but is also the opposite of goodness, which “may appear … as 
reasonableness, perfectibility, the capacity of being manipulated, of being taught, 
peaceful, and so forth.”80 In other words, that man is by nature evil means that 
mankind is incapable of being taught or of being peaceful. Exceptional men can be 
educated so as to become part of a community’s cultural and political elite, but the 
species as a whole does not learn, and cannot manage to organize internally and 
externally peaceable societies. In human relations at all places and at all times 
                                                          
75  Schmitt 2003a [1955], pp. 354-5. 
76  Ibid., p. 355. 
77  Ibid.; and Schmitt 1987 [1978], p. 80. 
78  Schmitt 1996 [1932], p. 58. 
79  Ibid., pp. 58 and 61. 
80  Schmitt 1996 [1932], p. 58. 
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there is an ineradicable element of violence that threatens to disrupt whatever 
established order there is. 
This non-trivial form of anthropological pessimism forms the basis for a 
stark opposition between liberal universalism and political order. For Schmitt, the 
formula of political order is “protego ergo obligo.”81 Whoever provides some 
degree of security and protection against internal and external enemies is to be 
obeyed. In every political community there is a necessary element of personal rule 
or domination that cannot be dissolved into a neutral rule of law guaranteeing the 
maximal individual freedom compatible with equal freedom for all. This goes even 
for democratic communities, which on Schmitt’s analysis are closer to dictatorship 
than to liberalism.82 A sovereign power that keeps subversive forces internal to a 
state in check and that protects against external aggressors is always required. 
Only if one presupposes that the human race is capable of learning does it make 
sense to limit political power for the sake of individual freedom – domestically in 
order to throw off the yoke of personal rule in favor of the rule of law and 
internationally in order to limit the state’s power over life and death. From the 
perspective of the anthropological pessimist, however, bourgeois freedom, the 
guiding principle of liberalism, is not only externally related to political order, but 
in the final resort detrimental to any order or nomos in the domestic as well as in 
the international domain.83 
 
 
6. Concluding critical discussion 
The problematic part of Schmitt’s affirmation of the political is not the implied 
advocacy of an international order consisting of plural political entities. There is 
                                                          
81  Schmitt 1996 [1932], p. 52. 
82  Schmitt 1985 [1923], pp. 13-17 and 25-30. Two crucial conceptual moves open up for the 
possible combination of democracy and dictatorship: i) the definition of democratic equality as 
substantial equality or homogeneity, and ii) the definition of democracy as “identity of ruler 
and ruled” (and not, as in Rousseau and Kant, identity of author and subject of law). See 
Schmitt 2008 [1928], pp. 263-4. 
83  Throughout this article, I have explained how the criminalization of war – the imposition of 
international restraints on state sovereignty in the name of humanity – allegedly implies a 
return to the nihilistic logic of the religious civil wars. Similarly, Schmitt explains the malaise 
of the Weimar Republic, a state whose unity was threatened by heterogeneous social forces, at 
least in part as a consequence of the hollowing out of state power by liberal Rechtsstaat 
principles such as basic rights and division of powers. 
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nothing wrong with pluralism as such. The problematic part is rather the implied 
non-discriminatory concept of war and the corresponding authoritarian 
conception of domestic politics. 
 Inasmuch as the crucial elements of Schmitt’s conception of political order – 
peace, security, protection, obedience – are antithetically contrasted with freedom, 
it can justifiably be characterized as a “one-sided” and “repressive” conception.84 
Theorists of the Enlightenment tradition, from Rousseau and Kant to Habermas, 
would consider the antithesis on which it is based as false. In their view, individual 
freedom and political order are co-constitutive rather than externally related. 
Political order is not a substance conceptually prior to or ranked higher than 
individual freedom. Nor is individual freedom identified with a pre-political set of 
natural rights that must be imposed on political orders from the outside. Instead, 
the freedom of each, their right to reciprocally regulated spheres of free choice, is 
enabled by and realized within political orders, whereas the substance of political 
order is precisely the realization of freedom via democratic self-legislation. On the 
one hand, we can become free from dependence on the arbitrariness of other 
individuals only by subjecting ourselves to the coercive power of the state. On the 
other hand, the only way to avoid domination by the state’s executive power is to 
subject the latter to the sovereign legislative will of the people. Certainly, on this 
conception the idea of equal freedom for all limits the legitimate use of political 
power. Legal norms and institutional arrangements that entitle some person or 
persons to subject others to their own arbitrary choice or that create systematic 
relations of dependency between persons are ruled out. Yet such limits are not 
meaningfully conceived as external restraints imposed on political communities, 
since, as implications of the idea of equal freedom, they are internal to the 
constitutive idea of political order.85 
 In Kant, this idea of a freedom-enabling democratic order motivates the 
“philosophical project” “Toward perpetual peace”86 aiming at the replacement of 
the European order of states established by the peace of Westphalia in 1648 with 
an international civil order of “universal and lasting peace.”87 An alleged right to go 
war is not only at odds with the equal sovereignty of states, but also represents a 
threat to the civil and political freedom of each state’s citizens. Accordingly, an 
                                                          
84  Brunkhorst 2004, p. 516. 
85  See, for instance, Kant 1996a [1797]; and Habermas 1996, esp. chapters 3 and 4. 
86  Kant 1996c [1795], 8:341. 
87  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:355. 
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international legal order that prohibits war is a precondition for law-governed 
interaction where “the freedom of choice of one can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law.”88 Working toward a stable and 
peaceful international legal order is therefore in Kant’s view a duty. Specifically, 
this means working toward the establishment of an international public authority, 
a league of states, empowered to adjudicate conflicts between states. Peace based 
on a balance of power, he mocks as “a mere fantasy” comparable to a certain 
“Swift’s house that the builder had constructed in such perfect accord with all the 
laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a sparrow alighted upon it.”89 
For Schmitt, however, such a project reflects anthropological optimism, and 
must therefore be rejected as apolitical. The fact that Kant repeatedly make rather 
harsh judgments on a corrupt human nature, for instance by characterizing men as 
being made of “such warped wood” that “nothing straight can be fashioned” from 
them90 and emphasizing their malevolence and desire to dominate others,91 does 
not count for much in this connection. Implied in the view that there is an 
obligation to work toward perpetual peace is a belief in possible progress: that 
deep political conflicts eventually can be tempered and resolved peacefully in 
processes where neutral third parties act as judges. And this is to deny that the 
political is unavoidable. 
Yet it is in no way clear what warrants Schmitt’s anthropological grounding 
of the political. At no point does he provide us with any compelling reason for 
thinking that human nature is so radically evil that progress is impossible. Nor 
does it seem likely that any such reason can be provided. Unless one adheres to a 
circular view of history, no appeal to the violent past of humanity can suffice in this 
context. As argued by some interpreters, what instead seems to form the basis of 
Schmitt’s anthropological pessimism is a profession of religious faith: that every 
human being by birth is a creature tainted by original sin.92 To profess 
anthropological pessimism, on this reading, is to recognize and affirm man’s 
subservience to God. It is to acknowledge that mankind cannot make it on its own, 
and therefore is in need of divine guidance. By contrast, anthropological optimism 
reflects disobedience toward God. Inherent in the Enlightenment belief in possible 
                                                          
88  Ibid., 6:230. 
89  Kant 1996b [1793], 8:312. 
90  Kant 1983 [1784], 8:23. 
91  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:307 and 6:312. 
92  See, for instance, Meier 1998. 
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progress is the idea of a common life based on the authority of human reason 
alone. This is to deny that enmity is essential to the order of human things, which 
in turn is to deny the Christian dogmas of original and inherited sin. In this 
perspective, Schmitt’s paraphrase of Proudhon, “whoever invokes humanity wants 
to cheat,”93 need not only be read as a critique of a deceptive form of imperialism, 
but can also be understood as referring to a deceptive “battle against God … in the 
name of mankind.”94 
 But if it is correct that anthropological pessimism, the fundamental premise 
of Schmitt’s affirmation of the political, ultimately rests on religious faith, it is not 
so easy to engage with it at the level of philosophical argument. How can one argue 
against revelation? And why should anyone not sharing Schmitt’s version of 
Christian faith find his critique of the efforts at criminalizing aggressive war an 
important contribution to a debate on international law and politics? For those 
who do not do so, I believe at least two considerations that speak against an 
affirmation of the political can be put forward. 
 First, one could question whether it makes much moral sense to defend a 
sovereign right to go to war after the experience with total war in the 20th century. 
Arguably, one lesson to be learnt from this experience is that reserving such a right 
to states is not a particularly good way of preventing excessive violence in war.95 
Considering the destructive potential of modern weapons technology, Schmitt’s 
defense of the right to go to war has something surreal about it. To the extent that 
the faith in the dangerousness of man in the final resort rules out impartial 
mediation of political conflicts by third parties, one has to ask: Can we really afford 
the luxury of such an extravagant faith? 
 Second, one could ask whether historical experience does not give us reason 
to question the harsh and unrelenting quality ascribed to political antagonisms by 
Schmitt. Even if it can be argued that there was no legally established prohibition 
against aggressive war before World War II, non-aggression has nevertheless been 
a peremptory norm of international law at least since the war crimes tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. Saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war” 
and providing “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace” is also the most important purpose of the UN.96 In addition, 
                                                          
93  Schmitt 1996 [1932], p. 54. 
94  Meier 1998, p. 23. 
95  Cf. Habermas 1998, p. 194. 
96  UN Charter, Preamble and art. 1. 
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basic human rights have become binding norms of international law via the 1945 
UN Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and in 
numerous other ways. Since the end of the Cold War we further have had wars and 
military interventions publicly justified either as response to the international 
crime of aggression or as humanitarian defense of civilians. And, according to 
official political rhetoric, even the wars of aggression waged by western powers 
since 9/11 are not simply wars against enemies of western-style secular society, 
but wars in defense of universal human values.97 
On the one hand, this can be seen as confirming the relevance of Schmitt’s 
critique of liberalism understood as a critique of the tendency to appropriate 
universalist moral language for political purposes. Like any other normative 
concept, so the concept of humanity can be abused, and today the language of 
universal human rights is not only the language of political opposition and critics 
of power throughout the world, but also the language of hegemonic powers that 
seek an exceptional status in the international system. Such exceptionalism further 
seems to be a danger inherent in a certain strand of contemporary cosmopolitan 
thought which seeks to replace state sovereignty with universal human rights as 
the moral basis for international law. Recognizing individuals rather than states as 
the ultimate subjects of international law, proponents of this form of 
cosmopolitanism ascribe no fundamental normative significance to territorial 
borders and defend military interventions for the moral purpose of promoting just 
institutions or of protecting human rights.98 Accordingly, they support a 
development toward a non-egalitarian international order where powerful states 
can intervene in other states on the basis of their own arbitrary moral judgment. In 
opposition to such views, Schmitt’s affirmation of the political would be attractive 
if it did not come along with authoritarian anti-individualism and a non-
discriminatory concept of war.99 
                                                          
97  See, for instance, Blair 2007. 
98  See, for instance, Caney 2005, Moellendorf 2002, and Tesón 1997. For a good critical 
discussion of Tesón, see Eberl 2008, pp. 124-46. 
99  With Jean Cohen 2006, I believe the main problem with the cosmopolitan position is not so 
much the talk about universal human rights as overemphasis on such rights in combination 
with neglect of the fundamental normative importance of state sovereignty. We can therefore 
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the political at the expense of individual freedom the cosmopolitans emphasize individual 
freedom at the expense of the political. 
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On the other hand, that Schmitt’s diagnosis of an indirect form of 
imperialism can be seen as relevant in view of current political trends does not 
mean that he provides a sound critique of the criminalization of aggressive war or 
of Kant’s project for perpetual peace. None of the wars in which western powers 
have been involved the last 20 years were symmetrical contests of force between 
just enemies. Nor were they uncontroversial. Yet, whatever stance one takes 
regarding the legitimacy of these wars, it is questionable whether any of them 
were particularly inhumane compared to wars wrapped up in non-humanitarian 
rhetoric. No doubt, the experience of war must have been terrible for those directly 
involved. There is no such thing as humane warfare. Still, criticizing the two Iraq 
Wars, the bombing of Serbia, the war in Afghanistan, or the intervention in the 
Libyan civil war for being total wars of annihilation seems to be far off target. What 
should be criticized is the combination of discriminatory practices and pursuance 
of limited political goals, such as retaining geopolitical hegemony or controlling 
vital natural resources. Rather than brutal extermination driven by universalistic 
rhetoric, the current configuration appears to be one of hegemonic control 
legitimized as defense of alleged universal values. While this certainly is 
distressing, it also indicates that Schmitt generally overstates existential otherness 
as a constitutive feature of political antagonisms, and, consequently, that a central 
premise of his critique of liberal universalism and a discriminatory concept of war 
can be put into question.  
 On the interpretation presented in this article, the idea of a radical 
difference separating political adversaries and excluding possible mediation of 
political conflicts by neutral third parties is crucial for Schmitt’s positioning in 
favor of the political. Only if political enmity is as sharp and deep-seated as he 
claims does the thesis of total war as a result of prohibiting aggressive war appear 
warranted. By contrast, if total war is merely assumed to be a persistent logical 
possibility in view of the openness of the future, there is no reason to worry more 
about wars in the name of humanity than there is reason to worry about wars in 
any other name, be it moral ideals, religion, glory, national interests, etc. War is in 
any case a grim condition that ought to be avoided. If it breaks out, combatting 
parties most likely already have or eventually will develop discriminatory 
attitudes toward each other nonetheless.100 In other words, unless the element of 
radical otherness is presupposed, it does not seem to make much of a difference 
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whether war is fought in the name of universalistic or particularistic causes. If this 
element is missing, there is no apparent reason why there is anything wrong in 
making aggressive war an international crime.101 Given the high stakes, the 
criminalization of aggressive war arguably has been a progressive step in the 
evolution of international law. Although it does not by itself prevent war or 
escalation of violence in war, it potentially provides political leaders that risk being 
put to trial with incentives for seeking peaceful solutions to international conflicts. 
For this reason alone, it should be affirmed. In addition, the prohibition against 
aggressive war accords better with mutual recognition among states than does a 
sovereign right to go to war. If all states have a right to pursue their claimed rights 
unilaterally by means of war, the sovereignty of each state depends on arbitrary 
decisions made by other states. As a result, the only sovereign is the strongest state 
or coalition of states. Therefore, contrary to what Schmitt thinks, limiting 
sovereignty by renouncing the traditional jus ad bellum is an affirmation of the 
equal sovereignty of states.102 
                                                          
101  Conversely, if Schmitt is right about the political, there also seems to be something to say in 
favor of his analysis of a dangerous potential for slaughter entailed in the political 
appropriation of universalist moral ideas. Inasmuch as political enmity does not allow for third 
party mediation and only the actual participants in a conflict can decide whether the 
possibility of war shall remain possible or become reality, criminalizing aggressive war indeed 
seems like a problematic project. The question, of course, is why we should think he is right. 
Michael Jeismann has suggested that radical otherness, which Schmitt presents as the defining 
feature of the political, first and foremost has a strong affinity to the modern idea of the nation. 
See Jeismann 1992, pp. 383-4. If Jeismann is right in this, the political, in the sense of an 
especially intense relation of association and dissociation is less a universal feature of the 
human condition than a phenomenon related to the development of a distinct national 
consciousness in the epoch after the French Revolution. I am indebted to Helge Høibraaten for 
the reference to Jeismann. 
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Chapter 3 
A Cosmopolitan Defense of State Sovereignty 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Cosmopolitan normative commitments are often considered incompatible with 
recognition of state sovereignty as a basic principle of international law. Although 
cosmopolitans do not necessarily reject the normative importance of sovereignty 
completely, proponents of an influential strand of contemporary cosmopolitanism 
that I call anti-statist cosmopolitanism tend to ascribe to it a mere derivative 
significance, dependent on its instrumental value for protecting human rights. In 
this article, I take issue with this kind of cosmopolitanism, arguing that there is a 
stronger connection between individual freedom and state sovereignty. Taking a 
conception of justice informed by Kant’s philosophy of right as a point of 
departure, I claim that state sovereignty is not only compatible with, but essential 
to the recognition of individuals as units of ultimate concern. Justice among 
persons, understood as each person’s right to be independent from subjection to 
other people’s arbitrary choices, presupposes that their interaction is regulated by 
coercive public institutions (i.e., state authorities). Accordingly, respect for the 
rights of persons requires respect for sovereignty, which entails norms such as the 
duty of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state and the right to self-
determination of peoples. 
 An important step in the argument is to challenge the specific way in which 
anti-statist cosmopolitans typically frame or conceptualize discourse about justice. 
Borrowing terminology from Iris Marion Young, I argue that most anti-statist 
cosmopolitan positions tacitly presuppose a problematic distributive conception of 
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justice,1 which, briefly put, is a conception where justice is understood as the fair 
allocation of certain pre-politically defined outputs (e.g., rights). My suspicion is 
that the ascription of a mere derivative significance to sovereignty is a 
consequence of adherence to such a conception. I therefore argue that justice is 
better conceptualized with a direct focus on interpersonal relations, and that 
Kant’s idea of an innate right to freedom is a promising alternative in this regard. 
Conceptualizing justice with a primary view on interpersonal relations rather than 
outputs not only brings us closer to what justice is really about, but also makes it 
easier to see why there is an internal connection between individual freedom and 
state sovereignty. 
 On the view that I defend, sovereignty is an international counterpart to 
freedom in the domestic realm. This view is sometimes dubbed the domestic 
analogy, since it implies that states have a right to territorial integrity much in the 
same way that individuals have a right to bodily integrity. Such an analogy is often 
criticized, either for overlooking important differences between states and 
individuals or for putting undue emphasis on communal integrity. The present 
defense of the analogy is not susceptible to this kind of criticism. I do not 
presuppose that states have moral faculties similar to those of human agents. Nor 
do I ascribe any independent moral value to community. States are instead 
understood as necessary institutional frameworks or arenas for realizing 
individual freedom, and being such arenas they have a right to be protected by the 
principle of non-intervention. That being said, I share the cosmopolitan 
commitment to the idea that all persons are equal units of normative concern 
generating obligations on every other person. I therefore call this a cosmopolitan 
defense of state sovereignty. 
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I present the basic position of anti-statist 
cosmopolitans. In Section 3, I criticize the distributive conception of justice implicit 
in this position. In section 4, I present an alternative relational conception, taking 
Kant’s innate right to freedom as a starting point. In Section 5, I explain why this 
conception also implies that there is an internal connection between individual 
freedom and state sovereignty. Finally, in Section 6, I argue that the line of 
reasoning pursued in the two former sections provides a defense of the domestic 
                                                          
1  Young criticizes a dominant distributive paradigm in contemporary political discourse on 
justice. Young 1990, pp. 15-38. See also Forst 2011. 
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analogy that circumvents the criticism typically raised against such an analogy by 
anti-statist cosmopolitans. 
 
 
2. Anti-statist cosmopolitanism 
By cosmopolitan normative commitments, I understand commitments entailed in 
the core idea of moral cosmopolitanism – the idea that each person is to be 
recognized as an equal unit of concern generating obligations on every other 
person. Thomas Pogge has spelled out this idea by identifying three features 
uniting diverging strands of cosmopolitanism: individualism: the ultimate units of 
concern are individual human beings or persons rather than human groups of 
various sorts; universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living human being equally; generality: this special status has global force, which is 
to say that persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone.2 
 Moral cosmopolitanism is commonly distinguished from institutional or 
legal cosmopolitanism,3 which refers to positions advocating institutional schemes 
that bring states under the authority of some kind of supranational agency. Such 
advocacy is not implied in moral cosmopolitanism, but is not ruled out by it either. 
Commitment to moral cosmopolitanism can lead to support for cosmopolitan 
institutional schemes, but there is no necessary relation between the two.4 
 In view of this openness with regard to institutional issues, there need not 
be any conflict between moral cosmopolitanism and an international legal order of 
sovereign states. The latter, sometimes dubbed a “statist” order, is an order where 
                                                          
2  Pogge 2002, p. 169. See Barry 1999, pp. 35-6 for a similar account. 
3  To my knowledge, the distinction is due to Beitz 1994, who distinguishes between institutional 
and moral cosmopolitanism. Pogge 2002 speaks of legal rather than institutional 
cosmopolitanism in order to draw a further distinction between interactional and institutional 
moral cosmopolitanism. According to this distinction, interactional moral cosmopolitanism 
formulates ethical principles that apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups, whereas 
institutional moral cosmopolitanism formulates principles of justice that apply directly to 
institutional schemes. See Pogge 2002, p. 170. 
4  Precisely what counts as a cosmopolitan institutional scheme differs somewhat from author to 
author. According to Pogge 2002, p. 169, legal cosmopolitanism implies the idea of a universal 
republic. Caney 2005, p. 5, writes that “institutional/legal cosmopolitanism … maintains that 
there should be global political institutions.” Beitz 1994, p. 124, identifies “the distinctive 
common feature” of institutional cosmopolitanism as “some ideal of world political 
organization in which states and state-like units have significantly diminished authority in 
comparison with the status quo and supranational institutions have more.” 
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all states qua sovereigns have legal standing and are recognized as equals. This 
means that they are formally subject to the same general rights and duties, most 
importantly the right to self-determination and the correlative duty of non-
intervention. In a statist order, sovereignty implies that a collective actor has legal 
personality, and thereby can be a subject of international legal processes and a 
party entering into international treaties. It also implies the entitlement to 
organize legislative, executive, and adjudicative institutions as it sees fit within a 
specific territory as well as the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of 
other sovereigns. Ideas congenial to a statist order are clearly present in the UN 
Charter, where paragraph 2(4) says that “members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state” and paragraph 2(7) says that 
nothing in the Charter “shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” 
 Despite the compatibility of moral cosmopolitanism and a statist 
international legal order in principle, the latter is today challenged by what I have 
termed anti-statist cosmopolitanism. Advocates of this strand of cosmopolitanism 
– which include philosophers like Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Allen Buchanan, 
Simon Caney, Darrel Moellendorf, and Fernando Tesón – support global legal 
reforms in a decisively individualistic direction. The idea is that we should move 
away from an order based on the sovereign equality of states toward an order 
where respect for basic human rights serves as the exclusive criterion for judging 
the legitimacy of political and legal institutions. This view is based on the idea that 
political borders have no fundamental normative significance or the idea that there 
should be congruence between domestic principles of justice and international or 
global principles of justice.5 Whatever principles of justice apply internally to 
states should also apply in the international realm. And since anti-statist 
cosmopolitans usually conceptualize justice in terms of human rights, so “the core 
of justice, protection of human rights, should be a primary goal of the international 
legal system,”6 much in the same way as protection of human rights is the standard 
by which we ought to assess domestic political orders. State sovereignty is thereby 
reduced to an instrumental value whose importance is dependent on its 
effectiveness in promoting and protecting basic human rights.7 Individuals, not 
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6 Buchanan 2004, p. 81. 
7 See, for instance, Beitz 1999, pp. 69 and 83, and Tesón 1997, p. 40. 
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states, should be recognized as the ultimate subjects of international law, whereas 
the international standing of states should depend on the legitimacy of their 
domestic orders. 
 An important implication of this view is a rejection of non-intervention as a 
basic international norm. Given the normative primacy of individuals, protecting 
or promoting basic human rights is considered a just cause for intervention – 
including military intervention. Some, but not all, proponents of this view even 
argue that such interventions are not only permissible, but a duty on the part of 
states capable of helping those whose basic rights are violated.8 This is not to say 
that human rights violations taking place on the territory of a state provide 
sufficient justification for military interventions. All interventions are subject to 
standard jus ad bellum constraints: the use of military force must have a 
reasonable prospect of success; be a means of last resort; stand in proportion to 
the injustice it is meant to rectify; etc. While this limits the scope of cases where 
interventions are justified, the norm of non-intervention is not, however, 
recognized as a basic norm governing international relations. As Charles Beitz puts 
it, “there is a right against intervention, but … it does not apply with equal force to 
all states.”9 Sovereignty is a derivative of the more basic concern with justice to 
persons, and “only just states deserve to be fully protected by the shield of 
sovereignty.”10 
 By the same token, the validity of claims to self-determination, as raised by 
former colonies in the 20th century, depend on whether or not liberation would be 
favorable with regard to reducing injustice in the relevant territory. People living 
under foreign rule can invoke no fundamental right to govern themselves against 
colonial powers. Self-determination, like non-intervention, is not a basic principle. 
It is just “a means to the end of social justice.”11 Only if there is reason to believe 
that decolonization will lead to a less unjust society is there a right to self-
determination. 
                                                          
8  That there is a duty to intervene militarily and thus to risk violent death is rejected by 
Buchanan 2004, p. 470. For the opposite view, see Caney 2005, p. 235, Moellendorf 2002, p. 
123, and Tesón 2003, p. 103. 
9  Beitz 1999, p. 191. 
10  Tesón 1997, p. 40. In a similar vein, Beitz 1999, p. 69, writes: “Intervention, colonialism, 
imperialism, and dependence are not morally objectionable because they offend a right of 
autonomy, but rather because they are unjust … This is not to say that there are never cases in 
which a right of state autonomy ought to be respected, but rather that such a right, when it 
exists, is a derivative of more basic principles of justice.” 
11  Beitz 1999, p. 104. 
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 It seems reasonable to say that anti-statist cosmopolitanism belongs to 
what Gerry Simpson has called a tradition of “liberal anti-pluralism” characterized 
by “lack of tolerance for non-liberal regimes.”12 Transforming sovereignty into a 
function of a state’s human rights record implies discrimination between states on 
the basis of their internal features. In addition to what I have already mentioned, 
such discrimination is reflected in proposals that would pull the international 
system in a less egalitarian direction were they to come into effect. These include 
proposals that representation in the UN should be restricted to democratic states 
that respect human rights,13 or that there should be established a coalition of 
democratic states that under certain circumstances can trump the UN Security 
Council with regard to authorization of preventive use of force.14 They also include 
proposals that regime change, or advancing justice in the basic structure of states, 
should be acknowledged as a just cause for military intervention.15 
 Recently, Jean Cohen has criticized this anti-statist trend among 
contemporary cosmopolitans for being “normatively flawed and politically 
dangerous.”16 In her view, it is a form of cosmopolitanism that risks becoming an 
imperial ideology of powerful states in need of an excuse for going to war and, 
more generally, seeking an exceptional status for themselves. The crucial mistake 
of the anti-statist cosmopolitans, she further claims, is that they seek cosmopolitan 
reforms without acknowledging the fundamental significance of the sovereign 
state.17 I agree with her on both points. The anti-statist cosmopolitan project 
seems to bring with it the risk of undermining one of the most important 
innovations of 20th century international law: the prohibition against aggressive 
war. And contrary to the advocates of this project, I think a sound defense of 
human rights should not come at the price of degrading sovereignty to a function 
of a state’s human rights record. It is a mistake to construe the relation between 
individual freedom and state sovereignty in such a way that whoever ascribes 
fundamental normative significance to the one is compelled to ascribe a derivative 
or secondary significance to the other. We should avoid understanding the two as 
hierarchically related concepts. In the following, I will therefore suggest a way in 
                                                          
12  Simpson 2001, p. 539. 
13  Tesón 1997, p. 25. 
14  Buchanan and Keohane 2005, pp. 274-8. 
15  Moellendorf 2002, pp. 104, 118, and 159-60; Tesón 2005. 
16  Cohen 2006, p. 486. 
17  Ibid., p. 497. 
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which individual freedom and state sovereignty can be understood as co-original 
aspects of one and the same normative package, so to speak. 
 
 
3. A critique of distributive conceptions of justice 
How can the normative tenets of moral cosmopolitanism outlined in section 2 be 
reconciled with the recognition of self-determination and non-intervention as 
fundamental principles of international law? An important first step is to call into 
question what can be termed a distributive conception of justice implicit in the 
anti-statist cosmopolitan view. I do so partly because I assume that it is precisely 
because they understand justice in distributive terms that anti-statist 
cosmopolitans cannot attribute more than an instrumental value to sovereignty. I 
also do so because I believe such conceptions are misleading and tend to produce 
erroneous reasoning about justice.18 
 What I term a distributive conception of justice is not specific to the anti-
statist cosmopolitan view. It is a way of thinking of justice that is dominant in 
contemporary political philosophy, and it therefore comes in different forms. 
Generally, one can say that what characterizes distributive conceptions is that 
justice is defined in terms of fair allocation of certain outputs. In the words of Iris 
Marion Young, a distributive conception is a conception that “defines social justice 
as the morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens.”19 Precisely what 
are regarded as morally relevant outputs or “benefits and burdens” vary 
somewhat, but typical examples are civil and political rights, duties, material 
resources, and opportunities. 
As far as anti-statist cosmopolitans are concerned, the output to be 
distributed is basic human rights grounded in certain fundamental human 
interests. In other words the term “justice” refers to the realization of a set of 
                                                          
18  Implicit in this criticism is also a critique of what I see as a failure to differentiate properly 
between morality and law, or, in Kant’s terminology, ethics and right. In giving purely moral 
justifications for the use of force in response to rights violations, the anti-statist cosmopolitans 
in effect makes legal norms a subset of moral norms. In line with Jürgen Habermas and 
Ingeborg Maus (and Kant), I think one would do well to think of the relation between morality 
and law as complementary rather than as hierarchical. An important consequence of making 
such a differentiation is that moral arguments that are not put forward within a positive legal 
framework cannot justify rights-protecting coercive sanctions. See Habermas 1996, pp. 82-
131; Habermas 1998, pp. 165-202; Maus 1994, pp. 308-336; and Maus 1998. 
19  Young 1990, p. 16. 
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rights, usually including the right to life, the right to security of the person, the 
right to freedom of belief, the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom 
of association, the right to freedom of movement, the right to protection against 
enslavement, the right to due process and equality before the law, the right to 
means of subsistence, etc. These rights are justified as protections of interests of 
fundamental importance to individual human beings. Such fundamental interests 
can refer either to personal autonomy or to well-being and human flourishing. On 
this latter point there seems to be some disagreement among the anti-statist 
cosmopolitans that I have referred to.20 Yet whatever differences there are 
regarding the justificatory ground of rights, a common idea is that human rights 
are protections of whatever fundamental interests one takes as a starting point. 
Whoever is seriously committed to justice should seek to establish conditions that 
secure the non-violation of these rights. 
 This way of conceptualizing justice has an impact on what role one ascribes 
to legal and political institutions, not least the institutions that make up a state. 
Insofar as one thinks of justice in terms of allocating morally desirable outputs, 
institutions can only serve as more or less useful means with which we 
approximate these allocations. By that, I do not suggest that those who adhere to a 
distributive framework consider legal and political institutions to be of no or little 
significance.21 The point is rather that conceptualizing justice in terms of pre-
politically defined outputs seems to imply that institutions and justice are 
externally related as means to an end. The reason for having institutions exercising 
the powers of making, applying, and implementing laws is to make it more likely 
that the right results are realized, and the legitimacy of such institutions depends 
on their effectiveness in this regard – that is, their effectiveness in generating the 
morally desirable outputs. 
 Such a view on institutions is easily traceable in the writings of anti-statist 
cosmopolitans. It seems to be implied in the claim that state sovereignty is an 
instrumental value dependent on its effectiveness in promoting and protecting 
human rights. It is unambiguously expressed by Brian Barry: “the value of any 
political structure … is entirely derivative from whatever it contributes to the 
                                                          
20  For instance, Beitz and Tesón emphasize autonomy, whereas Buchanan and Caney emphasize 
well-being. 
21  Such a suggestion would be particularly unfair to Buchanan, who emphasizes the need for 
more institutional focus in theories of international justice. Buchanan 2004, pp. 18 and 22-7. 
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advancement of human rights, human well-being, and the like.”22 In a similar vein, 
Allan Buchanan emphasizes the “teleological” nature of moral reasoning about 
institutions. Even if it need not be guided by the goal of maximizing welfare or 
happiness, and even if all efforts at achieving morally worthy goals should be 
subject to deontological constraints, such reasoning is nevertheless fundamentally 
goal-guided, in the sense that assessments of institutions takes the form of 
evaluating the institutions’ effectiveness in achieving the end they were made to 
achieve.23 
 The distributive framework for thinking about justice implicit in the anti-
statist cosmopolitan view provides us with a problematic ‘image’ of justice. It 
should therefore be questioned. Importantly, by conceptualizing justice within 
such a framework one tends to lose sight of the fact that justice is a concept that 
only applies to interpersonal relations. Whatever the demands and entitlements of 
justice are, they can never apply to persons living isolated from other persons. I 
believe few people would deny this. Yet the relational nature of justice is played 
down to the extent that justice is conceptualized in terms of distribution of 
outputs. If justice is understood primarily as a question regarding proper 
allocation of goods or rights, persons are first and foremost seen as recipients of 
justice. What a person has a right to is in the first place specified independently of 
his or her relation to other persons. Only in a second step, after clarifying what 
output each person can rightfully lay claim to, do other people come into the 
picture as those against whom claims of justice can be made. In my view, this is to 
distort the phenomenon at hand. It is a misrepresentation that tends to cause 
erroneous reasoning about justice. 
 One kind of distortion caused by conceptualizing justice in distributive 
terms is the blurring of important distinctions in a way that severs the link 
between demands for justice and actual injustice. A primary focus on outputs does 
not seem to allow one to distinguish adequately between cases where people 
suffer as a consequence of natural events and cases where people suffer as a 
consequence of what other people do to them. Nor does it seem to allow one to 
distinguish adequately between cases of rights violations due to the exploitative 
acts or practices of other people and cases of rights violations due to our own acts 
and practices. This is not to say that these distinctions cannot be recognized and 
                                                          
22  Barry 1999, p. 37. 
23  Buchanan 2004, pp. 74-6. 
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assessed differently by someone adhering to a distributive point of view. Yet 
inasmuch as justice is identified with a specific output it seems to follow that all 
the cases raise justice-based demands on the “supply-side”, so to speak. Since what 
matters is the realization of a certain pattern of distribution, it is in each case 
required that we remedy the bad situation of those who suffer in order to fulfill our 
duties of justice. This is to confuse acts of solidarity with what we owe to others as 
a matter of justice.24 Such confusion is reflected in the view that we have a duty to 
militarily assist people who are denied basic human rights by their government, a 
view defended by many anti-statist cosmopolitans.25 It is also reflected in Allen 
Buchanan’s claim that we have a “Natural Duty of Justice” to ensure that all 
persons have access to institutions protecting their basic rights even if we are not 
interacting directly or indirectly (via institutional schemes) with these persons.26 
 Another, and in this context more important, distortion caused by 
adherence to a distributive conception of justice, at least in the specific form of ant-
statist cosmopolitanism, is insufficient attention to the issue of who can 
legitimately decide how abstract principles of justice should be specified, applied, 
and implemented in particular cases. With Raymond Geuss, one could describe 
distributive conceptions as approaches that “complete the work of ethics first, 
attaining an ideal theory of how we should act, and then in a second step … apply 
that ideal theory to the action of political agents.”27 Characteristic is a primary 
focus on what are appropriate principles of justice. What matters is that justice is 
done. The questions ‘who is to determine what are justified claims?’ and ‘who is 
entitled to ensure that justice is done?’ are either not addressed or else thought to 
rely on the extent to which the relevant agent meets objective criteria of justice.28 
This is particularly unsatisfactory insofar as the demand for justice is linked to the 
use of coercive means, as in the case of military intervention. For the anti-statist 
cosmopolitan it becomes hard to identify any normatively significant difference 
between coercion by domestic political authorities and coercion by foreign 
                                                          
24  Cf. Forst 2011, p. 2. 
25  For references see footnote 8 above. I have yet to see any good account for why there is in fact 
such a duty. My suspicion is that anti-statist cosmopolitans are here jumping to conclusions as 
a result of their adherence to an outcome-oriented conception of human rights. 
26  Buchanan 2004, pp. 85-7. See also Caney 2005, pp. 111-16. 
27  Geuss 2008, p. 8. 
28  The latter part of this disjunction is supposed to cover the view defended by Buchanan 2004, 
pp. 233-49. 
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governments.29 Yet this is to ignore domestic context as the most important arena 
for specifying and concretizing what should count as each person’s legitimate 
rights.30 It implies a form of expert rule where political processes and decision-
making involving the rights holders themselves is replaced by normative reflection 
carried out by the moral philosopher. 
 
 
4. An alternative Kantian conception of justice 
In view of the considerations brought forward above, it is worthwhile to consider 
whether there are better ways of conceptualizing justice. To my mind, a promising 
alternative is to think of justice in terms of what Kant calls an innate “right to 
freedom,” defined as a right to independence from being subject to constraints 
arbitrarily imposed by other people.31 It is promising not only because it seems to 
steer clear of the problems connected to distributive conceptions of justice, but 
also, and particularly important in this context, because it better enables us to see 
the internal connection between individual freedom and state sovereignty. 
 The idea of a right to freedom is an idea that squares well with the basic 
features of moral cosmopolitanism, and it should therefore have some appeal to 
anti-statist cosmopolitans. It is individualistic in the sense that it acknowledges 
individual human beings as ultimate units of concern. It is universalistic in the 
sense that the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every human being 
equally. And it is general in the sense that all persons are ultimate units of concern 
for everyone. 
 The right to freedom is further linked to a concept of right which Kant says 
can be located “directly in the possibility of connecting universal reciprocal 
coercion with the freedom of everyone.”32 This formulation expresses the familiar 
idea of reciprocal and coercively protected spheres of freedom within which 
everyone is free to choose as they please. Inasmuch as the anti-statist 
cosmopolitans are political liberals committed to the ideal of freedom and equality, 
this should also appeal to them. 
                                                          
29  Beitz 1999, pp. 80 and 87. 
30  Cf. Cohen 2006, p. 488. 
31  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:237. 
32  Ibid., 6:232. 
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At the same time, conceptualizing justice in terms of Kant’s right to freedom 
differs remarkably from distributive conceptions that articulate justice in terms of 
human rights protecting fundamental human interests. First of all, the idea of equal 
freedom, as Kant understands it, does not track what are claimed to be 
fundamental human interests that persons have independently of their relation to 
other people. Although the capacity for rational agency forms the ultimate ground 
for claims of justice,33 the right to freedom is not a protection of some underlying 
interest attributable to persons considered individually. Its focus is exclusively on 
interpersonal relations, or what Kant calls “the form in the relation of choice” on 
the part of interacting persons.34 Rather than an output that can be specified 
without reference to one’s relations to other people, freedom as independence is a 
claim of each person against all other persons that they do not subject him or her 
to their arbitrary choice. As such, freedom “is not a good to be promoted,” but “a 
constraint on the conduct of others.”35 The normative baseline is that everyone 
should have the right to make choices of their own provided their exercise of this 
right does not encroach on anyone else’s right to make free choices. Every claim of 
justice must somehow be founded in this right to equal freedom, which is an 
unconditional constraint on any effort at promoting other desirable ends. 
Second, due to its direct focus on interpersonal relations the idea of a right 
to freedom is not a distributive idea. It does not refer to the equal distribution of a 
pre-politically defined set of rights or of an equal range of equivalent 
opportunities. Nor does it refer to freedom as one good among others that have to 
be promoted, possibly in competition with other goods. The idea is strictly 
relational, in the sense that it concerns the standing of persons vis-à-vis other 
persons. This standing should be one of mutual independence. Everyone should be 
free to decide for themselves what ends to pursue, and no one should be in 
position to impose their arbitrarily chosen ends on others. Justified restrictions on 
the right to pursue ends of one’s own choice must be reciprocal and non-
contingent. They must restrict everyone equally, and they must not merely 
represent the particular view of one person or group concerning what should 
count as binding prescriptions for interaction. Enabling relations of mutual 
independence is the rationale for establishing legal and political institutions, and 
the idea of such relations is the standard by which these institutions are assessed. 
                                                          
33  See, for instance, Hodgson 2010a. 
34  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:230. 
35  Ripstein 2009, p. 15. 
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On this basis there is no straightforward way of justifying a duty to aid 
other people whose fundamental interests are at stake. Inasmuch as questions of 
justice are not primarily questions about what ends to pursue, but questions about 
who gets to decide what ends to pursue, it is neither sufficient nor necessary that 
someone is badly off in order to generate duties of justice in other people. 
Accordingly, in Kant’s right to freedom there seems to be no support for a duty to 
intervene militarily in order to help victims of tyrannical state coercion36 or for a 
“Natural Duty of Justice” to help bring about just institutions for all persons.  
As regards the internal connection between individual freedom and state 
sovereignty that I am aiming at in this article, it is crucial that the right to freedom 
is not only a principle for assessing the legitimacy of legal norms and institutions, 
but also an idea that requires a state authority. Freedom, understood as a system 
of reciprocal and non-arbitrary constraints, is not possible to uphold in the 
absence of a public authority that organizes legislative, executive, and judicial 
public institutions. On this conception, we can only interact in a fully rightful way 
in a civil condition, of which the state is constitutive. If one accepts that justice 
should be thought of in terms of a right to freedom, one should therefore reject the 
view that legal and political institutions are mere tools for promoting desirable 
outputs. Such institutions should rather be seen as constitutive of justice. For the 
same reason, we should avoid thinking of state sovereignty as an instrumental 
value. If the state is a necessary condition for mutual independence, then 
recognizing the equal sovereignty of states is part and parcel of respecting each 
person's right to freedom. 
 
 
5. The complementarity of state sovereignty and individual 
freedom 
The core of the problem that makes the state a necessary condition for interaction 
on just terms is that the right kind of independence is not possible in a 
hypothetical state of nature. In his recent book Force and Freedom – Kant’s Legal 
and Political Philosophy, Arthur Ripstein has analyzed this problem in terms of 
certain structural defects that arise absent the right kind of institutions. In the 
                                                          
36  Elsewhere, I have argued that precisely the right to freedom excludes the possibility that there 
can be a duty of justice to risk one’s own life in coming to the rescue of people living in other 
states. See Mikalsen 2013. 
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following, I will focus on two of these: the problems of assurance and 
indeterminacy.37 Although the problems are different, they refer to defects that are 
parallel in their structure. In both cases the point is that interaction and 
coordination of action plans in a state of nature must be based exclusively on the 
private judgments of interacting parties, which means that we unavoidably subject 
each other to arbitrary choice as long as there is not established a public 
institutional framework governing our interaction.38 
 The assurance problem is a problem regarding property rights. In contrast 
to the right to freedom, which is an innate right to our own person, rights to 
property are acquired. Any legitimate legal system must permit such acquisition, 
because a general prohibition against it would be an arbitrary restriction of 
freedom.39 Further, acquired rights must be enforceable. It must be possible to 
coercively prevent others from using whatever we have acquired a right to. Yet in a 
state of nature there is no one who can enforce these rights in a rightful way. 
Absent public authorities any coercive act is necessarily performed by a private 
agent, and such an agent cannot possibly serve as an enforcer of justice. A private 
enforcer is what Kant calls a “unilateral will,” and cannot possibly establish a 
system of reciprocal and non-arbitrary constraints. Rightful assurance is therefore 
not possible outside civil society. 
The indeterminacy problem concerns the demarcation of each person’s 
sphere of external freedom from every other person’s sphere of external freedom 
when there is disagreement about rights. Since general rules and principles are 
indeterminate, there can be a plurality of equally reasonable, yet incompatible 
interpretations of what they imply in particular cases. While some cases are easy, 
many cases leave room for reasonable disagreement concerning the proper limits 
between my freedom and yours. As in the case of the assurance problem, the 
problem here is that there is no rightful way in which we could resolve such 
disagreement in a state of nature. Again, the problem is that any judgment about 
how to draw the distinction would be a private judgment. Hence, whoever decides 
                                                          
37  Ripstein also analyses a third defect: the problem of unilateral choice. See Ripstein 2009, pp. 
148-59. Due to considerations of space I do not discuss this defect here. 
38  In addition to Ripstein’s book, I have benefited greatly from the accounts found in Hodgson 
2010b, Ripstein 2004, and Varden 2008a when working out the argument that follows. The 
next three paragraphs are highly condensed versions of what I take to be central points in 
these works. 
39  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:247 and 6:250. See also Ludwig 2002, pp. 175-6. 
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where the line shall be drawn subjects others to one-sided restrictions, and this is 
incompatible with each person’s right to freedom. 
These defects of the state of nature are problems even under ideal 
conditions where people relate to each other in good faith. They do not depend on 
assumptions about moral baseness on the part of interacting persons. Since we are 
moral beings, we can always act according to what we recognize as being the right 
thing to do. Yet even if we assume human agents to be so fair-minded and well-
disposed toward each other that they are not inclined to violate anyone’s right to 
freedom, the form of the relationship between interacting parties would still be 
wrong as long as all coordination of action relied exclusively on their arbitrary 
choices. Not human malevolence, but structural features of the state of nature 
alone explain why one cannot exercise the right to free choice in a way fully 
compatible with everyone else’s right to exercise their right to free choice. This, I 
take it, is the point when Kant writes that even if “the state of nature need not, just 
because it is natural, be a state of injustice … it would still be a state devoid of 
justice (status iustitia vacuus), in which when rights are in dispute (ius 
controversum), there would be no judge competent to render a verdict having 
rightful force.”40 
 The only way to overcome the systematic dependencies that would exist in 
a hypothetical state of nature is in Kant’s view to establish a state – that is, a public 
authority organizing legislative, executive, and adjudicative bodies. Inasmuch as 
one agrees that any justified restriction on freedom must be for the sake of 
freedom itself, I think one should agree with him on this point as well. Absent 
public institutional bodies that coercively regulate interaction on a territory 
shared by several persons, there is no agent who can adjudicate or enforce rights 
in a way compatible with each person’s right to freedom. In a situation where such 
institutional bodies did not exist every conflict over rights would have to be 
resolved on the basis of arbitrary choices made by the conflicting parties. Rather 
than mutual independence there would be systematic dependence between 
persons. For this reason, creating a public authority that represents the will of all 
citizens united seems to be the only way there is to create a system of reciprocal 
and non-arbitrary constraints. 
 Yet if the state can reasonably be seen as a necessary condition for relations 
of mutual independence, it seems mistaken to contrast human rights with state 
                                                          
40  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:312. 
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sovereignty, or to reduce sovereignty to an instrumental value. Negatively put, this 
is so because the idea of mutual independence is not fully specifiable without 
reference to the legal and political institutions that make up the state. Rather than 
a pre-politically defined ideal, the right to freedom is a constraint on what can be 
recognized as a legitimate legal and political order. It is an abstract normative 
criterion that rules out laws and institutional arrangements that entitle some 
person or persons to subject others to their own choice or that create systematic 
relations of dependency between persons. What this concretely entails, however, is 
an open question. In what specific form the abstract right to freedom should be 
transformed into positive rights and how such rights should be interpreted in 
particular cases can only be determined within the institutional framework of a 
state. In other words, prior to political processes and procedures leading up to 
legally binding decisions issued by public and authoritative institutions there is no 
given or fixed moral output in relation to which sovereignty could be understood 
as an instrumental value. 
Put more positively, state sovereignty is a necessary complement to each 
person’s right to freedom, because it secures the autonomy of the political 
processes and procedures necessary for giving the abstract idea of mutual 
independence concrete content and binding force. To recognize the principle of 
non-intervention as a basic principle of international law is simply to approve of 
the state’s role as an institutional framework enabling rightful exercise of 
individual freedom. By contrast, a right to military intervention for the protection 
of human rights is the same as a right to jeopardize the freedom-enabling 
institutional framework of the state. It is a right to wage war, which in turn is to 
put the state sanctioned public order at risk. And this conflicts with each person’s 
right to freedom. If states are not protected from interventions in their internal 
affairs their function as public authorities is effectively undermined. Each of their 
decisions could then be contested and opposed by foreign powers, and individuals 
would thereby be deprived of a final authority that could determine the rightful 
boundaries of their freedom. For this reason, I believe Michael Walzer is 
completely right when he writes that “the recognition of sovereignty is the only 
way we have of establishing an arena within which freedom can be fought for and 
(sometimes) won.”41  
                                                          
41  Walzer 1977, p. 89. 
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It should also be noted that understanding states as freedom-enabling 
institutional frameworks is far from understanding them as guarantees that the 
equal freedom of citizens will in fact be realized. According to Kant, the ideal 
constitution for the state authority constitutive of civil society is the republican 
constitution that binds executive power to the legislative will of the people. Yet 
there is nothing in his argument or in the argument that I have put forward that 
makes a perfect republican constitution a criterion for recognizing the sovereignty 
of a state. Qua enabling frameworks states are structures where freedom can (but 
need not) take on concrete shape. Understood relationally, freedom is not a gift or 
something that can be imposed on a people from the outside, but a common 
practice, something which co-citizens must continuously strive for themselves. 
Such common practice needs an arena where reciprocal ascription of rights can 
take place. States are such arenas. And these arenas, even when they are less than 
perfect, should be protected by the principle of non-intervention.42 Whoever is 
concerned with individual freedom should therefore be equally concerned with 
state sovereignty. 
 
 
6. A novel defense of the domestic analogy 
If the preceding argument is sound, it provides a defense of the so-called domestic 
analogy that circumvents criticisms commonly aimed at such an analogy by anti-
statist cosmopolitans. On the basis of this analogy, sovereignty can be understood 
as an international counterpart to individual freedom in the domestic realm. In 
much the same way as individuals have a right to bodily integrity, states have a 
right to territorial integrity. In both cases, integrity is an external condition for 
autonomous conduct, although the right to integrity is not conditional on such 
conduct. The right to integrity is an essential aspect of the right to freedom, and it 
includes the right to make one’s own mistakes, on the part of individuals as well as 
states. As in the case of individuals, there are things we cannot do to states, even if 
it is for their own alleged good. In other words, there is no direct relation between 
                                                          
42  This is not to say that everything that goes under the name of a state is good enough. As I point 
out in the next section, we should draw a line between defective public orders, which can be 
oppressive yet still constitute necessary conditions for internal reform toward republican self-
legislation, and genocidal regimes, which should not be protected by the principle of non-
intervention. 
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the internal features of a state and its international standing.43 A state can be 
unjust domestically, but still be recognized as sovereign internationally. 
Accordingly, the domestic analogy implies equality of all states. In contrast to the 
asymmetrical view defended by anti-statist cosmopolitans, defending the analogy 
means defending non-intervention and self-determination as basic principles of 
international law covering both just and unjust states. 
 This parallel between interpersonal and international relations is 
frequently criticized by anti-statist cosmopolitans for being ill-founded. In their 
view, advocates of a statist international order have so far not succeeded in coming 
up with convincing arguments for recognizing non-intervention and self-
determination as basic principles of international law. Such arguments are 
considered either (a) to overlook important differences between individuals and 
states or (b) to put an undue emphasis on the value of communal autonomy to the 
detriment of the rights of individuals. 
 (a) The first line of criticism is often aimed at an argument in favor of 
territorial integrity and non-intervention that can be traced back to classical 
political theorists such as Christian Wolff, Samuel Pufendorf, and Emer de Vattel. 
The basic idea of this argument is quite simple: starting from the assumption that 
interstate and interpersonal relations are relevantly similar, one concludes that 
states should interact according to norms analogous to the norms governing 
interpersonal interaction. Like persons, states are morally equal actors, and just as 
persons generally are held to have a right to pursue ends of their own 
independently of what ends others think they should pursue, so states have a right 
to arrange their own affairs as they see fit without interference by foreign powers. 
Accordingly, states should be recognized as equal sovereigns possessing a right to 
self-determination and a duty of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states.44 
 Anti-statist cosmopolitans generally reject this argument on the ground that 
it neglects relevant differences that count against recognizing states as 
autonomous agents worthy of respect comparable to the respect we owe persons. 
In contrast to persons, states are collective actors that cannot form beliefs or make 
choices of their own, at least not in any straightforward sense. States are not 
human beings writ large. As Beitz puts it, “states qua states do not think or will or 
                                                          
43  Cf. Walzer 1977, p. 89 and Walzer 1980, pp. 212 and 214. 
44  I here bracket the question whether this is a fair way of reading Wolff, Pufendorf, and Vattel. 
For the sake of argument I take the interpretation presented by Beitz and Caney at face value. 
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act in pursuit of ends; only people … do these things.”45 It therefore does not 
appear to be any compelling reason to invest states with rights analogous to the 
rights persons have to pursue ends of their own choice (as long as they do so in a 
way compatible with the rights of others to do the same). Since states lack relevant 
moral properties justifying territorial integrity on an analogy with integrity of the 
person the argument seems to fail. 
 (b) The second line of criticism usually addresses Michael Walzer’s 
communitarian defense of the domestic analogy. This is a defense that does not 
ascribe moral agency directly to states. The idea is not that states are moral agents 
comparable to persons and therefore also have rights analogous to persons. The 
idea is rather that states are political representations of underlying social entities 
that have a right to autonomy – that is, a right to stake out their own paths toward 
freedom without interference by foreign powers.46 On this view, then, foreign 
intervention is less an offense against the state than an offense against the 
community represented by the state. 
 Although Walzer frequently speaks of communal autonomy as if it is a right 
possessed by political communities as such, he ultimately grounds it in the right of 
individuals to live in self-determining communities. In the final resort, the rights of 
communities rest on the tacit consent implicit in ongoing cooperative practices 
among community members. Thus, the deepest moral foundation of community is, 
as he puts it, “a contract, Burkean in character, among ‘the living, the dead, and 
those who are yet to be born,’” whereas “the idea of communal integrity derives its 
moral and political force from the rights of contemporary men and women to live 
as members of a historic community and to express their inherited culture through 
political forms worked out among themselves.”47 And to such historic communities 
foreigners owe respect, which Walzer juxtaposes with “a morally necessary 
presumption: that there exists a certain ‘fit’ between the community and its 
government and that the state is ‘legitimate.’”48 Even if governments sometimes 
can turn against their citizenry, foreigners do not have enough historical 
knowledge or direct experience to form adequate judgments about a government’s 
actual legitimacy. Generally, they are not in position to judge whether a 
government uses the coercive apparatus of the state merely in its own self-interest, 
                                                          
45  Beitz 1999, p. 76; see also Caney 2005, p. 236. 
46  Walzer 1977, pp. 88-9. 
47  Walzer 1980, p. 211. 
48  Ibid., p. 212. 
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or whether it governs in a way that fits with a community’s traditional way of life. 
In combination with the right to live in a self-determining community, this lack of 
contextual understanding requires that we act as if governments or other states 
are legitimate – except in certain special circumstances.49 Failure to do so would be 
to disregard the rights of other states’ citizens. For this reason, Walzer concludes, 
“states can be presumptively legitimate in international society and actually 
illegitimate at home.”50 
 Anti-statist criticism of this communitarian defense of the domestic analogy 
typically puts into question the connection between respect for communal 
integrity and the presumption of fit between community and government. For one 
thing, there seems to be no obvious reason for assuming that we do not know 
enough in order to make sound judgments regarding such a fit. On the contrary, 
there are usually an abundance of relevant sources of information, such as social 
scientists, emigrants, experienced travelers, diplomats, scholarly works, etc. that 
makes what Walzer calls a morally necessary presumption implausible.51 
Moreover, it is rarely the case that there is a clear match between state and 
community. For the most part, if not always, there will be a plurality of 
communities within one and the same state territory. And even if it makes sense to 
speak of a state representing one and only one community it does not necessarily 
follow that we can expect internal unanimity regarding the interpretation and 
importance of different traditional values. In view of such pluralism, it is not clear 
that non-intervention is the best way of respecting communal integrity. Abstaining 
from interfering in an intra-state conflict could instead be interpreted as 
partisanship in favor of the dominant party.52 In other words, Walzer’s argument 
does not explain why non-intervention is a principle that should protect states, and 
therefore fails as a defense of the domestic analogy. 
 I do not want to challenge the anti-statist cosmopolitan criticism of these 
two defenses of the domestic analogy. Instead, I claim that the present defense of 
the analogy is not susceptible to these lines of criticism. In no way have I assumed 
that states have moral faculties similar to those of human agents. Nor have I 
                                                          
49  Specifically, Walzer mentions secession or national liberation, counter-interventions against 
foreign powers that have intervened in support of one side in a civil war, and cases of 
enslavement or massacre as situations where the principle of non-intervention can be 
suspended. See Walzer 1977, pp. 89-108. 
50  Walzer 1980, p. 214. 
51  Luban 1980, p. 395; Caney 2005, p. 237. 
52  Beitz 1999, p. 195; Buchanan 2004, pp. 178-9. 
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assumed that communal integrity has any independent moral value or that we are 
morally required to presume any fit between government and community. On the 
account given here, states are understood as necessary arenas for realizing 
individual freedom in a rightful way, and qua such arenas they ought to be 
protected by the principle of non-intervention. Sovereignty in the international 
realm is a necessary complement to such an understanding of the state, whereas 
any right to wage wars in the name of justice would endanger the state as a 
freedom-enabling institutional framework, which is therefore in conflict with each 
person’s right to freedom. Just as persons have a right to independence vis-à-vis 
other persons so states have a right to independence vis-à-vis other states, because 
only if states have such a right can they perform their role as public authorities 
properly. And against this defense of the domestic analogy none of the 
considerations brought up above can count as relevant counterarguments. 
 I have also argued that having a just inner constitution is not a precondition 
for being recognized as a sovereign state in the international realm, which is to say 
that issuing unjust or oppressive laws does not provide other states with a just 
cause for intervention. A worry that probably will cause anti-statist cosmopolitans 
to resist this standpoint is that a general prohibition against intervention in a 
state’s internal affairs apparently can serve as protection for governments that 
commit grave violations of human rights, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing. 
Sometimes the coercive apparatus of a state is turned systematically against 
individuals and intra-state groups on a large scale. Are we really obliged to stand 
by and watch as atrocities are going on? I think not, but unlike anti-statist 
cosmopolitans I also do not think that permitting interventions in such extreme 
cases should prevent us from acknowledging non-intervention as a basic principle 
of international law. 
 In order to see how defending the principle of non-intervention can be 
consistent with permitting intervention in certain extreme cases it can be useful to 
point out the obvious: that organizing a state is not the same as organizing a 
monopoly of force on a territory. Although the latter is an essential aspect of the 
former, a state must also establish an institutional order where conflicts over 
rights can be resolved through legal procedures and binding decisions made by 
public officials acting on mandate. Such an order can certainly be defective. It can 
be unfair, oppressive, too invasive in private matters, etc. Yet the legitimacy of a 
state is not dependent on it satisfying some ideal standard of justice. It is sufficient 
that it establishes conditions that make it possible for persons to interact on 
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rightful terms. Regimes that commit genocide or ethnic cleansing do not satisfy 
this requirement. They are not simply defective public orders, but organizations 
that unilaterally employ force against other people. Permitting foreign 
intervention against them is fully compatible with defending the equal sovereignty 
of states as well as the principle of non-intervention. In such cases, military 
intervention is not to undermine a state sanctioned public order that potentially 
can make the freedom of each consistent with the freedom of all, but to prevent 
mass murder and arbitrary expulsion of people from a territory. 
Nor is it particularly useful to think of intervention as enforcement of 
individual human rights. More adequately, it is conceived as an emergency-
measure that can be justified in extreme cases so as to bring an exceptional 
situation to an end and to establish a normal situation where individual rights can 
be ascribed and enforced. And in all normal cases non-intervention is the basic 
principle we should adhere to. The concern with genocidal regimes should not 
mislead us into relativizing sovereignty, turning it into an instrumental value in the 
service of morally desirable outcomes. Justifying general rules on the basis of 
concerns related to exceptional cases is a bad habit. Just as in the domestic domain, 
so in the international: Hard cases make bad law. 
 Still, it is not necessarily an easy matter to determine exactly where one 
should draw the line between a defective public order and an illegitimate regime 
against which intervention is permissible. Unlike Walzer, I do not think we can 
presuppose a clear-cut chasm between brutal and oppressive regimes on the one 
hand and regimes guilty of systematic massacre on the other hand.53 While there 
can be cases that leave little room for doubt, other cases are less obvious, and any 
general criterion regarding where to draw the line will open up the possibility of 
reasonable disagreement in particular cases. If nothing else, the cases of Kosovo 
1999 and Libya 2011 seem to make it clear that moral stakes can be fundamentally 
unclear. 
 Given such indeterminacy, Walzer’s defense of a unilateral right to 
intervene for alleged moral purposes should also be rejected, because such a right 
reintroduces the kind of asymmetry and hierarchy between states that I have 
criticized in this article. If it is up to particular states to decide in accordance with 
their own arbitrary moral judgment whether the criteria justifying humanitarian 
intervention are met, the permission to intervene in exceptional cases seems to 
                                                          
53  See Walzer 2002. 
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translate too easily into an exceptional status for powerful states. For this reason, 
legitimate interventions must be anchored in an international public body 
authorized to specify and apply general criteria for when the basic principle of 
non-intervention can be overruled.54 Authorization by such a body for any use of 
force other than self-defense is the only way intervention as an emergency-
measure can be reconciled with the equal sovereignty of states. Only if the 
permission to intervene goes along with a commitment to an inclusive 
international organization representing all states is there a chance that it does not 
become a means of self-empowerment on the part of powerful states.55 
                                                          
54  See also Cohen 2006, pp. 498-9; and Habermas 2006, pp. 103-4 and 184-5. 
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Chapter 4 
Habermas and Kant on International Law 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In view of the problems of interstate and intrastate violence and the challenge 
posed by processes of globalization to the democratic nation-state, the issue of 
establishing and promoting a normatively desirable system of international law 
has been on the agenda for some time. This issue has gone hand in hand with 
proposals for institutional design. With regard to the latter, the alternatives in the 
contemporary debate range from minimal intergovernmental models to proposals 
advocating a world republic. Proponents of intergovernmental models are often 
inspired by Kant’s proposal for a league of states, which is an organization vested 
with judicial power to adjudicate conflicts between states and which states can join 
and leave freely. John Rawls is a notable example of such a proponent.1 Among the 
proponents of a world republic one can distinguish between those who advocate a 
state of states and those who advocate a cosmopolitan democracy. A state of states 
is a second order state authority that permanently establishes coercive power over 
primary state units, which nevertheless are left intact as separate entities.2 
Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy also recognize states as important 
institutional entities, but advocate a more closely integrated global legal order that 
entails establishment of new institutions on both the global and the regional levels. 
Such institutions include supranational parliaments and international courts 
where not only states, but also individuals, are represented and have legal 
standing.3 
                                                          
1  Rawls 1999. 
2  This model is defended in Byrd and Hruschka 2008. 
3  Cf., for instance, Held 1997. 
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 In what seems like an attempt at finding a middle ground between a league 
of states and a world republic, Jürgen Habermas has recently proposed a multi-
level model that involves cooperation between different kinds of collective actors. 
In addition to traditional state actors, he imagines a reformed and strengthened 
UN that is to serve as a supranational executive authority responsible for securing 
peace and protecting basic human rights. Importantly, such a reformed world 
organization should organize a global police force that has an obligation to 
intervene against egregious human rights violations that governments either cause 
or fail to prevent. At a mid-level between the nation states and the world 
organization, Habermas envisages democratically reformed regimes, such as the 
EU, that are to deal with transnational challenges, in particular within issue areas 
such as economy, ecology, and energy. 
 The main purpose of this article is to critically consider Habermas’ multi-
level model, which is an attempt to reformulate Kant’s project “Toward Perpetual 
Peace.”4 Special attention is paid to how well this model fares in comparison to 
Kant’s league of states. Although Habermas, like Kant, rejects a world republic, he 
is also skeptical of Kant’s league. In his view, a voluntary league is not sufficient in 
order to establish a system of binding international law. He also claims that an 
intergovernmental organization recognizing the inviolable sovereignty of states is 
at odds with the recognition of individuals as the ultimate units of normative 
concern. Moreover, he claims that an intergovernmental league is inadequate for 
dealing with pressing challenges that have arisen due to the increase and 
intensification of processes of globalization since Kant’s time. 
 While I agree that there are good reasons for rejecting a world republic, I 
argue (a) that Habermas’ critique of Kant’s league of states fails in important 
respects and (b) that his own proposal faces problems related to his attempt at 
going beyond such a league. With regard to (a), I argue that Habermas does not 
succeed in arguing that a voluntary league of sovereign states is at odds with the 
project of establishing a system of binding international law or with the primacy of 
individuals as units of normative concern. I also argue that Kant has sound reasons 
for proposing a less ambitious institutional framework in the international domain. 
With regard to (b), I argue that Habermas’ model seems to imply a problematic 
asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. Furthermore, I argue that 
                                                          
4  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:341. All references to Kant in this article are according to the Prussian 
Academy pagination. I have made use of the following of his works: The Metaphysics of Morals, 
PA 6:203-493; and Toward perpetual peace – A philosophical project, PA 8:341-386. 
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it is questionable whether a global police force that has an obligation to intervene 
against grave and widespread human rights violations can be squared with the 
idea that every person has an innate right to freedom – that is, a right to 
independence from being constrained by other people’s choices.5 
 The aim of engaging with Habermas’ model in relation to Kant’s league of 
states is to contribute to the ongoing debate in political and legal theory on the 
normative foundation of international legal institutions. On the one hand, I want to 
show that there are important normative constraints relevant for institutional 
design in the international domain that neither proponents of a world republic nor 
Habermas take sufficiently into account. In particular, Habermas’ focus on 
establishing a supranational executive authority (for example, organizing a global 
police force) is problematic. On the other hand, my defense of Kant’s league does 
not mean that it cannot be further developed or supplemented with more 
comprehensive forms of institutionalized cooperation between states. Such 
cooperation seems important not least in view of globalization processes that are 
often seen as undermining the action capacities of states. In this regard, Habermas’ 
multi-level model is an interesting proposal that can complement Kant’s league. 
 The article proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present Kant’s league of 
states, as well as Habermas’ objections to this model. In section 3, I set out 
Habermas’ multi-level model and his reasons for rejecting a world republic. In 
section 4, I argue that Habermas’ objections to Kant’s league fail in important 
respects, and that his multi-level model faces problems that a league of states 
avoids. On the basis of the preceding discussion, I suggest a way in which elements 
from Kant’s and Habermas’ proposals can be combined in a hybrid model. 
 
 
2. Kant’s model: a league of states 
Kant and Habermas are in agreement with regard to the characterization and 
evaluation of the European order of sovereign states circumscribed by classical 
international law often associated with the period between 1648 and 1914. They 
both understand this order as a latent state of war – an interstate anarchy 
characterized both by the absence of any superior authority that can resolve 
disputes between states and by the right to wage war in the name of national 
                                                          
5  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:237. 
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interests. They also agree that this order is normatively unacceptable and should 
be reformed by establishing authoritative public institutions beyond the domestic 
domain. Only by establishing such institutions is it possible to resolve questions 
regarding what shall count as binding rules and how binding rules are to be 
applied in particular cases in a just way. 
 Despite this agreement, they disagree about the institutional design of an 
international legal order. They both reject a world republic, but Habermas finds a 
league of states of the kind proposed by Kant to be “beset with conceptual 
difficulties and ... no longer consonant with our historical experiences.”6 In the 
following, I give an outline of Kant’s views on international law before I set out 
Habermas’ critique of Kant’s league in more detail. 
 
2.1 Kant’s league of states 
Kant characterizes the anarchical order of sovereign states of his own times as “a 
condition of war” that is “wrong in the highest degree.”7 As regards the right to 
wage war recognized by classical international law, he judges it “unintelligible,” 
since it is nothing but the right of the stronger party to arbitrarily determine what 
is right.8 This renunciation of an international system based on the balance of 
power does not imply that the idea of taming interstate violence by means of law 
should be abandoned. The “veto” of practical reason – that “there is to be no war”9 
– rather demands the replacement of international anarchy with an international 
civil condition. What is required is an international order of public law more 
consistent with principles of right or justice – that is, principles calling for the 
harmonization of particular wills according to universal laws of freedom that 
restrict interacting parties in a reciprocal and non-arbitrary way. In Kant’s view, 
this entails the establishment of a public authority empowered to make collectively 
binding decisions with regard to international disputes, since establishing such an 
authority is the only way in which one can avoid the subjection of state actors to 
the arbitrary choices of other state actors. 
 Although Kant repeatedly compares external state relations to the 
interpersonal state of nature, he draws different conclusions with regard to how 
                                                          
6  Habermas 1998, p. 166. 
7  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:344. 
8  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:356-7. 
9  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:354. 
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the state of war between persons and the state of war between states should be 
overcome. The problem in the state of nature between persons is that all interaction 
is necessarily based on interacting persons’ moral or immoral private judgments, 
which means that they unavoidably subject each other to their arbitrary choices. 
Such a condition is incompatible with each person’s innate right to freedom – the 
right to “independence from being constrained by another’s choice.”10 In Kant’s 
view, the only way to overcome this problem is to enter civil society, which 
requires the establishment of a state authority organizing a public coercive 
institutional framework for interaction. The ideal form of such a state authority is 
the republican constitution that has two essential institutional features. The first is 
separation and hierarchical organization of legislative (sovereign), executive 
(ruler), and judicial (judge) powers. The second is ascription of legislative power 
“to the united will of the people.”11 
By contrast, overcoming the state of nature between states is not said to 
imply the establishment of a world republic. Instead of a full parallel between the 
interpersonal and international spheres, Kant introduces a complementary 
institutional structure in the form of a league of states. While establishing such a 
league is a necessary precondition for just international relations, membership in 
the league is still voluntary – both with regard to entrance and exit. It is an 
organization that “each neighboring state is at liberty to join” and which “can be 
dissolved at any time.”12 Of the three powers characteristic of a state, the league 
Kant has in mind is only vested with an analogue to the judicial power. Its function 
is to establish a dispute-settling mechanism that enables states to decide “disputes 
in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), 
namely by war.”13 Further, since such a league is established for the sole purpose 
of solving conflicts between states, only state actors are represented and have legal 
standing in the league. 
 
2.2 Habermas’ critique of Kant’s league of states 
Habermas sets out three objections to this model. The first I call the objection from 
voluntariness. It addresses an alleged contradiction inherent in the idea of 
                                                          
10  Kant 1996a [1797], 6:237. 
11  Ibid., 6:313. 
12  Ibid., 6:350-1. 
13  Ibid., 6:351. 
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promoting the rule of law internationally in the form of a voluntary league. In 
Habermas’ view, there is a conflict between acknowledging each state’s sovereign 
right to leave the league at will and the aim of establishing a lasting and peaceful 
international legal order where states are obliged to abide by the verdicts of the 
public authority: “Kant cannot have legal obligation in mind here … he must rely 
exclusively on each government’s own moral self-obligation.”14 Habermas 
emphasizes that this objection is not empirical, but conceptual, in nature. As long 
as the arrangement regulating interaction between states is voluntary, it is 
dependent on the good will of its members, and cannot, in his opinion, count as a 
legal arrangement. Referring to Kant’s idea of a republican constitution, Habermas 
writes: “If the union of peoples is to be a legal, rather than a moral, arrangement, 
then it may not lack any of those characteristics of a ‘good political constitution’ 
that Kant enumerates.”15 
The second objection I term the objection from sovereignty. It addresses 
Kant’s defense of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. In view 
of the danger that states can turn their monopoly of violence against their own 
citizens, Habermas objects that a league of independent states whose sovereignty 
is inviolable is at odds with the basic normative premises of Kant’s theory, which 
gives priority to each person’s right to freedom in accordance with universal laws: 
“[I]f Kant holds that this guarantee of freedom … is the essential purpose of 
perpetual peace … then he must not allow the autonomy of citizens to be 
preempted even by the sovereignty of their states.”16 
The two former objections address internal tensions in Kant’s idea of a 
league of states. The third objection – the objection from globalization – more 
generally questions the adequacy of state-centered approaches to political theory 
in view of our historical situation. Against the background of the widely held view 
that processes of globalization place the traditional nation state under pressure, 
Habermas regards state-centered approaches as counterproductive. He does so, 
first, because a political practice which clings to the framework of independent 
state actors whose external affairs are regulated exclusively on an 
intergovernmental basis will probably fail to cope adequately with challenges that 
have an essentially transnational character. This includes challenges related to 
poverty, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, proliferation of weapons 
                                                          
14  Habermas 1998, p. 169. 
15  Ibid., p. 170. 
16  Ibid., pp. 180-1. 
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of mass destruction, organized crime, and transnational terrorism.17 Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, he is concerned with the internal democratic order of 
states whose capacity to regulate interaction within their own borders is 
challenged by the increase and intensification of these kinds of cross-border 
exchanges. 
I will consider these objections more closely in section 4. 
 
 
3. Habermas’ Multi-level Model versus a World Republic 
As mentioned, Habermas’ critique of a league of states does not imply that he 
advocates a world republic. Still, commentators at times misrepresent him as such 
an advocate.18 In view of Habermas’ critique of Kant’s league, it is to some extent 
understandable that such misunderstandings can arise. But since the publication of 
The Postnational Constellation (2001, orig. 1998), there can be no doubt that 
Habermas is not proponent of a world republic. Here, he rejects this model 
unequivocally. In later works, he has also proposed a multi-level model that is 
meant to serve as an example illustrating “a conceptual alternative to a world 
republic.”19 In the following, I present this model, and explain how it differs from a 
world republic and Kant’s league of states. Then, I set out Habermas’ objections to 
a world republic.  
 Habermas’ multi-level model is an arrangement that assigns different tasks 
to different institutional levels. On the supranational level, Habermas imagines a 
reformed and strengthened UN that is to serve, among other things, as an 
executive authority responsible for securing peace and protecting human rights. 
He supports reorganizing the Security Council and limiting the veto power of its 
permanent members in order to make the UN a more representative and effective 
organization. He also supports Held’s idea of dividing the General Assembly into 
two chambers – one in which states are represented and another in which world 
citizens are represented – but claims that the legislative function of such a “world 
parliament” must be restricted to “the interpretation and elaboration of the 
Charter.”20 In addition, Habermas defends the establishment of permanent 
                                                          
17  Cf. the 2004 report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. 
18  See Mertens 1996, p. 338 and Zolo 1999, p. 437. 
19  Habermas 2006, p. 136. 
20  Habermas 2008b, p. 449. 
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international courts where not only states, but also individuals, have legal 
standing. Beyond settling conflicts between states and conflicts between private 
actors and a state, the function of such courts is to prosecute individuals for 
criminal acts performed in the service of a state. Worthy of note, is Habermas’ 
suggestion that reforms, in addition to the strengthening of core institutions (i.e., 
the Security Council and the General Assembly), should aim at detaching these 
institutions from specialized UN organizations, such as FAO, IAEA, UNESCO, WHO, 
the World Bank, etc.21 This way, the world organization would become an 
institution whose tasks are considerably narrowed down compared to the 
contemporary UN. 
The main difference between a world organization reformed along these 
lines and a world republic is that the former lacks sovereign powers to define the 
reach of its own responsibilities. It is an organization for which “the enforcement 
of established law takes precedence over the constructive task of legislation and 
policy-making,”22 and can therefore be characterized as a supranational agent 
acting on delegated powers. 
Compared to Kant’s league of state, a reformed world organization has 
more extensive powers. It is supposed to serve as a supranational executive 
authority providing the international community with effective means to “enforce 
its rules and decisions,”23 although Habermas emphasizes that the states are to 
remain in control of the means of coercion. His model also extends the scope of 
responsibilities. Kant’s league is established for the sole purpose of dealing with 
conflicts between states, whereas the world organization is also supposed to 
protect basic human rights globally. Finally, the division of the General Assembly 
into two chambers would make the UN an organization that is not only for, but also 
of the two types of actors recognized as legal subjects by international law, namely 
states and individuals. 
 The feature distinguishing Habermas’ proposal most from both a league of 
states and a world republic is an institutional mid-level in between the 
supranational and the national levels. At this level, so-called “global players,” such 
as the US, China, India, Russia, and politically integrated “regional regimes” on the 
model of the EU, are envisaged as the central actors. Operating within a 
transnational negotiation system, such actors are supposed to work out binding 
                                                          
21  Habermas 2008a, p. 322. 
22  Habermas 2006, p. 174; also see p. 134. 
23  Ibid., p. 132. 
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compromises on important cross-border issues – particularly economic, ecological, 
and energy issues – that increasingly overstrain the capacities of nation states. 
These regional regimes are the main loci for democratic rule beyond traditional 
state communities, from whose perspective regional integration serve the purpose 
of creating political arenas where democratic processes can regain some of their 
autonomy vis-à-vis globalised economic forces. Within the transnational 
negotiation system, they serve the purpose of reducing the negotiating parties to a 
“manageable number” and of making these parties relatively equal in terms of 
negotiation power, so that fair compromises are conceivable.24 In addition, the 
delegation of cross-border issues to interregional negotiations is supposed to 
lighten the workload of the world organization, thus enabling it to deal more 
efficiently with global peace and human rights enforcement. 
 Habermas seems to have two main reasons for rejecting a world republic, 
and these explain why he thinks there is a need for his multi-level system instead 
of a world republic. 
(1) The first can be called the argument from civil solidarity. Habermas 
raises doubts concerning the possibility that a world republic could become 
democratic in any meaningful sense. In this connection, the decisive obstacle is 
said to be the lack of a thick global collective identity that can ground a sufficiently 
strong civic solidarity. Given its non-exclusiveness, a world republic would lack “a 
basis of legitimacy on structural grounds:” 
Any political community that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at 
least distinguish between members and non-members. … Even if such a 
community is grounded in the universalist principles of a democratic 
constitutional state, it still forms a collective identity, in the sense that it interprets 
and realizes these principles in light of its own history and in the context of its own 
particular form of life. This ethical-political self-understanding of citizens of a 
particular democratic life is missing in the inclusive community of world citizens.25 
Referring to this passage, Robert Fine and Will Smith suggest that Habermas is 
presenting an empirical argument in the guise of a conceptual argument. They 
object that even if knowledge about “actual democratic practices” gives us good 
reasons to doubt the feasibility of a global democratic state, it does not mean that 
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such a state is “conceptually impossible.”26 This judgment does not seem to do 
justice to Habermas’ actual claim, which concerns pragmatic presuppositions for 
democratic practice, and refers to a conflict between the idea of a world republic 
and the ethos of democratic citizenship – that is, the performative aspect of being a 
citizen (as opposed to “bourgeois”) concerned with the common good. When 
Habermas writes that it is the “concept” of self-determination that calls for the 
embedding of political practice in a particular community, he is not claiming that a 
democratic world republic is a contradiction in terms. At issue, rather, is the need 
for a common “we”-perspective that can motivate special obligations towards 
fellow citizens who nevertheless remain strangers and political adversaries. This 
becomes clear if one considers the discussion of civic versus cosmopolitan 
solidarity in the paragraphs that follow the above quote. 
The crucial issue is that an active “civic solidarity” in Habermas’ view must 
be rooted in a collective identity. Such civic solidarity is distinct from what he calls 
a negative, or reactive, “cosmopolitan solidarity” that unites humanity through 
common responses of indignation and outrage when confronted with grave 
violations of human rights and acts of aggression, as well as of sympathy for those 
who suffer due to natural and humanitarian disasters. On the basis of the latter, an 
all-inclusive world-organization could be empowered to pursue goals like human 
rights-protection and international peace and security. For the pursuit of political 
goals and projects beyond this, the social bonds among world citizens are too weak 
(Habermas specifically has redistribution policies in mind). Globally, a thicker 
context of common value orientations that enable citizens to see themselves as one 
community engaged in the joint practice of self-legislation is absent. Accordingly, 
the “institutionalization of procedures for creating, generalizing, and coordinating 
global interests cannot take place within the organizational structure of a world 
state.”27 In other words, the claim is not that the concept “cosmopolitan 
democracy” is self-contradictory in a formal-analytical sense. The claim is that a 
global democratic state should be able to, but in fact cannot, link up with the self-
understanding and motivations of world citizens. It would therefore fail to be a 
realization of the idea of a society of self-determining free and equal persons. 
 (2) A second line of argument pursued by Habermas can be called the 
asymmetry argument. This argument primarily aims at undermining the claim that 
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a world republic is conceptually necessary for establishing binding international 
law. It is developed against the background of an interpretation of Kant which 
differs from the one presented above, where Kant is seen as rejecting a world 
republic in favor of a league of states. In his later writings, Habermas takes Kant to 
mean that a world republic is in the end the only satisfactory solution to the 
problem of interstate violence, whereas the idea of a league is introduced as a 
“negative surrogate” due to the fear that a world republic might develop into a 
“soulless despotism.”28 Allegedly, Kant is led to this conclusion by his own analogy 
between the interpersonal state of nature and anarchic international relations. In 
view of the solution to the problem of overcoming the former condition, which is to 
establish a state, the establishment of a world republic is apparently the only way 
of overcoming the latter.29 
 Against this kind of reasoning Habermas objects that one should not 
overlook important differences between the interpersonal and the international 
levels when it comes to developing desirable legal institutions. This objection has 
two aspects. The first is that one must consider that states have established legal 
orders internally and therefore enjoy a normative status that must be taken into 
account when envisioning an institutional model for international law. One cannot 
simply superimpose the scheme known from domestic legal orders on the 
relationship between states. Nor can the rights of individuals be the sole reference 
point for an international legal order. In view of their role as guarantors of legally 
secured freedom among persons, state actors should be taken into account. 
Therefore, Habermas suggests that we understand the establishment of a just 
system of international law as complementary rather than as analogous to the 
establishment of just domestic legal systems.30 
                                                          
28  Habermas 2006, pp. 128-9. Habermas links this fear of “soulless despotism” to the risk of an 
unwanted social and cultural homogenization in the world republic. With Ingeborg Maus, I 
think it is more apt to say that Kant is concerned with the diminishing possibility of holding 
executive and judicial authorities accountable to democratically enacted law in large states. 
See Maus 2006, p. 472. 
29  Habermas is here influenced by McCarthy 2002, who is for his own part influenced by Byrd 
1995. I criticize McCarthy and Byrd’s interpretation in more detail in Mikalsen 2011, and I do 
not think Habermas’ subsequent counterargument succeeds if one understands it as a critique 
of Kant. This does not make the argument irrelevant, but it should rather be directed at those 
who consider a world republic to be an implication of Kant’s characterization of international 
relations as a state of nature. See, for instance, Höffe 2006, p. 193 and Lutz-Bachmann 1997. 
30  Habermas 2006, pp. 129-30 and Habermas 2008b, pp. 448-9. 
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 The second reason why one should think of international rule of law as 
complementary, and not similar, to domestic rule of law, is that promoting the rule 
of law in the two domains involves challenges that in certain respects are inverse 
and therefore call for different solutions. In this connection, Habermas draws a 
distinction between the concept of a “state” and the concept of a “constitution.” 
“State” is defined as “a complex of hierarchically organized capacities available for 
the exercise of political power or the implementation of political programs.” 
“Constitution” is defined as “a horizontal association of citizens … laying down the 
fundamental rights that free and equal founders mutually grant each other.”31 In 
view of these definitions, he points to the asymmetric relationship between state 
and constitution at the domestic and international levels. Domestically, the 
hierarchical state component comes first, so to speak. Here, promoting the rule of 
law implies “the reversal of the initial situation in which law serves as an 
instrument of power” into a situation where governmental power is subjected to 
democratically enacted law in “the fully established constitutional state.”32 
Internationally, one must think differently, because there is no parallel to an 
authoritarian state power which is to be legally tamed by means of the 
democratization of legislative power in this sphere: 
What is missing in classical international law is not an analogue of a constitution 
that founds an association of free and equal consociates under law, but rather a 
supranational power above competing states that would equip the international 
community with the executive and sanctioning powers required to implement and 
enforce its rules and decisions.33 
Seen in isolation this quote, with its reference to the lack of “executive and 
sanctioning powers,” might seem to imply that what is needed for establishing an 
international legal order is, after all, a world republic.34 But the point of stressing 
the priority of the horizontal relations between states is actually the opposite. 
First, Habermas tries to show that a legal constitution can be separated from a 
hierarchical state structure not only conceptually, but as a matter of fact as well. 
Although normatively deficient in many respects, not least due to its anarchical 
                                                          
31  Habermas 2006, p. 131. 
32  Ibid., p. 132. 
33  Ibid. 
34  And, as I argue in the next section, Habermas’ emphasis on the need for supranational 
sanctioning powers may also threaten the coherence of his proposal for a non-state 
institutional scheme for a legally integrated world society. 
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structure, the European order of states which emerged in the repercussions of the 
religious civil wars of the 17th century was not a lawless condition, but a 
rudimentary legal order that regulated international relations by certain rules of 
conduct. For this reason, Habermas speaks of the classical European order of states 
as a “proto-constitution” that “creates a legal community among parties with 
formally equal rights.”35 
Second, and more crucially, emphasizing the asymmetry between the 
domestic and the international cases is meant to show that the challenge of binding 
state power by law externally is essentially different from the challenge of binding 
state power by law internally, and subsequently that the former calls for a different 
solution than the latter. Again, the point is that one must take states into account 
when conceptualizing an institutional order for the international rule of law: 
“Where it is not a matter of constraining authoritarian state power but of creating 
political decision-making capabilities, those subjects who already control the 
legitimate means of violence and can make them available to a politically 
constituted international community are indispensable.”36 
 
 
4. Kant versus Habermas 
The considerations put forward in the previous section support the view that a 
world republic is not the right answer to the question of how a system of 
international law should be institutionalized. On the other hand, Habermas’ 
critique of a league of states is less convincing. With regard to his three objections 
presented in section 2.2, I think only the third can create a need for institutional 
structures that go beyond the league, whereas there are cogent responses to the 
two former objections. Furthermore, Habermas’ own proposal faces problems 
related to his attempt at going beyond Kant’s model. While this seems to pull in the 
direction of the less ambitious league, it does not necessarily mean that we should 
reject all the aspects of his multi-level model. In what follows, I first assess 
Habermas’ critique of the league of states. Then I discuss two problems related to 
the supranational aspect of his model. On the basis of the preceding discussions, I 
suggest a way in which elements from both Kant and Habermas’ proposals can be 
combined. 
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4.1 An assessment of Habermas’ critique of a league of states 
Although something can be said in favor of certain aspects of Habermas’ critique of 
Kant’s league of states, it also fails in important respects. 
(1) The objection from voluntariness: Habermas does not sufficiently explain 
why an international legal order has to resemble the internal legal order of states. 
By pursuing this line of criticism, he seems to come close to the proponents of a 
world republic. But Habermas is, after all, no proponent of such a model. Already in 
his 1995 article “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace,” Habermas expresses some 
reservations with regard to Held’s proposal for UN reform along the lines of a state 
constitution.37 In later writings, the rejection of a world republic is more explicit. 
Here, he claims that transformations of international law must proceed through 
“voluntary restrictions on sovereignty.”38 He also argues that a reformed UN 
empowered to make authoritative decisions regarding issues of collective security 
and human rights protection can leave the control of the means of violence to its 
member states: “The individual states retain their monopoly on force, although as 
members of the United Nations they formally cede the right to decide on when 
military force should be used to the Security Council (except in the case of justified 
self-defense).”39 But if this is true, why cannot Kant’s voluntary league count as a 
legal arrangement? There is a clear similarity between the two schemes when it 
comes to the voluntary cooperation of member states. If this aspect is consistent 
with one of them being a legal order, there is no obvious reason why it is not 
consistent in the other case. Conversely, if Habermas’ criticism of the league’s 
voluntariness is sound, it also seems detrimental to his own position.40 
 Moreover, there are at least two good reasons why membership in a league 
of states must be voluntary. First of all, states cannot, as can individuals, have an 
enforceable duty to enter a civil condition, even if they do wrong in the highest 
degree by remaining in the state of nature.41 If states had such a duty, then every 
                                                          
37  Habermas 1998, p. 188. 
38  Habermas 2006, p. 133. 
39  Habermas 2008a, p. 320. 
40  For a criticism of Habermas which parallels Habermas’ criticism of Kant, see Scheuerman 
2008b, pp. 141-3. 
41  Considerations of space do not allow me to explain in any detail why this is the case with 
regard to individuals. Suffice it to say here that Kant considers remaining in the state of nature 
as incompatible with each person’s right to freedom, and, consequently, that forcing those 
unwilling to leave this state can be justified as a hindrance of a hindrance to freedom. For good 
analyses of this point, see Ripstein 2009 and Varden 2008a. 
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state that had the capacity would, in the final resort, have a right to wage war 
against states that refused to do so voluntarily. But such a right is in conflict with 
the purpose of forming the league of states, namely that of enabling just and 
peaceful interstate relations. Furthermore, it is at odds with the primary duty of 
individuals to enter civil society, since to wage war is to put the entire public order 
at risk.42 
 Secondly, the right to leave at will is equally well-founded and coherent 
with the purpose of founding a league of states. The basic idea underlying this right 
is that states must be allowed to remain neutral when other people are fighting 
each other. Designating the avoidance of war as the fundamental aim of the league, 
Kant recognizes a right on the part of states to step back in order to not become 
entangled in violent conflicts between or within other states. Therefore, he writes 
that the league “can be renounced at any time and so must be renewed from time 
to time.”43 This claim squares well with the general restriction of the sphere of 
right to the external relations between interacting parties.44 Wrongdoing consists 
in hindering anyone’s free choice in accordance with universal laws, but there is no 
wrongdoing involved if a state that is not already party in an ongoing conflict 
refuses to become such a party.45 
 (2) The objection from sovereignty: The main problem with this objection, is 
that it is based on a conception of cosmopolitan right fundamentally different from 
Kant’s. Kant presents cosmopolitan right as a third dimension of public right 
complementing two other dimensions: the right of a state and the right of nations. 
As such, it does not compete with the other two dimensions. The three dimensions 
of right address different kinds of relations – all of which have to be legally 
regulated in order to enable an enduring peace in accordance with universal laws 
of freedom. The right of a state is concerned with the horizontal relations between 
fellow citizens and the vertical relations between each state and its citizens. With 
regard to these relations, the republican constitution is the normative ideal which 
should be continually approximated. The right of nations is concerned with 
external relations between states, and seeks the avoidance of war by means of a 
league of states. Cosmopolitan right is concerned with relations between states and 
strangers, be they citizens of another state or members of non-state peoples. 
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Interaction in this dimension should be constrained by the “conditions of universal 
hospitality”46 – that is, the right of foreigners to visit the land of other peoples 
without being treated with hostility, and the right on the part of those being visited 
to turn visitors away as long as it is not tantamount to their destruction. 
 By contrast, Habermas understands cosmopolitan right as superior law that 
takes priority in cases of conflict with the right of a state (i.e., domestic law) and 
that includes every person in a legal community of free and equal world citizens. 
Accordingly, cosmopolitan right is said to imply a global hierarchy of law where 
the rights and duties ascribed to persons qua world citizens trump the rights and 
duties ascribed to persons qua state citizens: “The point of cosmopolitan law is … 
that it bypasses the collective subjects of international law and directly establishes 
the legal status of the individual subjects by granting them unmediated 
membership in the association of free and equal citizens.”47 And since the relation 
between cosmopolitan norms and state-sanctioned norms are conceived in such a 
hierarchical fashion it appears inconsistent to insist on the inviolability of state 
sovereignty, especially in view of the possible abuse of states’ coercive powers 
internally. 
 From Kant’s perspective, however, there is no obvious conflict or tension 
between the sovereign rights of a state and cosmopolitan right. Being an aspect of 
public right concerned with the rights and duties relevant for interaction between 
states and strangers, cosmopolitan right is a transnational kind of right that 
presupposes the independency of the former kind of actors. Only if one conceives 
of cosmopolitan right as establishing a global hierarchy of legal norms does there 
seem to arise a possible conflict between insisting on inviolable state sovereignty 
and granting legal standing to every person irrespective of particular state 
citizenship, but even then it is not obvious that Kant’s league of states is a 
contradictory construction. As Habermas points out elsewhere, a transformation of 
existing states into constitutional democracies combined with a universal right to 
citizenship is an imaginable model, however distant such a condition may seem 
today.48 But in granting this, his critique of Kant’s defense of state sovereignty 
becomes all the more puzzling. 
 The defense of state sovereignty is also consistent with each person’s innate 
right to freedom. In Kant’s view, the internal hierarchical organization of the 
                                                          
46  Kant 1996d [1795], 8:357. 
47  Habermas 1998, p. 181. 
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republic, where the executive authority is subjected to the legislative will of the 
people, is the primary guarantee for this right. To insist on the principle of non-
intervention and the territorial integrity of states is in this perspective merely to 
confirm the state’s role as such a guarantee. First and foremost, the defense of state 
sovereignty implies that the internal political processes of states ought to be 
protected from interference by foreign powers. 
Such protection is not limited to the democratic processes of republican 
states. Despite unfair and repressive practices, the sovereignty of non-republican 
or despotic states is also to be acknowledged. By establishing a public order that 
perhaps only minimally accords with right or justice, the factual constitution of 
even an absolutist regime is a presupposition for autonomous learning-processes 
aimed at a condition where those subjected to coercive laws can understand 
themselves as authors of the same laws.49 For this reason, Kant writes that “some 
[legal] constitution or other, even if it is only to a small degree in conformity with 
right, is better than none at all.”50 Although the only just state is the republican 
state,51 one is still obliged to respect the integrity of non-republican states insofar 
as the actual legal order is a necessary precondition for internal reform towards a 
republican constitution. 
 At the same time, this may not be a sufficient response to Habermas’ main 
worry with regard to the norm of non-intervention – the worry that a prohibition 
against interference in a state’s internal affairs can serve as a protective shield 
behind which massive violations of human rights, such as genocide or ethnic 
cleansing, can take place. When state authorities either cause or fail to prevent the 
systematic murder of people on grounds of nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion, 
the rationale for the principle of non-intervention presented above does not seem 
adequate. In such cases, we are not dealing with imperfect public orders, but with 
unilateral employment of organized force by one group against another. Here, an 
appeal to the possible evolution towards a republican constitution by means of 
internal processes of self-enlightenment does not suffice for grounding an 
obligation on the part of foreign powers not to interfere, simply because a 
minimally functioning public order is not in place. Having said that, Habermas’ 
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attempt at recasting military intervention as law enforcement on the model of 
police action against criminals52 is still problematic. Equally problematic is his 
corollary claim that “the international community” has a “legal obligation to 
protect human rights worldwide.”53 I will discuss these issues more closely in the 
next subsection. 
 (3) The objection from globalization: This is, as mentioned, the weightiest 
objection against a league of states. It should, however, be noted that the increase 
of border-crossing transactions of various sorts points beyond the league of states 
first and foremost to the extent that the interdependencies and shared risks of the 
contemporary world community have an impact on the internal political order of 
states. I do not question that many urgent challenges are today transnational in 
nature, or that independent states by their own have limited capacities to protect 
the lives and well-being of their citizens. What should still be kept in mind is that 
Kant’s theory of right – with its inclusion of cosmopolitan right – actually takes the 
phenomenon of private actors moving from one jurisdiction to another into 
account as a special kind of interaction that requires legal regulation. It is in other 
words designed for dealing with transnational flows.54 Moreover, one should not 
overlook that Kant’s theory is primarily concerned with a priori conditions for 
rightful interaction, and not with questions pertaining to what are the most 
effective means for solving this or that problem. The idea of a league of states 
outlines an institutional framework without which states cannot possibly resolve 
conflicts of judgment in a rightful or just way. Insofar as this model signifies what 
we cannot possibly do without if there is to be such a thing as justice among 
nations, it is not clear in what sense it is challenged by the phenomena referred to 
by the term “globalization.” A wider range of shared risks seems to lead beyond the 
league with regard to the scope of issues that require international regulation, but 
such an extension of issues that states must address collectively does not 
necessarily require more than an intergovernmental mode of cooperation. 
 But if the scope of shared risks and challenges does not by itself put Kant’s 
league in question, what is more crucial is the way in which increased 
interdependencies appear to restrict the capacity of state authorities to regulate 
and intervene in the society delimited by their own territories. If the claim that 
globalization leads to such a loss of control on the part of national politics is sound, 
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it gains normative significance in view of the conceptual link between legitimate 
law and the modern idea of popular sovereignty found in both Kant55 and 
Habermas.56 According to this idea, legitimate law ultimately derives from the 
common will of the subjects of law. So far, democracy in this modern sense of 
identity of those who make and those who are bound by positively enacted law has 
been most closely approximated in the organizational body of territorially bound 
nation states. 
The adequacy of tying democratic self-legislation exclusively to the nation 
state presupposes that the comprehensive jurisdiction over a certain territory 
formally enjoyed by national political authorities is complemented by the actual 
capacity of such authorities to make efficient interventions in the society 
demarcated by the borders of this territory. Unless there is some degree of 
correspondence between formal authority and de facto capacity to regulate and 
intervene, those who in fact make the relevant decisions for a society will be 
beyond democratic control. Therefore, insofar as the “material” autonomy of 
formally sovereign states is put under pressure because of an increased density of 
transactions across borders, political integration above and beyond traditional 
nation states may be a sensible strategy for enabling democratic rule of law under 
present conditions. To be sure, a complex web of transnational organizations has 
already emerged, but these are problematic in view of central democratic 
principles.57 
 
4.2 Two problems with the supranational aspect of Habermas’ multi-level model 
One of the ways in which Habermas goes beyond Kant is in proposing that the UN 
should serve as a supranational agency providing “the international community 
with executive and sanctioning powers.”58 On this view, promoting a normatively 
desirable system of international law implies a “transformation of military force 
into a global police force” that is to enforce the prohibition against aggressive war 
and protect the basic rights of world citizens.59 There are at least two problems 
with this aspect of Habermas’ multi-level model. I call them the problem of 
asymmetry between states and the problem of the right to command world citizens. 
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122 
 
 The problem of asymmetry between states is related to the institutional gap 
between the power to make binding decisions at the supranational level and the 
actual control with the coercive means in Habermas’ model. In view of the fact that 
states have unequal resources of power, such an institutional gap implies a 
problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. 
 This problem has also been addressed by William Scheuerman, although in 
a somewhat unsatisfactory way. According to Scheuerman, there is a discrepancy 
between Habermas’ concern for more effective and non-arbitrary implementation 
of Security Council resolutions and his rejection of a world republic with coercive 
power. With regard to the dependency of even a reformed and strengthened UN on 
the power resources of its member states, Scheuerman writes: “Generality and 
consistency in law presuppose some capacity to enforce legal norms without 
undue dependence on those against whom they may need to be enforced. If 
individual nation-states … remain “final arbiters” on a global stage plagued by deep 
military inequalities … it seems improbable that such dependence could be easily 
reduced or made fair and calculable.”60  
 While this points to a true problem in Habermas’ multi-level model, I do not 
think Scheuerman really succeeds in showing why there is in fact a problem here. 
Central to his critique is the claim that Habermas, in making the UN rely on 
member states’ coercive powers for the implementation of its decisions, plays 
down the degree to which great powers tend to hold on to their advantages of 
power. In Scheuerman’s view, it is not realistic to assume that the UN can do 
without centralized power resources if its decisions are to be implemented in a 
consistent and non-arbitrary way, because the power interest of states is a too 
persistent structuring element in international relations. 
Contrary to Scheuerman, I do not think that pointing to such an obstinate 
power-oriented self-conception on the part of state actors counts for much in this 
context. Against such claims, Habermas can, and does, respond that even if we 
today experience glaring discrepancies between ideals and realities we do not 
need to assume that it always has to be this way. On Habermas’ view, state actors 
are capable of moral learning through collective coping with common problems 
within an increasingly complex web of international, transnational and 
supranational institutions. Accordingly, cooperative adaptation to growing 
interdependencies can transform the normative self-understanding of states and 
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gradually make them internalize norms and legal regulations that are at first only 
accepted nominally.61 Unless one is committed to the view that state actors are 
essentially narrow minded egoistic agents involved in a strategic game for power, 
it is therefore not enough to appeal to present political realities in order to 
undermine the idea of a multi-level world order as a conceptually coherent project 
– that is, as a vision which can be gradually approached and realized in the future. 
But if an argument that relies on the assumption of states being egoists 
exclusively pursuing goals perceived as being in their own self-interest fails, it 
should also be added that such an argument is superfluous. This is so because 
Habermas’ proposal is inconsistent with the rule of law idea that all are equal 
before the law on structural grounds alone. Insofar as the project of promoting a 
desirable system of international law is linked to the establishment of a global 
police force that is empowered to non-arbitrarily enforce and implement the 
norms of the international community, there seems to be no way in which this 
could succeed unless such a police force is made institutionally independent of 
state actors. In relying on the coercive power of states for the purpose of law 
enforcement the states are allowed to decide whether authoritative decisions 
made by the world organization are to be coercively implemented. In practice, this 
means that enforcement always depends on the benevolence of great powers or 
strong alliances of states, which further means that enforcement is only possible 
vis-à-vis less powerful states, whereas great powers that wage aggressive war or 
violate human rights can always get away with it. There is, in other words, no need 
to invoke power interests or partiality in order to see why this scheme cannot 
work, because selectivity and arbitrariness is unavoidable in view of its inherent 
asymmetric structure: punishment for the weak and impunity for the strong. 
Although there is a real problem in Habermas’ construction, it does not 
necessarily pull in the direction of global “state-like organizations” or “core 
elements of global government,” as Scheuerman claims.62 Alternatively, it can be 
seen as raising the question of whether the real challenge of overcoming the 
international state of nature is to establish a supranational executive authority. 
The conceptual and normative quandary arising in connection with the idea of an 
executive that depends on the voluntary cooperation of those who potentially have 
to be forced to comply can be avoided simply by dropping this ambition. Instead, a 
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supranational public authority, such as the UN, would serve the function of a 
judicial power that can judge in an impartial way whenever states raise opposing 
claims, or when private parties have complaints against their own government. To 
the extent that states internalize the legal norms of a world community consisting 
of equally sovereign states and world citizens, one could rely on their voluntary 
adoption of whatever verdict such a supranational authority reaches. Conceived in 
this way, the role of the supranational authority is similar to Kant’s league of 
states, although there is still a difference insofar as the power of the latter is 
restricted to disputes that are international in the strict sense of being a dispute 
between two or more states. 
The problem of the right to command world citizens is related to Habermas’ 
hierarchical understanding of cosmopolitan right. Recall that on Habermas’ view, 
the central idea of cosmopolitan right is to establish a global hierarchy of law 
where world citizens are ascribed legal rights and duties that trump the rights and 
duties ascribed to them in their role as state citizens. An important consequence of 
such a right is that any person can be held responsible and convicted for crimes 
committed in the service of a state. Another implication is that individuals have 
legal standing and can bring a case against their own state before international 
courts. The aspect of this understanding of cosmopolitan right which is particularly 
problematic is Habermas’ further claim that the international community is legally 
obliged to intervene, if necessary with military means, in cases of egregious human 
rights violation.63 The problem is that it does not appear that anyone can be so 
obliged. 
Even if there may be cases where overriding the principle of non-
intervention is permissible, it is questionable whether any person can be rightfully 
obliged to risk his or her life for the sake of saving the lives of people living in other 
states. One can argue that this is an implication of the rationale for establishing 
public coercive institutions (i.e., states). In line with Kant, I see this rationale as 
enabling persons to pursue ends of their own choice in a way compatible with 
every other person’s equal right to do the same. In this perspective, a state does 
have the right to impose obligations on its citizens for the purpose of perpetuating 
its existence as a public order. It does not, however, have the right to make use of 
citizens for purposes beyond this, such as requiring them to fight wars within or 
against other states as long as their own state is not directly threatened. Otherwise, 
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the state would be entitled to use its citizens as mere means, which is a violation of 
their innate right to freedom. As Kant puts it, “citizens … must always be regarded 
as co-legislating members of a state (not merely as means, but also as ends in 
themselves), and must therefore give their free assent … not only to waging war in 
general but also to each particular declaration of war. Only under this limiting 
condition can a state direct them to serve in a way full of danger to them.”64 If one 
accepts this claim with regard to the rights of state authorities, it also seems to 
hold with respect to any supranational authority. So even if only a supranational 
public authority can make authoritative decisions concerning the permissibility of 
military humanitarian interventions, it cannot have the right to command citizens 
of sovereign states to be part of such interventions. 
But if no one can be rightfully commanded to execute the decisions of a 
supranational authority, it seems to follow that the international community 
cannot be legally obliged to act collectively as a global police force on behalf of 
those whose rights are violated in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing. That 
does not mean that one should in no case feel morally compelled to intervene. Yet 
insofar as the right to decide whether to execute the rulings of a global 
supranational authority in the final resort always lies with the citizens of a 
particular state, whatever they are doing when intervening in order to stop 
ongoing atrocities it is not a fulfillment of a legal obligation triggered by egregious 
human rights violations. Provided the intervening states are willing to take the 
necessary risks, it can at best be described as an act of solidarity with those who 
suffer from the abuse of collectively organized use of force. For this reason, it is 
also misleading to conceptualize military humanitarian intervention as 
enforcement of the legal rights of world citizens by a global police force.65 It should 
rather be seen as an emergency measure that can be permitted, but never imposed, 
when there is a breakdown of a state-sanctioned public order somewhere in the 
world. 
 
4.3 A hybrid model 
The critique presented in the preceding subsections seems to support a system of 
international law such as Kant’s league of states. If the critique is sound, it implies 
that Habermas’ focus on the establishment of supranational executive powers is 
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65  For a similar view premised on somewhat different considerations, see Maus 1998, p. 112. 
126 
 
problematic and that a supranational authority vested with judicial power is most 
important with regard to the institutionalization of a just international legal order. 
However, it does not follow from the preceding discussion that a league of states 
cannot be further developed or that it is superior to Habermas’ multi-level model 
in every respect. Insofar as Kant’s model merely outlines necessary institutional 
preconditions for just resolution of international conflicts, it is compatible with 
more comprehensive forms of institutionalized cooperation between states. In 
view of our historical situation, such cooperation also seems to be essential for 
states to cope adequately with present challenges. For this reason, I believe a 
cogent case can be made for a hybrid model combining elements from both Kant 
and Habermas. 
 The most important lesson to draw from Kant is that the public authority 
necessary for just interaction between states should not establish coercive power 
over its member states. Its primary function should be to adjudicate international 
conflicts. Such an intergovernmental organization can be supplemented with a 
permanent system of international courts that also recognizes individuals as 
having legal standing. The latter is important for at least two reasons. First, it 
provides tribunals that can prosecute individuals for international crimes, such as 
crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, or war crimes. Second, it provides 
tribunals that can adjudicate conflicts between states and private parties, for 
instance with regard to human rights issues or issues of international trade. 
 In addition to the establishment of such a supranational adjudication 
system, there can be good reasons for welcoming the kind of regional political 
integration that is today taking place not only in Europe, but in many other parts of 
the world as well. To the extent that the world has changed in ways that make 
coping with actual problems no longer possible on a purely intergovernmental 
basis, the emergence of regional political and legal bodies could be crucial for 
facilitating an intermediary transnational institutional structure complementing 
the world organization in the way Habermas envisages. Such bodies may help state 
actors regain and preserve some of their action capacities, and thus enable 
democratic control with those who have decisive decision-making power with 
regard to what rules govern interaction within societies. They can enable fairer 
terms of negotiation on political issues that are transnational in character. Finally, 
if the many challenges related to increased transnational interdependency can be 
worked out on this mid-level between regional bodies, the world organization can 
specialize and deal more adequately with peace and human rights issues. 
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5. Summary 
In this article, I have presented and criticized Habermas’ reformulation of Kant’s 
project “Toward Perpetual Peace.” I have argued that Habermas critique of a 
league of states fails in important respects and that his own multi-level model faces 
problems related to his attempt at going beyond Kant’s model. While Habermas, 
like Kant, proposes an institutional model that is complementary rather than 
analogous to the internal legal orders of states, it is in a sense still too similar to a 
world republic. First, his defense of a transformation of the UN into a supranational 
executive authority relying on the coercive powers of member states seems to 
imply a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. 
Second, we can turn at least one of Habermas’ critiques of the league against his 
own proposal. Insofar as it is intertwined with the recasting of military 
humanitarian intervention into global police operations, his hierarchical 
understanding of cosmopolitan right is in conflict with the idea of an international 
legal order ultimately founded on an innate right to freedom “belonging to every 
man in virtue of his humanity.”66 
 It does not follow from this criticism that all aspects of Habermas’ multi-
level model should be rejected. The most important implication is that we should 
be concerned about establishing institutions with judicial, and not executive, 
powers in the international domain. This is compatible with a hybrid model that 
integrates elements from both Kant and Habermas and that may be preferable in 
view of our historical situation.67 
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